On Monday, October 14, 2013 12:13:43 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:05:46 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 13 Oct 2013, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Saturday, October 12, 2013 3:54:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
> >> On 10/12/2013 12:49 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: 
> >>> Yes, but you see, even the food we get from the restaurant, is   
> >>> delicious. Why would it be delicious, assuming        COMP. How   
> >>> could the primary modalities of things be good or bad assuming   
> >>> COMP? I know most people here think Craig is a hand waver, but I   
> >>> honestly cannot understand how qualia emerge from quantia,   
> >>> including their(meaning, my experiences) magically "emerge" from   
> >>> the many quants that Bruno's idea seems to require. 
> >> 
> >> Emergence is a description of how we think about our models of the   
> >> world - not something in the world.  So Bruno has a theory in which   
> >> some parts are true but incommunicable.  He identifies these with   
> >> qualia because that is (supposedly) a characteristic of qualia.   
> >> That's actually how all scientific theories work: you hypothesize a   
> >> model, including connections to observations and see if it has   
> >> explanatory and predictive power. 
> >> 
> >> Isn't the the characteristic of "true but incommunicable" math a   
> >> rather thin premise to suggest that the incommunicability of some   
> >> truth = the appearance of flavors, colors, sounds, etc? 
> > 
> > "true but incommunicable" applies to three hypostases, and thus get   
> > three different logics. How do you know in advance that one of them   
> > will not throw some light on the qualia problem? Try to answer this   
> > without begging the question. 
> > 
> > I think that that it is the failure of logic to access qualia in any   
> > way which throws light on the nature of qualia. Experience cannot   
> > logically follow from rules, 
>
>  From only logical rules? Right. 
>
> But logical rules + addition and multiplication?


Why should addition and multiplication be seen as something other than 
rules?
 

> Quite the contrary,   
> you get the dreams, the semantical fixed points, accepting standard   
> definition. 
>

If standard definitions of addition and multiplication give us dreams, then 
comp would already be true by definition. Of course, I would expect that 
fully formed movies should appear at random all over the place, bleeding in 
between objects and empty space.
 

>
> Don't confuse logic, which strictly speaking has no subject domain,   
> and arithmetic, which talk about something which seems to transcend us   
> and is non axiomatizable. 
>

Sure it transcends us, because it's a habit of organization that cuts 
across all experience orthogonally. You seem to be turning its 
impersonality into super-personality.
 

>
>
>
> > but rules can logically follow from experience. 
>
> That might happen, but logic+number is more conceptually simple than   
> experience, 


If that's true, its only because conceptual simplicity already supervenes 
on experiential depth. 
 

> and as I said, I want to explain what I understand the   
> less from what I have a better understanding. 
>

? 

>
>
>
> > In order for any rule to be followed, it must be sensed in a way   
> > which motivates a voluntary effect on some level of description. 
>
> Few will agree with this. 
>

I agree. It may be a long time before more people catch up :)
 

>
>
> > 
> > If it were otherwise, and metaphysical rules could impregnate   
> > experience/physics from on high, then experience and physics would   
> > both be logically redundant. 
>
> I can accept this. It is redundant like theorems are redundant in the   
> their theories. You betray that you are against any theory of   
> experience and physics. You refuse the very idea that we might be able   
> to grasp where experience and physics come from. 
> The fact that it seems impossible, is made invalid, as machines can   
> already understand that this has to look impossible. 
>

I have no problem with it having to look impossible, but I have a problem 
with it looking superfluous. If we want to explain qualia, we can't start 
by saying that anything which can't be disproved as the cause of qualia 
should be considered an adequate explanation, just by virtue of its 
mechanism being hidden. If there are reasons why quantitative processes are 
not available to public inspection, that's fine, but it hardly explains 
anything having to do with qualia. 


>
>
>
> > In a universe made of rules ruling over each other in silent and   
> > invisible information pantomime, there would be no logical use for   
> > qualia. 
>
> Qualia have many roles, from chunking information to creating the   
> sharable quanta appearance.


Chunking information requires only a compression algorithm, not the 
invention of flavor. The idea of quanta having an appearance is begging the 
question. It is pretty obvious to me that running a program does not 
require that data 'appears' - which is why we need a video screen to help 
with that.
 

> Qualia are unavoidable, in comp +   
> classical theory of knowledge and belief. 
>

Only from the retrospective view. There is no theory which prospectively 
predicts any such thing as 'qualia'. If you dig a hole, you can put qualia 
in it, but no hole tells you that it has been dug for that purpose.
 

>
>
>
>
> > To say that we should assume that there is a use and that physical   
> > experiences can follow metaphysical-theoretic rules is a worthwhile   
> > exercise, certainly, and I think that it does shed some light on   
> > qualia, but I think that it will always make more sense to put the   
> > head in front of the tail, i.e., that counting apples is a function   
> > of our wanting to know about apples, 
>
> Sure, when you buy apples for the dinner or something. 
>
>
> > not a function of numbers wanting to know about themselves through   
> > us and the apples. 
>
> ? 
>

I'm saying that it makes no sense for numbers to express themselves to 
other numbers in a non-numerical form. The whole idea of specific 
non-numerical forms is not really explainable in numerical terms - maybe 
the concept of non-numerical can be mentioned from within mathematics, but 
I doubt that any particular non-numeric phenomenon can be used by 
mathematics.
 

>
>
>
>
> > If that difference between head and tail cannot be proved   
> > mathematically, that does not surprise me, for the same reason that   
> > physics cannot locate free will or awareness. The head can see the   
> > tail but the tail can only see the head as another part of   
> > itself....fallacy of the instrument. 
>
> ? 
>

If you are completely color blind, it is easy to prove to yourself that 
colors do not exist.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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