On 14 May 2013, at 04:15, Pierz wrote:

On Tuesday, May 14, 2013 12:13:19 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 May 2013, at 09:30, Pierz wrote: > > > On Monday, May 13, 2013 2:49:32 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: The inside view comes when we agree that knowledge obeys to S4, and we recover S4 (S4Grz) by linking truth to belief. In a sense, for a machine M1 much stronger than a machine M2, the theology of M2 can be made mathematical. What M2 cannot do "mathematically" is to lift that theology on herself, unless she bet (cautiously) on some self-correctness principle, but that cannot be done in any 3p method, and usually math is considered as 3p-science, so that correctness is not a part of math, but on faith in some reality made by the machine M2. Likewise, I decide to not look at such machine as zombie, and that means I project a non mathematical thing (my consciousness) on them. This too is not mathematical. In fact some mathematicians understood already that the encompassing notion of "mathematical truth", or even just "arithmetical truth" is not accessible by mathematics. In practice, this is no problem because we hardly need such an encompassing notion, but in "theology" we need it for the inside views.Well I'll need to read the magical island story to make any sense ofthat.

Computerland or Numberland are more magic than the Wonderland :)

A good book is Boolos 1979. A nice recreative introduction to G is Smullyan's "Forever Undecided". In that last book it looks like it concerns only people living in some fairy tale, with perfect liars and truth-tellers inhabiting some magic island, but that fairy tale is shown to be the case for ideally perfect machines thanks to the "famous" diagonalization lemma of GĂ¶del.Cool. Thanks for those references. A fairy tale! I can cope withthat :)

Nice. I will come back on this, soon or later on Russell's FOAR list.

I think you did a pretty good summary of the UDA(*). I am not sure what you are missing. Feel free to try to point on an assumption which would have been made implicitly, or if a step is not valid. UDA1-7 is enough I think, as step 8 is more subtle, and can certainly be clarified. (*) http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html Ha! Nothing on the net is safe!

Nope :)

(*) http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html (I will reread it and answer some questions there asap)I wrote that for my philosophy group quite some time ago (well, 2011as you can see). Since then I have gotten my head around step 8. Myagnosticism about the argument stems not so much from having found aconcrete flaw as from a lack of confidence in our understanding ofthe nature of consciousness (a question about the comp assumptionitself), as well as an uncertainty about your use of arithmeticalrealism. I know you insist that your version of AR is "weak", but Iwonder if you're not conflating types of "being". To be sure, I canaccept "7 is prime" as an independently "existing" fact, but of allthe problems of philosophy, the nature of what being is is surelyone of the trickiest.

Sure.

Our minds just don't seem to be well equipped to grasp something sofundamental - perhaps even the whole notion of being and non-beingis unintelligible when enquired into deeply enough. There arepropositions about the states of being in the world ("the cat isdead"), and there are propositions about propositions - purelylogical ones (forgive my lack of rigorous philosophical terms here.I'm not an academic philosopher

`That's why you are clear and talk in an intelligible way. I am not an`

`academic philosopher too. I am a biologist/psychologist/theologian who`

`understood early that with comp, biology/psychology/theology admits`

`mathematical (even arithmetical) foundations.`

and I can't recall the technical way of defining this distinction).You've merged the two, making statements about the world a specialkind of logical statement. You've argued in effect in the MGA thatthis move is the only elegant solution to the paradoxes that becomeapparent when the notion of physical supervenience is pushed farenough. But it is a pretty massive leap. I see the appeal of thesolution - but I've also wondered if paradoxes like the one exposedby the MGA aren't actually better seen as refutations of the comphypothesis itself.

That remains logically possible.

The comp hypothesis is in a sense a naive one - one notices thatcomputers can perform 'thinking-like' operations, solving problemsthat we use thought for, so one makes the leap that perhaps the minditself is a computer.

`Well, the brain, or the body, or the environment, at some level. The`

`mind is a too fuzzy term, even with comp. It can be the software`

`(still machine or number like), or the consciousness, which is more in`

`the limit of the UD* than in any particular computations.`

This began as a natural hypothesis, before anyone saw the abyss thatit inevitably and logically leads to. To my mind, the MGA isunnecessary. One can arrive at much the same point by imaginingcomputations carried out with hoses and buckets ("Olympia") orspread out over continents and centuries, with partial resultspassed around from one weird hose and bucket computer to another byletters, pigeons, arrangements of stones or whatever. How on earthcan such a computational system contain consciousness?

`Leibniz asked the same question with a brain, when look in details, it`

`is not different from buckets and stone and pigeons, ... Consciousness`

`is "in platonia", even a bit above (truth). The computational system`

`just makes it possible for the "divine consciousness" to forget its`

`divine nature and to concentrate on the terrestrial duties.`

You really are forced either to abandon comp or to embrace the ideathat it's the logical relations themselves that "create" theconsciousness.

`OK. I find this nice, as I tend to consider matter and physics as`

`hiding problem, or even create it, due to the incorrect conception of`

`reality (WYSIWYG, instead of non-wysiwig).`

It stretches comp to the breaking point and throws one back on thewhole problem of consciousness yet again. I see the appeal in yourmathematical formalism, but it still leaves many strange unansweredquestions, like where time comes from for instance.

