On Monday, May 13, 2013 2:49:32 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 May 2013, at 08:07, Pierz wrote:
>
> I've long been interested in the very different realities which the left 
> and right brain hemispheres perceive. I recently read a fascinating account 
> of the 'pure' right brain perspective in Jill Bolte Taylor's book "My 
> Stroke of Insight". Bolte Taylor is a neuroanatomist who suffered a 
> catastrophic stroke in her early thirties due to a undiagnosed AVN. The 
> stroke wiped out her left brain's functioning almost completely - she lost 
> the capacity for language production and comprehension, mathematical 
> reasoning, and a host of other functions to boot. What was left, she 
> discovered, was a blissful sense of one-ness with the world around her and 
> the cosmos as a whole. She felt herself as a fluid rather than a solid. 
> Despite the loss of may perceptual functions, such as the ability to 
> perceive visual edges, she was still highly attuned to "energy" - energy in 
> the rather New Age sense of the qualities that pervade a space or emanate 
> from a person. She was instantly able to perceive the emotion and attitude 
> that a person brought with them when they visited her, despite being unable 
> to understand a word of what they said or even distinguish their physical 
> features. In this left-impaired state she lived in an eternal present, 
> unable to connect past and future with the current moment. Even after long 
> and arduous rehabilitation of her left brain functions, which were 
> eventually restored almost completely to pre-stroke levels, Bolte Taylor 
> insists that she gained vital insights into the nature of the left and 
> right brain through this experience, insights that very much support 
> Eastern teachings about mindfulness and switching off the analytical mind. 
> According to her experience, it seems to be the left brain mode that 
> interferes with our native capacity for joy, but that a state of bliss is 
> always just a "step to the right" away, if we can still the left brain's 
> interference.
>
>
> Interesting. It supports also Theatetus' knowledge theory, I could argue. 
> It is the difference between Bp and Bp & p. It works thanks to 
> incompleteness.
>

Because not everything knowable is provably so, I take it.
 

> Reading this account I was reminded of an idea I used to entertain. We 
> know that the world we perceive is in a sense a product of the brain. The 
> reality we see is just the spectrum of reality our brains allow us or are 
> attuned to perceive. This extends even to something as basic as time. 
> Nothing in physics defines a moment "now" or an idea of progression. Rather 
> it seems to be a by-product of the way the brain processes. My wondering 
> was this: what if the scientific conception we have of reality is a product 
> not of the whole brain, but specifically of the left brain?
>
>
> Yes. Type Bp. That's science.
>
>
>
>
> In one sense, this is definitely the case: our scientific theories were 
> developed by the left brain and reflect a left brain mode of perceiving the 
> world. But what if this is true in a deeper sense? What if the scientific 
> way of seeing the world is a product of a one-eyed mode of perception? What 
> if reality has two hemispheres so to speak? A qualitative and a 
> quantitative aspect? 
>
>
> Aritmetic seen from inside as many different views.
>
>
>
> Such a view would cast a different light on "comp". Bruno's version of 
> comp (I have no idea to what extent other computationalists embrace the 
> more radical elements of Bruno's theory, the reduction of physics to 
> arithmetic)
>
>
> The reasoning is valid, or is not valid.
>
> True, but that doesn't mean that everyone who is a computationalist 
embraces it, right? Computationalism as its widely understood <> your 
"comp", sorry to say. That's all I'm asserting, not that "radical" makes it 
invalid.

>
> claims to derive consciousness and qualia from mathematics. 
>
>
> This is not claimed, but assuming comp, we get a theory which provides the 
> math for the different points of view.
>
>
> I'm pretty sure I read you making this this very claim recently, but maybe 
you were either speaking loosely, or I was reading loosely. Perhaps you 
said "from this we get the qualia and consciousness". My thought was, no 
you don't "get" those things at all. You put them in with the initial 
assumption and found them again at the end, surprise, surprise. Anyway, I 
don't have the energy to trawl through 1 million posts by rclough  (do you 
think he likes Leibniz by any chance?) to find your exact words! The claim 
above I can accept.

