On 7/16/2013 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Tuesday, July 16, 2013 4:18:09 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

    On 7/16/2013 12:37 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


    On Monday, July 15, 2013 6:32:28 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

        On 7/15/2013 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
        Would this kind of universality of human sense-making be likely if the
        connections between words, shapes, and feelings were purely 
computational?

        Why not? Being a broken line vs a differentiable line is a computable
        property.  The difference between "k" sounds and "b" sounds is 
computable.  So
        I'm not sure what you're getting at.  Or are you asking how "k" came to 
be
        associated with "broken line" or how the written letter "k" was 
associated with
        the phonetic sound of "k"?


    I'm saying that a computer which is programmed to differentiate between the
    phonemes of 'ki-ki' and 'bou-ba' would have zero chance of associating 
either of
    them with the curvy figure or the pointy figure without some arbitrary link 
being
    provided programmatically. This suggests that there exists within human 
experience
    purely aesthetic, elemental associations which are synthetic a priori 
rather than
    arrived at mechanically. A computer can't tell that there is anything 
inherently
    curvy about the sound of bouba, but a person can.

    Sez you.  I think you're just suffering from a failure of imagination.


You say failure of imagination, I say success avoiding the pathetic fallacy.

And success in stroking your ego that wants humans to be special.

Brent

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