2013/5/18 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>

>
>
> On Thursday, May 16, 2013 12:13:56 PM UTC-4, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2013/5/16 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
>>
>> If the first three assumptions define consciousness as software, then why
>>> would there be any 'extension' of the original program to the copy?
>>>
>>> Say I have a phone in L.A. with a GPS indicating the local weather. I
>>> duplicate the entire phone, send it off to London in a package, which I
>>> pick up on arrival. I turn on the phone, see the that the local weather is
>>> now foggy rainy London weather. I look at the weather log and see that
>>> previous weather was in sunny, smoggy L.A.
>>>
>>> So what?
>>>
>>> I can break the original phone or the copy phone and it won't affect the
>>> other. There isn't even an original and a copy unless someone who is
>>> thinking too much about it decides on that relation. It doesn't matter how
>>> many phones or what you do with them,
>>
>>
>> I've never encounter a conscious phone, so your argument is ... not an
>> argument at all. Of course a phone is not a human, it is a straw man to
>> compare the two and say afterward, see... a phone is not a human... well
>> yes it's true.
>>
>
> If you are allowing that there is some difference-in-kind between software
> and consciousness, then you are invalidating comp to begin with.
>

There is a difference of software and complexity, where did I invoke a
difference in kind... you do it all the time, but it's you, not me, another
straw man.


> The whole premise of the three assumptions is to define the thought
> experiment as taking place in a universe where brain function can only
> differ from the function of any computer in degree rather than in kind.
>
>
>>
>>> none of them extend to each other at all. I think that any weirdness
>>> comes from the original bad assumption that consciousness is on the one
>>> hand certainly reproducible by emulating the physical brain,
>>
>>
>> You did not explain why it is bad (you never did actually).
>>
>
> I think it's a bad assumption because:
>
> *1. The Material Incompleteness problem*. We have not understood any
> reason that the physical brain would produce consciousness.
>

So what ?


> It is only our own subjective experience that we think there is such a
> thing as personhood, self, etc. It's like a chef who has never eaten trying
> to cook based on a verbal description of food. Where there is a known
> vacuum of information and understanding, we cannot scientifically expect
> the result we intend.
>
> *2. The universal intuition of the Uncanny.* Thus far the devices we have
> created not only do not follow the pattern of baby organisms, nor do they
> follow a similar pattern, but they follow what can be understood to be the
> opposite pattern in every way. Machines are not considered to be disgusting
> or cute, not willful etc. They are specifically felt to be impersonal -
> 'cold', 'unfeeling'.  This is not proof of the emptiness of machines, but
> it suggests that there may in fact be a valid basis for our intuitions and
> we should not give the benefit of the doubt to the contrary position
> without understanding more.
>

So because no conscious machine exist currently, there never will ?? And
it's us that have bad assumption ?!??

You should not be certain of one or another before understanding more....
but you assert all the time without *any* proof.

>
> *3. The Presentation problem*: We use a video screen to convert digital
> computation into optical presentations. If digital computation had any
> aesthetic presence that would not be necessary. The existence of geometry,
> even more than the hard problem of consciousness, makes comp a bad
> assumption. There is simply no plausible use for an aesthetic presentation
> of any kind for computation or arithmetic.
>
>
Same invalid argument all over again. Compare an apple and a rabbit, and
conclude the rabbit is not an apple... yes so what ?

I stop here. Come back again when you want to explain, not asserting what
you believe.

