On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:03:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Oct 2013, at 06:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 12, 2013 12:27:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Oct 2013, at 09:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 11, 2013 11:32:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:37:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: 
>>>>>>> > http://online.wsj.com/article/****SB1000142405270230349250457911**
>>>>>>> **5310362925246.html<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html>
>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers 
>>>>>>> don't 
>>>>>>> > understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A 
>>>>>>> mechanical 
>>>>>>> > description of a function is not the same thing as participating 
>>>>>>> in an 
>>>>>>> > experience. 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can 
>>>>>>> perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic 
>>>>>>> sensibility, 
>>>>>>> it must have aesthetic sensibility. 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The 
>>>>>> failure of digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence is not 
>>>>>> testable unless you yourself become a digital mechanism. There can never 
>>>>>> be 
>>>>>> a test of aesthetic sensibility because testing is by definition 
>>>>>> anesthetic. To test is to measure into a system of universal 
>>>>>> representation. Measurement is the removal of presence for the purpose 
>>>>>> of 
>>>>>> distribution as symbol. I can draw a picture of a robot correctly 
>>>>>> identifying a vegetable, but that doesn't mean that the drawing of the 
>>>>>> robot is doing anything. I can make a movie of the robot cartoon, or a 
>>>>>> sculpture, or an animated sculpture that has a sensor for iodine or 
>>>>>> magnesium which can be correlated to a higher probability of a 
>>>>>> particular 
>>>>>> vegetable, but that doesn't change anything at all. There is still no 
>>>>>> robot 
>>>>>> except in our experience and our expectations of its experience. The 
>>>>>> robot 
>>>>>> is not even a zombie, it is a puppet playing back recordings of our 
>>>>>> thoughts in a clever way.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers did 
>>>>>> a better job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite this 
>>>>>> article?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a 
>>>>> fundamental difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic 
>>>>> awareness. 
>>>>> If there were no difference, then I would expect that the problems that 
>>>>> supermarket computers would have would not be related to its 
>>>>> unconsciousness, but to unreliability or even willfulness developing. Why 
>>>>> isn't the story "Automated cashiers have begun throwing temper tantrums 
>>>>> at 
>>>>> some locations which are contagious to certain smart phones that now 
>>>>> become 
>>>>> upset in sympathy...we had anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda 
>>>>> yadda"? 
>>>>> I think it's pretty clear why. For the same reason that all machines will 
>>>>> always fall short of authentic personality and sensitivity.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So you would just say that computers lack authentic personality and 
>>>> sensitivity, no matter what they did.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Beyond question, yes. I wouldn't just say it, I would bet my life on it, 
>>> because I understand it completely.
>>>
>>
>> Do you believe that computers can perform any task a human can perform? 
>> If not, what is an example of a relatively simple task that a computer 
>> could never perform? 
>>
>>
>> I thought Craig just made clear that computers might performs as well as 
>> humans, and that even in that case, he will not attribute sense and 
>> aesthetic to them.
>> This was already clear with my sun-in-law (who got an artificial brain, 
>> and who can't enjoy a good meal at his restaurant). 
>>
>> He call them puppets, but he believes in philosophical zombies.
>>
>
> I don't believe in philosophical zombies. I use puppet because a puppet 
> implies an absence of conscious presence, which is an ordinary condition of 
> macrocosmic objects as we seem them, because the sensation associated with 
> them belongs to a distant frame (microcosm). 
>
>
> All object are conscious?
>

No objects are conscious.
 

>
>
>
> A zombie is supernatural because rather than the seeming absence of 
> presence (normal), they imply the presence of absence, 
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> which is unnatural and cannot exist. There can be no undead, only the 
> unlive.
>  
>
>>
>> He is coherent, but invalid in his debunking of comp. He debunks only the 
>> 19th century conception of machines (controllable physical beings).
>>
>
> I think that I also debunk the 21st century reality of machines. The 
> promissory mechanism offered by comp is purely a theoretical futurism - 
>
>
> Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview such machines. 
>

Are there any such machines available to interview online?
 

>
>
>
> which I would not object to at all, but in this case, it so happens that 
> it is not applicable to the universe that we actually live in. 
>
>
> Let me say it simply: I don't believe in universe(s). I have few doubt 
> that there is a physical reality, but I have no evidence it comes from 
> something like an (aristotelian) universe.
>

Universe to me is just a way of saying 'everything that we are connected 
to'.
 

>
>
>
> It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to its own 
> blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics comes at a cost 
> which mathematics has no choice but to deny completely. Because mathematics 
> cannot lie, 
>
>
> G* proves <>[]f
>
> Even Peano Arithmetic can lie.  
> Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie.
>
> Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such.
>

 Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing as an 
intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves <>[]f' means 
but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who understands it, and 
not something different to the boss than it does to the neighbor.


>
>
> it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how 
> sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can never 
> transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and authenticity. 
>
>
> That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct 
> sufficiently rich machines.
>

Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines, cannot 
intentionally lie or tell the truth either?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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