On 16 May 2013, at 15:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 16.05.2013 15:50 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 16 May 2013, at 08:00, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 15.05.2013 21:02 meekerdb said the following:
On 5/15/2013 12:02 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.05.2013 21:45 meekerdb said the following:
On 5/14/2013 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 May 2013, at 19:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.05.2013 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 14 May 2013, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
If you are monist, that distinction is quite
artificial, because humans have no special status.
They have the special status of being humans.
If you are dualist and anthropomorphic, then you can
absolutize the distinction (but this seems ad hoc to
me).
I don't see what is has to do with dualism. If you can
distinguish "humans" from "not-humans" then you can
distinguish "made by humans" from "not made by humans". It's
as scientific as any concept: table, chair, tiger, star,
amoeba,...
What is a scientific difference between "humans" and
"not-humans"? How would you define it?
What difference does it make? Why do you have this obsession
with definition of words? Are you going to try to prove a theorem
about humans?
My question was not about strict definitions. My goal was better to
understand the difference physical vs. mental. I believe that most
people on this list state that
1) mental is physical
Never heard this on this list. What would that mean? I don't see that
in the link you sent to Brent.
This could mean for example:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
“The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the
universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the
condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don’t deny that
the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem
physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or
social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the
day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical.”
The UDA shows that physicalism is incompatible with computationalism.
To make mental and physical identifiable, you need to put string
infinities on both matter and mind. Although this is logically
possible (assuming NON-comp), I have never seen such attempts in the
literature. Most physicalist defends comp (more or less explicitly)
and are thus inconsistent.
With comp, we are back to Plato. The physical is only how the border
of the arithmetical, viewed from inside-modality, appears. Physics is
made into a branch of arithmetic, through machine's psychology or
theology. This is testable, and already tested as we found, when we do
the math, that such a border has already a quantum logic, and we have
already an arithmetical quantization of a physical reality, etc. The
physical is thus a tiny, but crucial and unavoidable, part of the
mental of the machines.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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