The New Tractatus (ver. 1.0)
    by Roger Clough,  copyright 2013

Introduction.

It is said that Wittgenstein spent the first half of his life writing the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) and the second half disproving it.
It became the Bible of the Vienna Circle of the thirties of analytic logic. 
My conjecture is that it ultimately didn't work because it left out the One
(mind, subjectivity, the nonphysical) and only dealt with the physical world 
of spacetime (the objective world, modal logic).

Russell  contributed to the TLP project in the form of his Theory of 
Descriptions,
where as Russell stated, there are two types of knowledge, knowledge by
acquaintance (personal knowledge, what bruno calls 1p) and knowledge by
descriptions (objective knowledge, what Bruno calls 3p). Russell had trouble 
understanding
the One and hence 1p.

My conjecture is that intuitively it seems possible that Leibnbiz's world view 
(1p +3p)  can be written  in a form similar to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (3p only), where  his Proposition 1 is given at the bottom of the 
page.

The New Tractatus might start out as

Proposition I.  


1. In the beginning was the Creator, the One, the a priori nonphysical global 
Mind of Plato's One (1P),  
which is absolute, eternal, outside of spacetime and is ruled by necessary 
logic.  Here propositions are
always either true or false.

2. Then the One expressed a script of  contingent pre-established harmony (PEH) 
for the world of
spacetime (3P), in which objects move in harmony with each other. Here 
propositions, depending on space
and time, be  may be either true or false, so this --the world of facts and 
physics--is not an absolute world. 
It is simply whatever is the case.

3. The One (1P)  being good, the PEH was written as the best possible 3P, with 
the least suffering and evil.

4.  In the world of 3P, matter is created as an infinite number of individual  
spacetime particles (3p) 
are created by collisions with pre-existing Higgs bosons according to the PEH.

5.The One (1P) contains the "perceptions" (in the sense defined by Leibniz, 
being the sum of the individual 3p's, 
each with its own perspective on the rest of the 3ps --but is also more than 
that.

6. Then the world is 1P + 3P, where 1P is the world of Mind, and 3P is the 
world of matter, the picture theory of the world as described by Wittgenstein.

7. The world of 3P is the mental representation of 1P.

Proposition II

8.. Because of 1P, the world of 3P is also alive, and conscious. 

9. The physical objects of 3P, if they can be described by a single concept (or 
part), are monads.

10. If the object contains more than one part, it is a composite monad.

11. Thus the world divides into monads. 

12. Each monad (or whole concept), is a substance or entity.

13. Each monad is also a logical subject, which contains its predicates 
analytically. 

14. Monads do not perceive the world or act on it directly but only through 1P, 
which constantly
    monitors (by rapid, infinitely small stages) and acts on the components of 
3P, then forwarding the 
    contents of 1P back to the individual monads.

15. Thus each monad has knowledge of the entire universe from its own 
perspective,
    providing a holographic vbiew of all.  

16. Neither space nor time can be monads because they cannot be conceived as a 
whole
    nor divided only a finite number of times.

17.  Thus the world is made up of monads.

18.  Monads are in 3P, so there is no physical space between them , they are 
nonlocal.

19. Being nonlocal, monads share mental contents.
 

.....and so on.....


============================================================================= 
PROPOSITION 1

>From 
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tractatus_Logico-Philosophicus#Proposition_1. 



Proposition 1.  
The first chapter is very brief: 
1 The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts. 
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever 
is not the case. 
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 
1.2 The world divides into facts. 
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains 
the same. 

This along with the beginning of two can be taken to be the relevant parts of 
Wittgenstein's metaphysical view that he will use to support his picture theory 
of language. 
Propositions 2. & 3.  
These sections concern Wittgenstein's view that the sensible, changing world we 
perceive does not consist of substance but of facts. Proposition two begins 
with a discussion of objects, form and substance. 
2 What is the case. Facts, the existence of states of affairs. 
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects 
(things). 
This epistemic notion is further clarified by a discussion of objects or things 
as metaphysical substances. 
2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an 
object. 
2.02 Objects are simple. 
... 
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be 
composite. 
His use of 'composite' in 2.021 can be taken to mean a combination of form and 
matter, in the Platonic sense. 
The notion of a static unchanging Form and its identity with Substance 
represents the metaphysical view that has come to be held as an assumption by 
the vast majority of the Western philosophical tradition since Plato and 
Aristotle, as it was something they agreed on. ?what is called a form or a 
substance is not generated.? [5] (Z.8 1033b13) The opposing view states that 
unalterable Form does not exist, or at least if there is such a thing, it 
contains an ever changing, relative substance in a constant state of flux. 
Although this view was held by Greeks like Heraclitus, it has existed only on 
the fringe of the Western tradition since then. It is commonly known now only 
in "Eastern" metaphysical views where the primary concept of substance is Qi, 
or something similar, which persists through and beyond any given Form. The 
former view is shown to be held by Wittgenstein in what follows... 
2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case. 
2.025 It is form and content. 
... 
2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. 
2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the substantial are one and the same. 
2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and substantial; their configuration is 
what is changing and unstable. 


Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/14/2013  
See my Leibniz site at 
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to