I pretty much agree with you Jason. The materialist simply posits that the conciousness of a person (or conscious being) represents a static track through the 4d block universe, misperceived as changing due to something about the way the brain processes. What this account fails to explain however is the moment "now", or rather why I am at this moment now rather than another or all at once. This is the same as saying that it fails to account for subjectivity, because from a purely objective point of view -ie one that does not take into account any observer's experience - there is no problem. From outside of the experience of any individual observer, there are just bodies moving/behaving in space-time. Materialists/scientists are so accustomed to seeing the world from this abstracted perspective that they don't see any particular problem with this elimination of the subject. But in making this move, it has already removed consciousness from the reality it attempts to explain. A true theory of everything would need to explain the mysteries of I-ness (why am I me and not someone else) and now-ness (why am I now rather than somewhen else). The whole conflict between materialists and sundry others who can't accept a purely material world view seems to come down to how comfortable a person is with eliminating the conscious subject's experience from their account of the world. It's not a matter of wishful thinking or stupidity, as some materialists seem to imply - it comes down to a deep suspicion that the manoeuvre to eliminate 'I' and 'now' is philosophically illegitimate. Note that even Bruno's comp does this with time - there is no representation in the model of the 'current moment' or why there is an illusion of a current moment or of change over time. And though I frequently find Craig's Weinberg's ideas woolly and unconvincing, I do agree with him that the qualia are still deeply mysterious in comp, that they arise "for no reason at all" except that we have observed that they exist, so we postulate that they are "somehow" the inside view of a computation.