On 1 October 2013 09:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a 100%
> probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember being the
> Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that the Helsinki man
> had more than one future.
> Nicely and succinctly put. In comp the "duplicated man" indeed has more
than one future.
Bruno is distinguishing between our "overview" and the man's personal point
of view, and ISTM that this is analogous to a scientist performing a
schrodinger's cat type experiment. The scientist naturally assigns a 50%
chance to each outcome, even though he knows that he's duplicated by worlds
splitting, and that in reality "he will see both" (i.e. he has more than
one future). Similarly the guy in Helsinki assigns a 50% chance to
"himself" arriving in Washington, and ditto for Moscow. But from our "third
person" perspective, he arrives in both places. I can't see that this is
problematic, if we accept the MWI then the comp thought experiment is very
similar. But there seems to be a lot of trouble with the comp version for
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