Quentin


> *4. The Emulation problem:* Having no understanding of the ultimate
> source of consciousness, we cannot assume that any particular configuration
> of brain function is identical to a particular person's experience. It may
> not work that way. Identity may arise through time and dispersed by
> function rather than being assembled by function into a single subjective
> time. In my view, the cardinality of identity is inseparable from
> uniqueness itself, and is therefore not  reproducible in any way, just as a
> moment in history is not reproducible. Consciousness cannot be imitated.
>
> *5. The Pathetic fallacy:* The tendency to over-signify inanimate objects
> is well established. From stuffed animals to puppets to cartoons, we cannot
> deny that the temptation for cognitive bias in this direction must be
> examined very carefully.  We cannot assume that computer scientists are
> somehow capable of superhuman impartiality toward their devices and
> programs.
>
> What are the counterfactuals? There is only one. Every mechanical system
> that we have reverse engineered so far has made the same kind of sense, so
> there is no reason to assume that the brain is any difference... except
> that the brain is correlated with human consciousness and nothing else in
> the universe is.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> and at the same time entertaining the contrary bad assumption that once
>>> emulated, data is literally independent of local physics.
>>>
>>
>> No one said that.
>>
>
> Isn't that what all of this teleporting is about?
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, May 15, 2013 8:45:04 AM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, May 14, 2013 7:14:26 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 14 May 2013, at 04:15, Pierz wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, May 14, 2013 12:13:19 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 13 May 2013, at 09:30, Pierz wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > On Monday, May 13, 2013 2:49:32 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The inside view comes when we agree that knowledge obeys to S4, and
>>>>>> we
>>>>>> recover S4 (S4Grz) by linking truth to belief.
>>>>>> In a sense, for a machine M1 much stronger than a machine M2, the
>>>>>> theology of M2 can be made mathematical. What M2 cannot do
>>>>>> "mathematically" is to lift that theology on herself, unless she bet
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (cautiously) on some self-correctness principle, but that cannot be
>>>>>> done in any 3p method, and usually math is considered as 3p-science,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> so that correctness is not a part of math, but on faith in some
>>>>>> reality made by the machine M2. Likewise, I decide to not look at
>>>>>> such
>>>>>> machine as zombie, and that means I project a non mathematical thing
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (my consciousness) on them. This too is not mathematical.
>>>>>> In fact some mathematicians understood already that the encompassing
>>>>>>
>>>>>> notion of "mathematical truth", or even just "arithmetical truth" is
>>>>>>
>>>>>> not accessible by mathematics. In practice, this is no problem
>>>>>> because
>>>>>> we hardly need such an encompassing notion, but in "theology" we need
>>>>>>
>>>>>> it for the inside views.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well I'll need to read the magical island story to make any sense of
>>>>> that.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Computerland or Numberland are more magic than the Wonderland :)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> A good book is Boolos 1979. A nice recreative introduction to G is
>>>>>> Smullyan's "Forever Undecided". In that last book it looks like it
>>>>>> concerns only people living in some fairy tale, with perfect liars
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> truth-tellers inhabiting some magic island, but that fairy tale is
>>>>>> shown to be the case for ideally perfect machines thanks to the
>>>>>> "famous" diagonalization lemma of Gödel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cool. Thanks for those references. A fairy tale! I can cope with that
>>>>> :)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nice. I will come back on this, soon or later on Russell's FOAR list.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I think you did a pretty good summary of the UDA(*). I am not sure
>>>>>> what you are missing. Feel free to try to point on an assumption
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> would have been made implicitly, or if a step is not valid. UDA1-7 is
>>>>>>
>>>>>> enough I think, as step 8 is more subtle, and can certainly be
>>>>>> clarified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (*) http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/**20**11/08/my-topic-universal-**
>>>>>> dovet**ailer-argument.html<http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ha! Nothing on the net is safe!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope :)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> (*) http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/**20**11/08/my-topic-universal-**
>>>>>> dovet**ailer-argument.html<http://clubofsc.blogspot.be/2011/08/my-topic-universal-dovetailer-argument.html>
>>>>>>      (I will reread it and answer some questions there asap)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I wrote that for my philosophy group quite some time ago (well, 2011
>>>>> as you can see). Since then I have gotten my head around step 8. My
>>>>> agnosticism about the argument stems not so much from having found a
>>>>> concrete flaw as from a lack of confidence in our understanding of the
>>>>> nature of consciousness (a question about the comp assumption itself), as
>>>>> well as an uncertainty about your use of arithmetical realism. I know you
>>>>> insist that your version of AR is "weak", but I wonder if you're not
>>>>> conflating types of "being". To be sure, I can accept "7 is prime" as an
>>>>> independently "existing" fact, but of all the problems of philosophy, the
