The New Tractatus (ver. 1.0)
by Roger Clough, copyright 2013
It is said that Wittgenstein spent the first half of his life writing the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) and the second half disproving it.
It became the Bible of the Vienna Circle of the thirties of analytic logic.
My conjecture is that it ultimately didn't work because it left out the One
(mind, subjectivity, the nonphysical) and only dealt with the physical world
of spacetime (the objective world, modal logic).
Russell contributed to the TLP project in the form of his Theory of
where as Russell stated, there are two types of knowledge, knowledge by
acquaintance (personal knowledge, what bruno calls 1p) and knowledge by
descriptions (objective knowledge, what Bruno calls 3p). Russell had trouble
the One and hence 1p.
My conjecture is that intuitively it seems possible that Leibnbiz's world view
(1p +3p) can be written in a form similar to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (3p only), where his Proposition 1 is given at the bottom of the
The New Tractatus might start out as
1. In the beginning was the Creator, the One, the a priori nonphysical global
Mind of Plato's One (1P),
which is absolute, eternal, outside of spacetime and is ruled by necessary
logic. Here propositions are
always either true or false.
2. Then the One expressed a script of contingent pre-established harmony (PEH)
for the world of
spacetime (3P), in which objects move in harmony with each other. Here
propositions, depending on space
and time, be may be either true or false, so this --the world of facts and
physics--is not an absolute world.
It is simply whatever is the case.
3. The One (1P) being good, the PEH was written as the best possible 3P, with
the least suffering and evil.
4. In the world of 3P, matter is created as an infinite number of individual
spacetime particles (3p)
are created by collisions with pre-existing Higgs bosons according to the PEH.
5.The One (1P) contains the "perceptions" (in the sense defined by Leibniz,
being the sum of the individual 3p's,
each with its own perspective on the rest of the 3ps --but is also more than
6. Then the world is 1P + 3P, where 1P is the world of Mind, and 3P is the
world of matter, the picture theory of the world as described by Wittgenstein.
7. The world of 3P is the mental representation of 1P.
8.. Because of 1P, the world of 3P is also alive, and conscious.
9. The physical objects of 3P, if they can be described by a single concept (or
part), are monads.
10. If the object contains more than one part, it is a composite monad.
11. Thus the world divides into monads.
12. Each monad (or whole concept), is a substance or entity.
13. Each monad is also a logical subject, which contains its predicates
14. Monads do not perceive the world or act on it directly but only through 1P,
monitors (by rapid, infinitely small stages) and acts on the components of
3P, then forwarding the
contents of 1P back to the individual monads.
15. Thus each monad has knowledge of the entire universe from its own
providing a holographic vbiew of all.
16. Neither space nor time can be monads because they cannot be conceived as a
nor divided only a finite number of times.
17. Thus the world is made up of monads.
18. Monads are in 3P, so there is no physical space between them , they are
19. Being nonlocal, monads share mental contents.
.....and so on.....
The first chapter is very brief:
1 The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever
is not the case.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains
This along with the beginning of two can be taken to be the relevant parts of
Wittgenstein's metaphysical view that he will use to support his picture theory
Propositions 2. & 3.
These sections concern Wittgenstein's view that the sensible, changing world we
perceive does not consist of substance but of facts. Proposition two begins
with a discussion of objects, form and substance.
2 What is the case. Facts, the existence of states of affairs.
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects
This epistemic notion is further clarified by a discussion of objects or things
as metaphysical substances.
2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an
2.02 Objects are simple.
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be
His use of 'composite' in 2.021 can be taken to mean a combination of form and
matter, in the Platonic sense.
The notion of a static unchanging Form and its identity with Substance
represents the metaphysical view that has come to be held as an assumption by
the vast majority of the Western philosophical tradition since Plato and
Aristotle, as it was something they agreed on. ?what is called a form or a
substance is not generated.?  (Z.8 1033b13) The opposing view states that
unalterable Form does not exist, or at least if there is such a thing, it
contains an ever changing, relative substance in a constant state of flux.
Although this view was held by Greeks like Heraclitus, it has existed only on
the fringe of the Western tradition since then. It is commonly known now only
in "Eastern" metaphysical views where the primary concept of substance is Qi,
or something similar, which persists through and beyond any given Form. The
former view is shown to be held by Wittgenstein in what follows...
2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.
2.025 It is form and content.
2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form.
2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the substantial are one and the same.
2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and substantial; their configuration is
what is changing and unstable.
Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/14/2013
See my Leibniz site at
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