Opps. I replied before reading the entire discussion

On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 9:08 AM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote: > Pierz: Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, > fungible universes. > Richard: How do you know this? Who said so? > Besides the branches must contain a finite number of identical universes > for probabilities to be realized. > Dividing infinity by any number results in an infinity. > > > On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:11 PM, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm >> not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI >> by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my >> understanding of Deutsch's version of MWI, the reason for Born >> probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a "single >> branch". Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, >> fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite >> universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The >> appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication >> of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic? >> >> On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian >>> quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN >>> PRESS. >>> >>> ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, >>> emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The >>> possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, >>> in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the >>> ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the >>> Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch >>> ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that >>> Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. >>> First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the >>> theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not >>> successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to >>> put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of >>> rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not >>> rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for >>> setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and >>> which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, >>> and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue >>> that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the >>> probability problem in EQM persists. >>> >>> http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.**pdf <http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf> >>> Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May >>> 2012) >>> ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, >>> British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming >>> ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 >>> 78(5): 976-988 >>> ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, >>> (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) >>> ‘Conﬁrmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): >>> 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) >>> >>> His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available >>> in: >>> ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): >>> Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational >>> Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association >>> Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer >>> >>> I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI >>> probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by >>> members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally >>> convincing. >>> >>> Richard >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.