>
> But this seems to me to be circular, since qualia were already smuggled in 
> with the original assumption of computationalism, namely that consciousness 
> supervenes on computation.
>
>
> This is made clear at the beginning by the very comp hypothesis.
>
> Yes 

>  
>
This assumption is expressed in "yes doctor", the "bet" that a digital 
> brain substitution will work. Having made this assumption, Bruno's 
> reasoning eventually shows that the qualia must inhere in the purely 
> abstract computation taking place in the mathematical Platonia of the UD. 
>
>
> OK.
>
> But this is not deriving qualia and consciousness from maths per se. 
>
>
> Absolutely so. that is why I am not a mathematicalist. With comp, you can 
> be arithmeticalist on the basic ontology, but the inside points of view 
> grows in the transfinite.
>

I think I follow - the 1p perspective arises from the limit of the 
(infinite) consistent histories
 

>  
>

> It is performing a reductio ad absurdum to remove the intervening layer of 
> the physical between computation and mind, once the comp assumption has 
> been made. 
>
>
> It shows such intervening layer can't work, nor is it well defined.
>
>
>
>
> The problem I have pointed out before, which Bruno seems not to see, is 
> that mathematics cannot admit qualia without becoming something other than 
> mathematics. 
>
>
> Not at all. Comp is not mathematicalist. It is mathematicalist (even 
> arithmeticalist) for the ontology, but the epistemology os more ... 
> theologicalist, we might try to say.
>

"Not at all" - are you saying that mathematics *can* admit qualia and still 
be mathematics? Or do you agree you've added something fundamentally 
non-mathematical to the picture by giving maths an "inside view"? I'd call 
you a mathematical mystic. 

> It turns into a kind of numerical mysticism like numerology or the 
> kabbalah, which see qualities in numbers. Of course numerology can't be 
> regarded as mathematics because mathematics is defined by logical axioms 
> which define purely and simply the relationships between given symbols. It 
> is certainly the case that there are, provably, non-provable truths within 
> any mathematical system, but these truths are still mathematical truths, 
> that is they still pertain to intelligible sentences within that system of 
> logic. The sentence "2 is creative" (numerology) is like the sentence 
> "Function x in the UD is happy". It is unprovable, to be sure, but that 
> doesn't mean it is legitimised by Gödel. In fact it is not "unprovable" in 
> a Gödelian sense at all. It is simply unintelligible.
>
>
> Yes, but the Lôbian machines are sensible to that distinction too, they 
> know that if they are correct or consistent their own Bp does not behave 
> like knowledge should be. Their knowledge is not intelligible for them too.
>
> You mean they know they can't prove their truth? 

>
> Comp, as it is defined, has no need of qualia, and no place for them 
> beyond the initial assumption of a correspondence between qualia and 
> computation. 
>
>
>
> In UDA the purpose is to explain what is physics if we take comp seriously 
> enough. 
> In AUDA the qualia and consciousness is approached, and things are defined 
> in term of self-reference, limited to sigma_1 sentence, and from different 
> modal variant of the classical logic of self-reference.
>

Really have to read that! But you've talked about it so many times I think 
I get the gist, without really understanding the G* stuff... My maths 
stopped after first year uni.

>  
>
Mathematics has no need of any perceiver within the numbers. But because we 
> know there *is* a perceiver, and because we've assumed this perceiver must 
> be nothing more than the computational processes which we assume underly 
> it, we're forced into the idea that maths itself contains consciousness, a 
> notion that seems to subvert mathematics into something else, kabbalah or 
> numerology. 
>  
> But what if mathematics is pure left-brain reality and qualia are pure 
> right brain reality? What if our brains, by being split into two distinct 
> perceptual systems, force the world to be split in the same way, as the 
> cones of the eye force the world into the primary colours. "Logic" dictates 
> that everything must be reducible to maths, 
>
>
> No. not logic. The comp hypothesis, OK. Logic alone dictates nothing.
>

That was shorthand - the logic of the UDA dictates that (or so you say, I'm 
still agnostic). 

