On 13 May 2013, at 09:30, Pierz wrote:

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On Monday, May 13, 2013 2:49:32 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2013, at 08:07, Pierz wrote:I've long been interested in the very different realities which theleft and right brain hemispheres perceive. I recently read afascinating account of the 'pure' right brain perspective in JillBolte Taylor's book "My Stroke of Insight". Bolte Taylor is aneuroanatomist who suffered a catastrophic stroke in her earlythirties due to a undiagnosed AVN. The stroke wiped out her leftbrain's functioning almost completely - she lost the capacity forlanguage production and comprehension, mathematical reasoning, anda host of other functions to boot. What was left, she discovered,was a blissful sense of one-ness with the world around her and thecosmos as a whole. She felt herself as a fluid rather than a solid.Despite the loss of may perceptual functions, such as the abilityto perceive visual edges, she was still highly attuned to "energy"- energy in the rather New Age sense of the qualities that pervadea space or emanate from a person. She was instantly able toperceive the emotion and attitude that a person brought with themwhen they visited her, despite being unable to understand a word ofwhat they said or even distinguish their physical features. In thisleft-impaired state she lived in an eternal present, unable toconnect past and future with the current moment. Even after longand arduous rehabilitation of her left brain functions, which wereeventually restored almost completely to pre-stroke levels, BolteTaylor insists that she gained vital insights into the nature ofthe left and right brain through this experience, insights thatvery much support Eastern teachings about mindfulness and switchingoff the analytical mind. According to her experience, it seems tobe the left brain mode that interferes with our native capacity forjoy, but that a state of bliss is always just a "step to the right"away, if we can still the left brain's interference.Interesting. It supports also Theatetus' knowledge theory, I couldargue. It is the difference between Bp and Bp & p. It works thanksto incompleteness.Because not everything knowable is provably so, I take it.

OK.

Reading this account I was reminded of an idea I used to entertain.We know that the world we perceive is in a sense a product of thebrain. The reality we see is just the spectrum of reality ourbrains allow us or are attuned to perceive. This extends even tosomething as basic as time. Nothing in physics defines a moment"now" or an idea of progression. Rather it seems to be a by-productof the way the brain processes. My wondering was this: what if thescientific conception we have of reality is a product not of thewhole brain, but specifically of the left brain?Yes. Type Bp. That's science.In one sense, this is definitely the case: our scientific theorieswere developed by the left brain and reflect a left brain mode ofperceiving the world. But what if this is true in a deeper sense?What if the scientific way of seeing the world is a product of aone-eyed mode of perception? What if reality has two hemispheres soto speak? A qualitative and a quantitative aspect?Aritmetic seen from inside as many different views.Such a view would cast a different light on "comp". Bruno's versionof comp (I have no idea to what extent other computationalistsembrace the more radical elements of Bruno's theory, the reductionof physics to arithmetic)The reasoning is valid, or is not valid.True, but that doesn't mean that everyone who is a computationalistembraces it, right?

`Everyone who understand computationalism and rational enough do so,`

`when also patient enough to study it of course. The exception are`

`some philosophers, and some scientists defending them for unknown`

`reasons. But I have never succeeded in meeting any of them.`

Computationalism as its widely understood <> your "comp", sorry tosay.

`Not it is not. It is weaker than the other comp. Of course some people`

`take time to understand that comp does not work with weak materialism.`

`The widely understood computationalism is like the QM in the textbook:`

`it is not coherent.`

`I am aware that many ignore the result, but I don't think it is`

`related to having discovered some flaw or something.`

That's all I'm asserting, not that "radical" makes it invalid.claims to derive consciousness and qualia from mathematics.This is not claimed, but assuming comp, we get a theory whichprovides the math for the different points of view.I'm pretty sure I read you making this this very claim recently, butmaybe you were either speaking loosely, or I was reading loosely.Perhaps you said "from this we get the qualia and consciousness". Mythought was, no you don't "get" those things at all. You put them inwith the initial assumption and found them again at the end,surprise, surprise.

`I assume them in UDA, but no more in AUDA, where I use semi-axiomatic`

`of them (mainly "capable of being find or produce by the machine, and`

`not rationally communicable), or, for knowledge, anything obeying the`

`S4 modal axioms, etc.`

`There are aspects of consciousness which is beyond the ability of the`

`machine to understand, or even define, completely, but this can be`

`explained by the machine.`

Anyway, I don't have the energy to trawl through 1 million posts byrclough (do you think he likes Leibniz by any chance?) to find yourexact words! The claim above I can accept.

OK. Normally I will come back on some of this on FOAR.

