On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 3:42:53 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 9/3/2013 12:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: 
> > Telmo and Brent, 
> > 
> > The Humean quote sums it up nicely. You can think of a human as a 
> collection of desires 
> > and a reasoning process that arbitrates between and attempts to realize 
> them. In the 
> > process of reasoning, one might bring about new desires, but reasoning 
> is always 
> > employed by desires one currently has. 
> > 
> > Just couple days ago I was trying futilely to logically deduce what it 
> is that I should 
> > want to do, I realized that "logic is the servant of desire," (im not 
> quite as eloquent 
> > as hume, it seems...) and to find a logically justified want is futile. 
> Desire is 
> > inherently illogical. 
>
> I'd say "extralogical".  That doesn't mean though that your desires aren't 
> caused (by 
> evolution, by metabolism,...).  Many of them may even be predictable - 
> that's how 
> advertising agencies make a living. 
>

*Your* desires can be included in your experience by evolution, etc, 
provided that desire in general exists as a possibility in the universe. No 
amount of statistical reproduction of inanimate objects or unconscious 
machines could cause a desire to appear out of nowhere though. Could it? 
Why would it?

Craig
 

>
> > Turns out Hume beat me to this insight by quite a bit, but I suppose he 
> had a head start, =p 
> > 
> > It seems that if we were completely logical, we would simply cease to 
> function 
>
> Dostoevsky beat you to that one, "If everything on Earth were rational, 
> nothing would 
> happen."  But he had a head start too. :-) 
>
>
> Brent 
>

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