>>>>> nature of what being is is surely one of the trickiest.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sure.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Our minds just don't seem to be well equipped to grasp something so
>>>>> fundamental - perhaps even the whole notion of being and non-being is
>>>>> unintelligible when enquired into deeply enough. There are propositions
>>>>> about the states of being in the world ("the cat is dead"), and there are
>>>>> propositions about propositions - purely logical ones (forgive my lack of
>>>>> rigorous philosophical terms here. I'm not an academic philosopher
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That's why you are clear and talk in an intelligible way. I am not an
>>>>> academic philosopher too. I am a biologist/psychologist/**theolog**ian
>>>>> who understood early that with comp, biology/psychology/theology admits
>>>>> mathematical (even arithmetical) foundations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and I can't recall the technical way of defining this distinction).
>>>>> You've merged the two, making statements about the world a special kind of
>>>>> logical statement. You've argued in effect in the MGA that this move is 
>>>>> the
>>>>> only elegant solution to the paradoxes that become apparent when the 
>>>>> notion
>>>>> of physical supervenience is pushed far enough. But it is a pretty massive
>>>>> leap. I see the appeal of the solution - but I've also wondered if
>>>>> paradoxes like the one exposed by the MGA aren't actually better seen as
>>>>> refutations of the comp hypothesis itself.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That remains logically possible.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The comp hypothesis is in a sense a naive one - one notices that
>>>>> computers can perform 'thinking-like' operations, solving problems that we
>>>>> use thought for, so one makes the leap that perhaps the mind itself is a
>>>>> computer.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, the brain, or the body, or the environment, at some level. The
>>>>> mind is a too fuzzy term, even with comp. It can be the software (still
>>>>> machine or number like), or the consciousness, which is more in the limit
>>>>> of the UD* than in any particular computations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This began as a natural hypothesis, before anyone saw the abyss that
>>>>> it inevitably and logically leads to. To my mind, the MGA is unnecessary.
>>>>> One can arrive at much the same point by imagining computations carried 
>>>>> out
>>>>> with hoses and buckets ("Olympia") or spread out over continents and
>>>>> centuries, with partial results passed around from one weird hose and
>>>>> bucket computer to another by letters, pigeons, arrangements of stones or
>>>>> whatever. How on earth can such a computational system contain
>>>>> consciousness?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Leibniz asked the same question with a brain, when look in details, it
>>>>> is not different from buckets and stone and pigeons, ... Consciousness is
>>>>> "in platonia", even a bit above (truth). The computational system just
>>>>> makes it possible for the "divine consciousness" to forget its divine
>>>>> nature and to concentrate on the terrestrial duties.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You really are forced either to abandon comp or to embrace the idea
>>>>> that it's the logical relations themselves that "create" the 
>>>>> consciousness.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK. I find this nice, as I tend to consider matter and physics as
>>>>> hiding problem, or even create it, due to the incorrect conception of
>>>>> reality (WYSIWYG, instead of non-wysiwig).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It stretches comp to the breaking point and throws one back on the
>>>>> whole problem of consciousness yet again. I see the appeal in your
>>>>> mathematical formalism, but it still leaves many strange unanswered
>>>>> questions, like where time comes from for instance.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Subjective time comes from the third hypostases (the first person,
>>>>> S4Grz1). Physical time is more mysterious and difficult to derive. It 
>>>>> might
>>>>> be just a local indexical gauge of some sort. Physicist have not solved
>>>>> that problem either.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe computationalism is just wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Absolutely. Even if true, it is unbelievable, from a purely rational
>>>>> standpoint. But there are also strong evidences for it, and few evidences
>>>>> for an alternative theory.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems a digital substitution *should* work, but do we know really
>>>>> enough to make that claim - or bet?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The next generation will not wait to know, they will accept copies,
>>>>> just to have a higher probability to see the next soccer cup or something.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Our understanding of the brain is still in its infancy and the
>>>>> philosophy of mind still flounders about in a logical quagmire (I've read
>>>>> the deeply unsatisfactory texts).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But we don't need to understand the brain to copy it. We can't really
>>>>> understand completely our own brain, and that's why I insist on the act of
>>>>> faith or theological aspect of comp.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are data from studies of psychedelics that are still *way* too
>>>>> confronting and radical for the mainstream to even dare to talk about
>>>>> because of the fear of being labelled a mystic and having one's reputation
>>>>> as a serious scientist trashed.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In my case some other people did a good job, without mentioning
>>>>> psychedelic. In a sense it makes me free to aboard such talk. But then,
>>>>> with salvia, I have got a better understanding that many people are not
