On 14 Oct 2013, at 22:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:

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On Monday, October 14, 2013 3:17:06 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Oct 2013, at 20:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Sunday, October 13, 2013 5:03:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: All object are conscious? No objects are conscious.We agree on this.Not at all. It is here and now. I have already interview suchmachines.Are there any such machines available to interview online?I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a goodfree lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral descriptionof the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper andpencils, and appears in books and papers.You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study morelogic too.Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newerthan 20 years old,

`That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if`

`that was true, that would prove nothing.`

and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments?

Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appearsthat there has not been any promise for it in quite some time.It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind toits own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematicscomes at a cost which mathematics has no choice but to denycompletely. Because mathematics cannot lie,G* proves <>[]f Even Peano Arithmetic can lie. Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie. Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such.Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thingas an intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves<>[]f' means but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone whounderstands it, and not something different to the boss than itdoes to the neighbor.Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines(a lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non-monotonical umbrella, saving the LĂ´bian machines from the constantmistakes and lies they do, provides different interpretation of []f,likeI dream, I die, I get mad, I am in a cul-de-sac I get wrong etc. It will depend on the intensional nuances in play.Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes orcolored pixels instead?

Why not. Humans can do that too.

it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter howsophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it cannever transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, andauthenticity.That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correctsufficiently rich machines.Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines,cannot intentionally lie or tell the truth either?No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justifythat if they are correct they can't express it, and if they areconsistent, it will be consistent they are wrong. So it means theycan eventually exploits the false locally. Team of universal numbersget entangled in very subtle prisoner dilemma.Universal machines can lie, and can crash.That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that theymust, not that they can lie intentionally because they enjoy it orout of sadism.

That sounds like an opportunistic inference. Bruno

Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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