But this seems to me to be circular, since qualia were alreadysmuggled in with the original assumption of computationalism,namely that consciousness supervenes on computation.This is made clear at the beginning by the very comp hypothesis. YesThis assumption is expressed in "yes doctor", the "bet" that adigital brain substitution will work. Having made this assumption,Bruno's reasoning eventually shows that the qualia must inhere inthe purely abstract computation taking place in the mathematicalPlatonia of the UD.OK.But this is not deriving qualia and consciousness from maths per se.Absolutely so. that is why I am not a mathematicalist. With comp,you can be arithmeticalist on the basic ontology, but the insidepoints of view grows in the transfinite.I think I follow - the 1p perspective arises from the limit of the(infinite) consistent histories

`Notably. This concerns more the content of the 1p experience, as the`

`logic of 1p is given just by the self-reference ability, which will`

`structure that content.`

It is performing a reductio ad absurdum to remove the interveninglayer of the physical between computation and mind, once the compassumption has been made.It shows such intervening layer can't work, nor is it well defined.The problem I have pointed out before, which Bruno seems not tosee, is that mathematics cannot admit qualia without becomingsomething other than mathematics.Not at all. Comp is not mathematicalist. It is mathematicalist (evenarithmeticalist) for the ontology, but the epistemology os more ...theologicalist, we might try to say."Not at all" - are you saying that mathematics *can* admit qualiaand still be mathematics?

`No. I am saying that the qualia are not mathematical. But this is a`

`consequence of the math, as all machine can prove that her qualia will`

`have a non mathematical components for them. The machines are mystic,`

`somehow, and consciousness can be seen as the easiest and most common`

`mystic experience. We are born in it, and that is why we rarely see is`

`that way.`

Or do you agree you've added something fundamentally non-mathematical to the picture by giving maths an "inside view"? I'dcall you a mathematical mystic.

`The inside view comes when we agree that knowledge obeys to S4, and we`

`recover S4 (S4Grz) by linking truth to belief.`

`In a sense, for a machine M1 much stronger than a machine M2, the`

`theology of M2 can be made mathematical. What M2 cannot do`

`"mathematically" is to lift that theology on herself, unless she bet`

`(cautiously) on some self-correctness principle, but that cannot be`

`done in any 3p method, and usually math is considered as 3p-science,`

`so that correctness is not a part of math, but on faith in some`

`reality made by the machine M2. Likewise, I decide to not look at such`

`machine as zombie, and that means I project a non mathematical thing`

`(my consciousness) on them. This too is not mathematical.`

`In fact some mathematicians understood already that the encompassing`

`notion of "mathematical truth", or even just "arithmetical truth" is`

`not accessible by mathematics. In practice, this is no problem because`

`we hardly need such an encompassing notion, but in "theology" we need`

`it for the inside views.`

It turns into a kind of numerical mysticism like numerology or thekabbalah, which see qualities in numbers. Of course numerologycan't be regarded as mathematics because mathematics is defined bylogical axioms which define purely and simply the relationshipsbetween given symbols. It is certainly the case that there are,provably, non-provable truths within any mathematical system, butthese truths are still mathematical truths, that is they stillpertain to intelligible sentences within that system of logic. Thesentence "2 is creative" (numerology) is like the sentence"Function x in the UD is happy". It is unprovable, to be sure, butthat doesn't mean it is legitimised by Gödel. In fact it is not"unprovable" in a Gödelian sense at all. It is simply unintelligible.Yes, but the Lôbian machines are sensible to that distinction too,they know that if they are correct or consistent their own Bp doesnot behave like knowledge should be. Their knowledge is notintelligible for them too.You mean they know they can't prove their truth?

`Yes. They know that if they are consistent then they cannot prove it.`

`They know that if they are correct, they cannot even define it. The`

`machines are quickly aware of their limitation, and of the need of`

`many non provable or non definable things which concerns them, and`

`machines can justify why, IF they are machines, it is normal that this`

`happen.`

Comp, as it is defined, has no need of qualia, and no place forthem beyond the initial assumption of a correspondence betweenqualia and computation.In UDA the purpose is to explain what is physics if we take compseriously enough.In AUDA the qualia and consciousness is approached, and things aredefined in term of self-reference, limited to sigma_1 sentence, andfrom different modal variant of the classical logic of self-reference.Really have to read that! But you've talked about it so many times Ithink I get the gist, without really understanding the G* stuff...My maths stopped after first year uni.

`A good book is Boolos 1979. A nice recreative introduction to G is`

`Smullyan's "Forever Undecided". In that last book it looks like it`

`concerns only people living in some fairy tale, with perfect liars and`

`truth-tellers inhabiting some magic island, but that fairy tale is`

`shown to be the case for ideally perfect machines thanks to the`

`"famous" diagonalization lemma of Gödel.`

Mathematics has no need of any perceiver within the numbers. Butbecause we know there *is* a perceiver, and because we've assumedthis perceiver must be nothing more than the computationalprocesses which we assume underly it, we're forced into the ideathat maths itself contains consciousness, a notion that seems tosubvert mathematics into something else, kabbalah or numerology.But what if mathematics is pure left-brain reality and qualia arepure right brain reality? What if our brains, by being split intotwo distinct perceptual systems, force the world to be split in thesame way, as the cones of the eye force the world into the primarycolours. "Logic" dictates that everything must be reducible to maths,No. not logic. The comp hypothesis, OK. Logic alone dictates nothing.That was shorthand - the logic of the UDA dictates that (or so yousay, I'm still agnostic).

