On 03 May 2013, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote:

Never argue with a logician! I try to insert some re-remarks into '&'-induced lines below JohnOn Fri, May 3, 2013 at 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 02 May 2013, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote:Bruno asked: "are you OK with this?" - NO, I am not OK: as I follow, 0 is NOT a number, it does not change a number.0 * 1000 = 0. & read in English: 'zero times thousand is zero, - which is&-funny: it is not additional/subtractional only states that if I&take the '1000' NOT AT ALL I get nothing. You are right: I &haveno problem with 0.00089, 0s as "position markers" for &the order ofmagnitude of the 89. I have problems if (some &of the) 0-s are NOTzeros, like 0.20489: to use NUMBERS &as position-markers (the dirtytrick of a decimal point -<G>)Well, I have to say you are the first to refuse to 0 the numberstatus, with the notable exception of the greeks, but they did notreally discovered it.I am sure you have no problem with expression like "theconcentration of this product is 0.00089 cc". It uses the number 0,which is very useful in the decimal or base notation of the naturaland real, and complex numbers.But how do you " A D D " a number to another one if it is notidentified as a quantity?"quantity" is already part of some interpretation, but you can useit, it is very well.&so you do not IDENTIFY, you just INTERPRET? (and do &so'practically')

`Yes, and if we are cautious enough, the reasoning and the conclusion`

`will not depend on the interpretation. It is not well known, but this`

`has made clear by Gödel, Henkin in the frame of the first order`

`predicate logic.`

Can you add an electric train to the taste of a lolly-pop?No, but those are not numbers.&How would you know, if you do not know what NUMBERS &are? So far(my) 'Ding an Sich' can be anything.

`We might not know what numbers are, and be pretty sure what they are`

`not.`

You speak about 'axioms' (- in my words they are inventions toprove a theory's applicability.)They are just hypotheses that we accept at the start for doing thereasoning. Nobody ever says that an axiom is true, except in somephilosophical context.&does that mean that 'an axiom is untrue'? if it is 'not true',&why should I accept the hypothesis based on it? Maria said &I lacka proposal substituting the accepted reasoning. &Pardon me, I am notsmarter than those zillion wise men&who so far used 'numbers' - yet I have the right to question.

`We don't know if the hypotheses are true. That does not entail that an`

`hypothesis is untrue. It means that we are agnostic. This should not`

`prevent us to reason as IF they are true, in case the theory`

`(hypotheses) shed light on some subject.`

So no reversing please: proving the theory by axioms.We never do that. We always prove FROM axioms, and we always knowthat "proving" does not entail truth or knowledge. Only pseudo-scientists believe that we can prove things about some reality.&I am not for 'proving', do not accept 'reality' and 'truth'. I am&just a simpleminded agnostic who asks questions.

`And I am a simple minded agnostic who try to answer them. The point is`

`that proving does not mean at all "making true". Proving just shows a`

`shatable path (for good willing people readu to do some work) between`

`hypothesis and consequences. It does not mean that the hypotheses, nor`

`the consequences, are true.`

May I repeat the main question: is YOUR number a quantity?Natural number have both. A quantity aspect, and an ordinalityaspects, like in the first, the second, the third, etc.so you can add (two = II to three = III and get five = IIIII) ??That's correct.&Now I really do not get it. You marked the quantity-aspect &by pegs- au lieu de anything better.

? you did.

So WHAT is that & NUMBER TWO marked by 'II'? Do you COUNT them? &(what?)

`In the theory I gave, two is the successor of one, and one is the`

`successor of zero, and zero is that unique number which is such that`

`when added to some number, it gives that number.`

If THAT is your axiom then numbers are quantity specifiers.You can see it that way, but we don't need to agree on this, as longas you agree with the axioms given. Agreeing in science does notmean that we believe those axioms to be true, but that we canunderstand them and use it to develop some other theories.Now 2+3 = 5 was not an axiom, but it can be derived from them easily.&As an agnostic I cannot "agree in science" or it's axiomatic &basesjust to submerge into a conventional belief system,&which includes the interlaced assumption-conclusion mass &we call'science'. Numbers, or not.

`Science is agnostic. (well, before Nobel Prize and before pension, and`

`out of the coffee room, actually). When science is not agnostic it is`

`pseudo-religion or pseudo-science.`

We may AGREE on that, but then numbers are indeed the products ofhuman thinking applied as humans think. Q E DIn which theory? &Maybe in the overall 'belief' that we can understand the &world.