>
> Then if you agree that you can survive with both an artificial left and 
> right brains, the consequences go through.
> And the incompleteness is beautiful as it suggests an innate left/right 
> brain interpretation for any machine.
>
> but the strongly right-brained person reviles this notion. The problem 
> with the right brain of course is that is inarticulate and loses every 
> argument it gets into with the left. It doesn't have the words to argue. It 
> will never do good science. And so, in this culture of hypertrophied 
> rationality, right brain ways of being are denigrated as irrational, 
> superstitious, soft, feminine etc. 
>
>
> OK. 
>
> But this victory of one hemisphere over the other may have come at a cost 
> - the cost of happiness if Bolte Taylor is right, but also at a 
> philosophical cost, because increasingly the only reasoning that is seen as 
> valid is mathematical, when so many (all?) of the great philosophers were 
> led by heart and instinct as much as pure reason. 
>
>
>
> Yes that very sad. But then again, you should appreciate that such a very 
> fact *can* be understood and developed by the right brain (science). 
>
> ? Mixing left and right again, but even so, not quite sure what you mean. 

>
>
>
> (And yes, the philosophy-haters will say I only incriminate philosophy 
> with this admission, but that merely reasserts the mathematical bias).
>
> Comp suggests qualia arising as a sort of by-product of the maths, 
>
>
>
> No, comp bet our bodies are finite creature, locally. Then the math 
> suggests where the qualia come from, and why it is not computable, etc. 
>  Science is on the side of proof (doubtable), the qualia is on the side of 
> truth (not doubtable). 
> Qualia are in Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p, with p sigma_1, at the G* level. I have 
> explained this on this list and might explain soon or later on the FOAR 
> list.
>
>
>
> but this does beg the question of why the qualia are necessary at all, 
>
>
> They are necessary because the machines or numbers are confronted with, 
> not only machines, but also truth. The left brain keep intact its ombilical 
> chord with truth (Bp & p); The right brain is the dreamer/believer/reasoner 
> (Bp). 
>
> just as that question is begged by the materialist position. Arithmetic 
> would seem to get along just fine adding one and one without needing to 
> involve any subject in the business. A view that unifies right and left 
> realities would suggest that the ontologically prior reality is one which 
> encompasses both qualia and structure (number). Qualia would have equal 
> footing in such a worldview. 
>
>
> But with comp, numbers of finite things are enough for the ontology, then 
> qualia get a large footing encompassing the first person sharable one, the 
> quanta.
>
> This is only speculation of course, but it appeals to me and there is some 
> phenomenlogical "evidence" for it in the form of Bolte Taylor's 
> experiences. However, I'm aware that in one sense there can never be real 
> evidence for it, since our current mode of manufacturing ("finding") 
> evidence is a product of the left brain dominant wordview, which excludes 
> qualia from the outset. This leaves this whole idea potentially stranded in 
> the ridicule zone, due to the cutting of the cultural corpus callosum. 
> Nevertheless I look forward to anyone's responses.
>
>
> I think that I subscribe much to your view, but that it fits actually both 
> comp, like in UDA, but also the what the machines already says (or remain 
> silent, but then can explain why) about themselves.
>
> p (truth, beyond quanta and qualia)
> Bp (no qualia)
> Bp & p (qualia)
> Bp & Dt (physics, observable, no qualia)
> Bp & Dt & p (qualia: physics sensible)    (all this at the G* level)
>
> The qualia comes from the non communicable link you have with truth, and 
> some of those truth are undoubtable fixed point for self-observation, 
> self-sensibility, self-knowledge, self-belief, etc.
>
> Machine *can* reason on the "non reasonable things", and even eventually 
> understand that there is no need of domination relation between dream and 
> truth. It works better when collaborating.
>
> Bruno
>
> Interesting. I appreciate your response.
 

>
>
>
>
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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