>>>>> ready, neither for salvia, nor comp, nor QM or GR actually ...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What's appealing about your theory Bruno is that it does provide some
>>>>> kind of framework within which those data could make sense - I know you've
>>>>> talked about Someone-Who-Isn't-You's salvia experiences as fitting or
>>>>> supporting comp, and have argued for greater openness to the
>>>>> phenomenological evidence of psychedelics.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes. It is of course quite double edged today. Then salvia go quite
>>>>> farer than comp. I am overwhelmed by the data on consciousness and
>>>>> "reality" ....
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But the weakness of the arithmetical ontology is its permissiveness. I
>>>>> have grave doubts about your claims of testability. You've admitted that
>>>>> the mathematical problems of deriving physics from arithmetic are "hard".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We got already the quantum shape, but we have no hamiltonian, nor
>>>>> anything looking like a physical constant. It is works for the infinity of
>>>>> future generations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that is surely an understatement! The maths involves far too
>>>>> many infinities.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But that's not really a problem. On the contrary, those infinities are
>>>>> needed for having reasonable measure, and the modal logics can cope with
>>>>> the constraints for the certainty case, from which we can derive the logic
>>>>> they obey. The self-referential logics does bring a lot of information, 
>>>>> and
>>>>> notably that justifiable/non-justifiable distinction, and the negative
>>>>> (neo-platonist) aspect of the theology.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On the face of it, it seems to me that pure arithmetic would permit
>>>>> all self-consistent physics and any specific set of physical laws would be
>>>>> a local condition so to speak (mathematically, not spatially "local" of
>>>>> course).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not really. That's an advanatge of comp: the physics is unique and the
>>>>> same for all machines, but it is complex and has possible cluster of
>>>>> multiverse (multi-multi-verse, intermediate realities between heaven and
>>>>> earth, etc.).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There's also the question of measuring infinite sets - a problem
>>>>> raised by Deutsch in "The Beginning of Infinity" when critiquing ideas
>>>>> similar to yours. I've asked about this before but you assured me Deutsch
>>>>> was wrong and you were right - alas my maths was not up to disputing the
>>>>> point. But I still wonder how it's possible to measure the proportion of
>>>>> infinite sets of computations. If I have some function f(), then I can 
>>>>> also
>>>>> imagine some function f1() where f1() = f() +1 -1. Then of course I get
>>>>> f2() = f1() +1 -1, f3() =... etc up to f()inf, all equivalent to f(). So
>>>>> deriving a proportional measure seems impossible, since every function can
>>>>> be calculated in an infinite number of (admittedly more or less efficient
>>>>> or inefficient) ways.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But infinities makes measure theory more easy. And the
>>>>> self-referential constraints put a lot of order there. But of course, this
>>>>> leads to very hard mathematical questions (one of which has been solved by
>>>>> Vandenbussche).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Phew. So, in a word I find appeal in your ideas, but despite
>>>>> recognizing the force of the argument, I remain agnostic on the initial
>>>>> assumption of comp
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am too. That's why I am not a philosopher, but a scientist. A
>>>>> scientist does not defend that a theory is true. Only that it is testable,
>>>>> and then he can love it for its elegance, but true? Nobody knows,
>>>>> especially for comp, we just can't know (but we can be deluded in 
>>>>> believing
>>>>> we know, like after surviving, apparently, with a  digital body).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and am as inclined to see the UDA as an argument *against* comp as to
>>>>> see it as an inevitable conclusion.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Without QM Everett, I would have thought so. But the MW looks like a
>>>>> confirmation of the most startling consequence of comp, that we are
>>>>> multiple. It does not make comp true, but it makes it quite plausible with
>>>>> the current knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Truth is bigger than us, (a proposition I know you agree with), and
>>>>> Truth I suspect is bigger than mathematics, bigger even than arithmetical
>>>>> truth which incompleteness shows is beyond the reach of formulation. In
>>>>> these deep realms we are over our heads in mystery and I'm suspicious of
>>>>> any reduction to rationality.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, here rationality forces us to see the limit of that reduction,
>>>>> like if the left brain can see the grandeur and depth, and the necessity,
>>>>> of the right brain. This really gives sense, informally and formally, to
>>>>> Plato. Even if false, all this can help to open our mind, and have fun.
>>>>> Then comp gives a sense of modesty, which I like very much, notably it
>>>>> reminds us that we are linked to something that we cannot reduce in any 3p
>>>>> manner, so it looks more like a vaccine against reductionism (notably of
>>>>> numbers and machines) than a reductionism.
>>>>> I certainly love comp. But, like salvia, this does not mean I believe
>>>>> they are true. Just very interesting, quite mind blowing, and, as far as I
>>>>> can know, rather plausible.
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, here's to all that! That's an attitude I can applaud. Thanks
>>>> again for your generous response.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**march**al/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>>
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