On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, October 14, 2013 4:37:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 10:54 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:08:01 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 4:52 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> It's not that computers can't do what humans do, it's that they can't
>>>>>> experience anything. Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose music, 
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it is Mozart. 
>>>>>> It's
>>>>>> a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized that has 
>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> at all to do with humans.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So you think "strong AI" is wrong. OK. But why can't computers
>>>>> experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming
>>>>> people are complicated machines?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I think Craig would say he does think computers (and many/all other
>>>> things) do experience something,
>>>>
>>>
>>> You're half right. I would say:
>>>
>>> 1. All experiences correspond to some natural thing.
>>> 2. Not all things are natural things. Bugs Bunny has no independent
>>> experience, and neither does Pinocchio.
>>> 3. Computers are made of natural things but, like all machines, are
>>> ultimately assembled unnaturally.
>>> 4. The natural things that machines are made of would have to be very
>>> low level, i.e., not gears but the molecules that make up the gears.
>>>
>>> Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the
>>> only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They
>>> don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an
>>> experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic
>>> conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any
>>> particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom
>>> of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some
>>> radically different time scale from ours.
>>>
>>> It's not really important - the main thing is to see how there is no
>>> substitute for experience and a machine which is assembled from unrelated
>>> parts has no experience and cannot gain new experience in an alien context.
>>>
>>> I think that a machine (or any inanimate object or symbol) can also
>>> serve as a vehicle for synchronicity. That's a completely different thing
>>> because it is the super-personal, holistic end of the sensible spectrum,
>>> not the sub-personal, granular end. The creepiness of a ventriloquist dummy
>>> is in our imagination, but that too is 'real' in an absolute sense. If your
>>> life takes you on a path which tempts you to believe that machines are
>>> conscious, then the super-personal lensing of your life will stack the deck
>>> just enough to let you jump to those conclusions. It's what we would call
>>> supernatural or coincidental, depending on which lens we use to define
>>> it..  
>>> http://s33light.org/post/**62173912616<http://s33light.org/post/62173912616>
>>> (Don't you want to have a body?)
>>>
>>
>> After reading this ( 
>> http://marshallbrain.com/**discard1.htm<http://marshallbrain.com/discard1.htm>
>>  )
>> I am not so sure...
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>  just that it is necessarily different from what we experience. The
>>>> reason for this has something to do with our history as biological
>>>> organisms (according to his theory).
>>>>
>>>
>>> Right, although not necessarily just biological history, it could be
>>> chemical too. We may have branched off from anything that could be made
>>> into a useful machine (servant to alien agendas) long before life on Earth.
>>>
>>>
>> What if humanity left behind a nano-technology that eventually evolved
>> into mechanical organisms like dogs and fish, would they have animal like
>> experiences despite that they descended from "unnatural" things?
>>
>
> The thing that makes sense to me is that the richness of sensation and
> intention are inversely proportionate to the degree to which a phenomenon
> can be controlled from the outside. If we put nano-tech extensions on some
> living organism, then sure, the organism could learn how to use those
> extensions and evolve a symbiotic post-biology. I don't think that project
> would be controllable though. They would not be machines in the sense that
> they would not necessarily be of service to those who created them.
>


Craig,

Thanks for your answer.  That was not quite what I was asking though.
Let's say the nano-tech did not extend some living organism, but were some
entirely autonomous, entirely artificial  cell-like structures, which could
find and utilize energy sources in the environment and reproduce
themselves.  Let's say after millions (or billions) of years, these
self-replicating nanobots evolved into "multi-cellular" organisms like
animals we are familiar with today. Could they have experiences like other
biological creatures that have a biological lineage? If not, why not?

Jason

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