On 04 May 2013, at 14:52, Roger Clough wrote:


1. The two realms of existence in idealistic metaphysics.

As Descartes proposed, there are two categories of existence, One is purely mental, that is to say, thoughts or ideas, Plato's forms. These are not extended in space. They include mathematical or logical propositions, some being necessary propositions and
others contingent propositions.

There is already a big difference between mathematical, and mental.





The other category is that of physical substances, which are
extended in spacetime. In spacetime they are physical, but since L's metaphysics is that of idealism, they can also be represented at the same time mentally as "monads". The physical forms can only be perceived by us mortals from a single viewpoint,
That is to say phenomenally. At the same time, they are not illusions,
you can still perform physical experiments on them and stub your toe.

So the physical exists but it might be a stable, and explainable "illusion". Mechanism explains it as a stable higher level modality.





2. The inextended mental realm.

There are two mental realms, corresponding to the two types of propositions.
One is the timeless or eternal, Platonic realm of necessary
truths, such as 1+1=2, propositions which are always true or false.

OK.




The other realm is the realm of contingent truths, such as
the proposition "today is tuesday" or "it is raining today".
These are only sometimes true. These propositions can I thijnk be mathematical, or they can refer the world of time and place, spacetime, but are all still mental.


Those are the internal indexical. With comp and computer science they are given too by high level self-referencial modalities, that you can define in arithmetic (or any Löbian theory).

Bruno



References


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism


You might want to purchase an inexpensive readable paperback,

http://www.amazon.com/LEIBNIZ-PELICAN-RUTH-LYDIA-SHAW/dp/B0000CIXXY/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1367321579&sr=1-5


Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/4/2013
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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