`Subjective time comes from the third hypostases (the first person,`

`S4Grz1). Physical time is more mysterious and difficult to derive. It`

`might be just a local indexical gauge of some sort. Physicist have not`

`solved that problem either.`

Maybe computationalism is just wrong.

`Absolutely. Even if true, it is unbelievable, from a purely rational`

`standpoint. But there are also strong evidences for it, and few`

`evidences for an alternative theory.`

It seems a digital substitution *should* work, but do we know reallyenough to make that claim - or bet?

`The next generation will not wait to know, they will accept copies,`

`just to have a higher probability to see the next soccer cup or`

`something.`

Our understanding of the brain is still in its infancy and thephilosophy of mind still flounders about in a logical quagmire (I'veread the deeply unsatisfactory texts).

`But we don't need to understand the brain to copy it. We can't really`

`understand completely our own brain, and that's why I insist on the`

`act of faith or theological aspect of comp.`

There are data from studies of psychedelics that are still *way* tooconfronting and radical for the mainstream to even dare to talkabout because of the fear of being labelled a mystic and havingone's reputation as a serious scientist trashed.

`In my case some other people did a good job, without mentioning`

`psychedelic. In a sense it makes me free to aboard such talk. But`

`then, with salvia, I have got a better understanding that many people`

`are not ready, neither for salvia, nor comp, nor QM or GR actually ...`

What's appealing about your theory Bruno is that it does providesome kind of framework within which those data could make sense - Iknow you've talked about Someone-Who-Isn't-You's salvia experiencesas fitting or supporting comp, and have argued for greater opennessto the phenomenological evidence of psychedelics.

`Yes. It is of course quite double edged today. Then salvia go quite`

`farer than comp. I am overwhelmed by the data on consciousness and`

`"reality" ....`

But the weakness of the arithmetical ontology is its permissiveness.I have grave doubts about your claims of testability. You'veadmitted that the mathematical problems of deriving physics fromarithmetic are "hard".

`We got already the quantum shape, but we have no hamiltonian, nor`

`anything looking like a physical constant. It is works for the`

`infinity of future generations.`

I think that is surely an understatement! The maths involves far toomany infinities.

`But that's not really a problem. On the contrary, those infinities are`

`needed for having reasonable measure, and the modal logics can cope`

`with the constraints for the certainty case, from which we can derive`

`the logic they obey. The self-referential logics does bring a lot of`

`information, and notably that justifiable/non-justifiable distinction,`

`and the negative (neo-platonist) aspect of the theology.`

On the face of it, it seems to me that pure arithmetic would permitall self-consistent physics and any specific set of physical lawswould be a local condition so to speak (mathematically, notspatially "local" of course).

`Not really. That's an advanatge of comp: the physics is unique and the`

`same for all machines, but it is complex and has possible cluster of`

`multiverse (multi-multi-verse, intermediate realities between heaven`

`and earth, etc.).`

There's also the question of measuring infinite sets - a problemraised by Deutsch in "The Beginning of Infinity" when critiquingideas similar to yours. I've asked about this before but you assuredme Deutsch was wrong and you were right - alas my maths was not upto disputing the point. But I still wonder how it's possible tomeasure the proportion of infinite sets of computations. If I havesome function f(), then I can also imagine some function f1() wheref1() = f() +1 -1. Then of course I get f2() = f1() +1 -1, f3() =...etc up to f()inf, all equivalent to f(). So deriving a proportionalmeasure seems impossible, since every function can be calculated inan infinite number of (admittedly more or less efficient orinefficient) ways.

`But infinities makes measure theory more easy. And the self-`

`referential constraints put a lot of order there. But of course, this`

`leads to very hard mathematical questions (one of which has been`

`solved by Vandenbussche).`

Phew. So, in a word I find appeal in your ideas, but despiterecognizing the force of the argument, I remain agnostic on theinitial assumption of comp

`I am too. That's why I am not a philosopher, but a scientist. A`

`scientist does not defend that a theory is true. Only that it is`

`testable, and then he can love it for its elegance, but true? Nobody`

`knows, especially for comp, we just can't know (but we can be deluded`

`in believing we know, like after surviving, apparently, with a`

`digital body).`

and am as inclined to see the UDA as an argument *against* comp asto see it as an inevitable conclusion.

`Without QM Everett, I would have thought so. But the MW looks like a`

`confirmation of the most startling consequence of comp, that we are`

`multiple. It does not make comp true, but it makes it quite plausible`

`with the current knowledge.`

Truth is bigger than us, (a proposition I know you agree with), andTruth I suspect is bigger than mathematics, bigger even thanarithmetical truth which incompleteness shows is beyond the reach offormulation. In these deep realms we are over our heads in mysteryand I'm suspicious of any reduction to rationality.

`Well, here rationality forces us to see the limit of that reduction,`

`like if the left brain can see the grandeur and depth, and the`

`necessity, of the right brain. This really gives sense, informally and`

`formally, to Plato. Even if false, all this can help to open our mind,`

`and have fun. Then comp gives a sense of modesty, which I like very`

`much, notably it reminds us that we are linked to something that we`

`cannot reduce in any 3p manner, so it looks more like a vaccine`

`against reductionism (notably of numbers and machines) than a`

`reductionism.`

`I certainly love comp. But, like salvia, this does not mean I believe`

`they are true. Just very interesting, quite mind blowing, and, as far`

`as I can know, rather plausible.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.