`I think you did a pretty good summary of the UDA(*). I am not sure`

`what you are missing. Feel free to try to point on an assumption which`

`would have been made implicitly, or if a step is not valid. UDA1-7 is`

`enough I think, as step 8 is more subtle, and can certainly be`

`clarified.`

(*) http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html

Then if you agree that you can survive with both an artificial leftand right brains, the consequences go through.And the incompleteness is beautiful as it suggests an innate left/right brain interpretation for any machine.but the strongly right-brained person reviles this notion. Theproblem with the right brain of course is that is inarticulate andloses every argument it gets into with the left. It doesn't havethe words to argue. It will never do good science. And so, in thisculture of hypertrophied rationality, right brain ways of being aredenigrated as irrational, superstitious, soft, feminine etc.OK.But this victory of one hemisphere over the other may have come ata cost - the cost of happiness if Bolte Taylor is right, but alsoat a philosophical cost, because increasingly the only reasoningthat is seen as valid is mathematical, when so many (all?) of thegreat philosophers were led by heart and instinct as much as purereason.Yes that very sad. But then again, you should appreciate that such avery fact *can* be understood and developed by the right brain(science).? Mixing left and right again, but even so, not quite sure what youmean.

`Yes. I was mixing right and left again. Sorry. What I mean, roughly`

`speaking, is that the brain (beliefs) is a dynamical map of the`

`neighborhood (truth), and that it has a fixed point, and that the`

`theory you mention suggests that the fixed point is in the right`

`brain. So our left hemisphere uses the Bp logic, and the right`

`hemisphere use the Bp & p logic.`

`If someone lost one hemisphere, then it will quickly develop a new`

`fixed point soon enough. Those are more logical points than spatial`

`points to be sure. Eventually "space is in our head".`

(And yes, the philosophy-haters will say I only incriminatephilosophy with this admission, but that merely reasserts themathematical bias).Comp suggests qualia arising as a sort of by-product of the maths,No, comp bet our bodies are finite creature, locally. Then the mathsuggests where the qualia come from, and why it is not computable,etc. Science is on the side of proof (doubtable), the qualia is onthe side of truth (not doubtable).Qualia are in Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p, with p sigma_1, at the G* level.I have explained this on this list and might explain soon or lateron the FOAR list.but this does beg the question of why the qualia are necessary atall,They are necessary because the machines or numbers are confrontedwith, not only machines, but also truth. The left brain keep intactits ombilical chord with truth (Bp & p); The right brain is thedreamer/believer/reasoner (Bp).just as that question is begged by the materialist position.Arithmetic would seem to get along just fine adding one and onewithout needing to involve any subject in the business. A view thatunifies right and left realities would suggest that theontologically prior reality is one which encompasses both qualiaand structure (number). Qualia would have equal footing in such aworldview.But with comp, numbers of finite things are enough for the ontology,then qualia get a large footing encompassing the first personsharable one, the quanta.This is only speculation of course, but it appeals to me and thereis some phenomenlogical "evidence" for it in the form of BolteTaylor's experiences. However, I'm aware that in one sense therecan never be real evidence for it, since our current mode ofmanufacturing ("finding") evidence is a product of the left braindominant wordview, which excludes qualia from the outset. Thisleaves this whole idea potentially stranded in the ridicule zone,due to the cutting of the cultural corpus callosum. Nevertheless Ilook forward to anyone's responses.I think that I subscribe much to your view, but that it fitsactually both comp, like in UDA, but also the what the machinesalready says (or remain silent, but then can explain why) aboutthemselves.p (truth, beyond quanta and qualia) Bp (no qualia) Bp & p (qualia) Bp & Dt (physics, observable, no qualia) Bp & Dt & p (qualia: physics sensible) (all this at the G* level)The qualia comes from the non communicable link you have with truth,and some of those truth are undoubtable fixed point for self-observation, self-sensibility, self-knowledge, self-belief, etc.Machine *can* reason on the "non reasonable things", and eveneventually understand that there is no need of domination relationbetween dream and truth. It works better when collaborating.Bruno Interesting. I appreciate your response.

`Thanks. I appreciate your comment, and your page on the UDA(*). There`

`is no problem of not being convinced, but I fail to see an error or a`

`missing assumptions, and theories works like that. It is preferable to`

`fake them as true until we see a clear falsity, in which case we can`

`improve the theory or search another one. UDA is not entirely logical,`

`as it is applied logic, and I use some occam razor, and the idea that`

`reification or ontological commitment should never been done in`

`science. In applied science, it means that an amount of good-`

`willingness is presupposed. It is quite similar to Everett. We cannot`

`say that Everett has proved that there is no collapse, but it has`

`proved that the collapse does not make sense if we suppose QM`

`universally true. Likewise I don't prove that primitive matter does`

`not exist, but that it does not make sense for selecting, without some`

`magic, digital machine's consciousness.`

Bruno (*) http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html (I will reread it and answer some questions there asap) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.