`That needs an act of faith in some world, and some act of faith in our`

`own capacity to understand.`

I do not assume the humans as primitive, I try to explain them inthe theory which assumes that human can be Turing emulated. Theresult is that the physical laws evolve from the relation betweennumbers, and this in a testable way. the advantage is that we get anexplanation (perhaps wrong, of course) of why we have consciousnessand qualia.&Please do not forget all those knowables we may acquire &later on

`That's why we build hypotheses, and are open to change them in case`

`new informations refute them, or make them doubtful.`

- they may change the 'physical Law' of yesterday

`I have never buy them. The physical is just an appearance of reality,`

`not reality. provably so in the mechanist theory of mind.`

&even the "Turing emulation" of the 'HUMAN'.

`The result is that IF human are Turing emulable, then Aristotelian`

`physics is no more defensible.`

Which raises &again the question how reliable the "numbers" may be.(If &we agree in their identification).

`Never identify. Just agree on some axioms, and reason from them. Or`

`propose other axioms.`

Bruno: "...That's very good, but we can also develop generalstatement. We would not have discover the universal number (thecomputers) without agreeing on those principles."That's a practicality and very fortunate.It is also a conceptual very deep discovery. Before it,mathematicians thought that no epistemiological concept (likecomputability) could have a universal nature. They believe we coulduse Cantor's diagonalization to refute all prtendion to universalityin math, but computability seems to be an exception (cf the ChurchTuring thesis).Does not enlighten the problem of what 'numbers' may be, if notquantifiers.The problem is what mind and matter are. The numbers are tools thatwe use, and we don't even try to explain them, if only because wecan already explain (in the comp theory) why it is impossible tounderstand what they are from anything simpler than them.&My common sense feeling bows before that. &I would leave out mind, matter, consciousness

Well, that is what I am working on.

and accept &the numbers as (simplest) tools in a certain aspect.

Good.

Unless &you want to include the 'computation' term for non-mathi.e. &analogue or else not even thought of) topics (logical?) when&I may see trouble again. Complexity of the world is beyond &ourcapabilities (infinite?) to comprehend.

`That is why I favor clear hypothetical deductive approaches. We can`

`learn by being refuted, and suggest new theories.`

Bruno

&- John BrunO :)JOhnOn Thu, May 2, 2013 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 01 May 2013, at 22:09, John Mikes wrote:Bruno asked why I have problems how to figure out 'numbers'.In his texts (as I remember and I have no quotes at hand) the"world" can be construed from a large enough amount of numbers insimple arithmetical ways (addition-subtraction). Also: numbers donot mean quantities.If his older post with pegs (II=two, IIII=four etc.) is OK, the'words' two and four DO mean quantities. If not, as 'numbers' theyare meaningless combinations of letters (sounds?) we could callthe series any way, as well as e.g.:tylba, chuggon, rpais, etc. for 1,2,3 - or take them from anyother language (eins,zwei,drei, - egy, kettő, három) as theydeveloped in diverse domains/lifestyles. The 'numbers' would belike "Ding an Sich" (German) however used as qualifiers forquantities if so applied (see Bruno's 'pegs' above).The terms we are using are not important. All we need is someagreement on some theory.Most things we need for the natural numbers can be derived from thefollowing axioms (written in english):any number added to zero gives the number we started with (= x + 0= x)0 is not the successor of any natural number if two numbers are different, then they have different successorsa number x added to a successor of a number y gives a successor ofthe sum of x and y.Are you OK with this?In science we know that we cannot define what we are talking about,but we can agree on some principles about them.Bruno: "...We would not have discover(ed) the universal number (thecomputers) without agreeing on those principles."To have discovered the 'universal number'(?) (i.e. computers) is fine but that does not imply understanding on numbers: like "numbers are such as to be applicable for..." etc. My agnosticism needs more than that. Sorry.More reasonably sounds the idea of my wife, Maria, who assigns theprimitive development of quantities originally to proportions:"larger (amount)" - "smaller (amount)" evolving in some thousandcenturies into the process of 'counting' the included units.That's very good, but we can also develop general statement. Wewould not have discover the universal number (the computers)without agreeing on those principles.I published on this list my thought for developing the Romannumbering signs. I started with 2 - a PAIR of hands etc. (not withone, which means only the existence) and branching into 5 (asfingers, as in pentaton music) already as 'many'.OK.I still have no idea what description could fit 'number' inBruno's usage (I did not study number - theory - to keep mycommon sense (agnostic?) thinking free).See above. Bruno JohnJohn Mikes --http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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