Re: Unexpected Hanging

```On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 17 Sep 2013, at 11:49, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Sep 2013, at 10:37, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 14 Sep 2013, at 04:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> <snip>
>>>
>>>
>>> With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at the
>>> ontological level, is what make true a sentence like "ExP(x)". So number
>>> exists, once we assume arithmetic or combinators ..., because they make
>>> true
>>> Ex(x = x). And then (and only then), we can define different notions of
>>> epistemological existence, and they will be as many notion of existence
>>> as
>>> we have modalities (notably those coming from incompleteness, as they are
>>> unavoidable.  They will make true proposition with the shape [] Ex []
>>> P(x),
>>> or []<> Ex [] <> P(x), etc...
>>
>>
>> Ok, nice. I'm slowly getting used to modal logic. It's a weird thing
>> to learn because it seems to require removing things from your thought
>> process rather than adding them (at least for me). It's hard because
>> it's simple.
>
>
>
> That's the idea of math and logic. It is abstraction. it simplifies, indeed.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> So we will get notions of psychological
>>> existence, physical existence, etc.
>>
>>
>> Ok, but what is the computational substrate?
>
>
> *any* first order logical specification of *any* turing universal system
> will do.
>
> I suggest a very tiny part of arithmetic, but the S and K combinators will
> do as well, or the Unitary group, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> There is still a
>> dissatisfaction in having to just accept it. I guess one can go back
>> to the idea of God, in a way.
>
>
> God created 0, and its successors, and then said to them add, and multiply.```
```
Ok. I'm agnostic, so I don't cringe at this sort of statement. I guess
I'm also an atheist, because I reject the idea of anthropomorphised
gods, but that's irrelevant here. My dissatisfaction with this is
empirical: god has been used so many times to cover up for our lack of
knowledge that, when confronted with current lack of knowledge and one
hears the word "god" one tends to become suspicious. On the other
hand, if there is something fundamental we provably can't know, I
guess it's fair enough to call that thing "god". But I think we should
be extra-extra-careful before making that move.

> All the rest is what emerge from a universal matrix of cohering
> Computations/dreams (1-computations, 3-computation) provably existing as a
> consequence of the addition and multiplication laws.
>
> If you can believe that 17 is prime, independently of you, then you can
> understand, that, if you assume computationalism, arithmetic, as seen from
> different internal self-referential view, contains such "universal matrix",
> or the universal dovetailing or any sigma_1 complete set of number, or a
> Post creative set, a universal purpose computer, reflecting itself.
>
> Arithmetic provides the block-mindscape. The existence and unicity of a
> block multiverse emerging from it is basically unsolved, nor even yet made
> enough precise.
>
>
>
>
>
>> It's just what is. But then this is an
>> ontological statement. Does this substrate exist? You can not use the
>> previous reasoning to support its existence, or can you?
>
>
> I can't.  I only justify why machines develop such beliefs, even for "good"
> (relatively correct for they local purpose in their probable history)
> reason. Just that the physical reality is not the fundamental reality. The
> physical reality is a complex self-referential sum made by a universal
> machine/number, and selected or varied through first person (sometimes
> plural) experiences.
>
> There is no substrate (in that picture). Just dreams, or limit on
> computations, probably related to (Turing) Universal group, braids, as the
> empirical evidences suggest, but that is what we must recover from the
> machine looking inside (in different ways corresponding to the intensional
> variants, the arithmetical hypostases).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> Even events seen in dreams get some
>>> notion of existence, for example.
>>
>>
>> That's nice. I even have problems with statements like "batman doesn't
>> exist".
>
>
> Really?
>
> I will send you a video!
>
>
>
>> Doesn't he, in some sense?
>
>
> Certainly, in many sense. He has "real" cousins, like jetman:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=BE&v=x2sT9KoII_M

A batman with a french accent! Coincidence?

>
> And certainly not, in some common sense.
>
> Here, with comp, it is easy at the start, only 0, s(0), s(s(0), ... exist.
>
> The rest will come from the many relationships the number inherits from the
> + and * laws. (+ the comp invariance of consciousness manifestation and
> experience for the digital substitution at some level). That gives the
> relative perceptions, the dreams, the beliefs, and (but only God knows), the
> truth.
>
> If we don't recover common sense existence, we fail. But unless comp is
> false, why should it contradicts common sense? Thanks to Everett we do have
> evidence of sharable histories and stable first person scenarios. Comp get
> close to solipsism, but should avoid it.

But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where
there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No?

> Comp will doubtfully change most of
> physics, no more than evolution can changed actual biology.

Right. Or even evolution itself can be seen in a new light under the
MWI, but there's no reason to reject it. It might just not be the
ultimate approximation to truth (like classical vs. modern physics).

>
>
>
>> We cannot invite him for coffee but
>> we can talk about him and we all know what we're talking about.
>
>
> No doubt.
>
> I think that with comp you don't have to believe in anything more than the
> independence of the numbers' properties and relationships.
>
> Plato's God is truth, and with comp, if sigma_1 truth is enough for the
> ontology, you need much more than the arithmetical truth, to get the inside
> view(s) and their mathematics.
>
> Fortunately, this is reflected only on the first order extensions of the
> arithmetic hypostases. That has been worked out for G and G* by the Russian
> and Georgian logicians. See Boolos 1993 for this.
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
```