On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 5:34:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 16 Oct 2013, at 14:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 4:21:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>>>> I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good 
>>>> free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the 
>>>> interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and 
>>>> appears 
>>>> in books and papers.
>>>> You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic 
>>>> too.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 
>>> 20 years old, 
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>>> That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that 
>>> was true, that would prove nothing.
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>> It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If 
>> this is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not 
>> saying it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that 
>> this is as fertile an area as you imply.
>>
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>> A revolutionary contemporary result (Gödel's incompleteness) shows that 
>> the oldest definition of knowledge (greeks, chinese, indians) can be 
>> applied to the oldest philosophy, mechanism, and that this is indeed very 
>> fertile, if only by providing an utterly transparent arithmetical 
>> interpretation of Plotinu's theology, which is the peak of the rationalist 
>> approach in that field, and you say that this instill any confidence in 
>> mechanism?
>>
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> It doesn't instill confidence of your interpretation of incompleteness. 
> For myself, and I am guessing for others, incompleteness is about the 
> lack-of-completeness of mathematical systems rather than a 
> hyper-completeness of arithmetic metaphysics. 
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> The whole point here is that the machines prove their own theorem about 
> themselves.
>

Which is why their proofs are not reliable as general principles. If you 
ask people who cannot hear about music, they might confirm each others view 
that music consists only of vibrations that you can feel through your body.
 

> The meta-arithmetic belongs to arithmetic. I don't say much more than what 
> the machines already say. I just need the classical theory of knowledge 
> (the modal logic S4), just to compare with the machine's theory (S4Grz), 
> like I need QM to compare with the machines's statistics on computation 
> seen from inside.
>

I think that all theories of logic are incestuous and ungrounded.
 

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> Do you say that Gödel was a supporter of the Plotinus view, or are saying 
> that even he didn't realize the implications.
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> Gödel was indeed a defender of platonism, at the start. But he has been 
> quite slow on Church thesis, and not so quick on mechanism either. That is 
> suggested notably by his leaning toward Anselm notion of God.
>

Platonism is alright, but it just doesn't go far enough. It takes the 
ability to sense forms for granted.
 

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> The reductionist view of machines may be wrong, but that doesn't mean that 
> its absence of rules at higher level translates into proprietary feelings, 
> sounds, flavors, etc. Why would it? 
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> Why not? Evidences are that a brain does that. You need to find something 
> non-Turing emulable in the brain to provide evidences that it does not.
>

No, I don't need to find something non-Turing emulable in the brain, any 
more than I need to find something non-pixel descriptive in a TV set to 
provide evidence that a TV show can have characters and dialogue.
 

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> In theory it could, sure, but the universe that we live in seems to 
> suggest exactly the opposite.
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> But we can understand what is that universe, and why it suggests this, for 
> the machine "embedded" in that apparent universe.
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I have no problem with using mathematics to describe a theoretical 
universe. I don't even say that such a universe could not be real, I only 
say that the universe which hosts our experience does not quite make sense 
as a mathematical universe.
 

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>> It says that we must give the undead a chance to be alive - that we 
>> cannot know for sure whether a machine is not at least as worthy of our 
>> love as a newborn baby. 
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>> You cannot do that comparison. Is an newborn alien worthy of human love? 
>> Other parameters than "thinking and consciousness" are at play.
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> What are those parameters, and how do they fit in with mechanism?
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> The parameters are that love asks for some close familiarity. It fits with 
> mechanism through long computational histories.
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You can have long computational histories without inventing love, surely?
 

> Anyway, it is up to you to find something non mechanical. I don't defend 
> comp, I just try to show why your methodology to criticize comp is not 
> valid.
>

I already am something non mechanical, and all of the qualia that has ever 
been experienced.
 

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>> To fight this seduction, 
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>> You beg the question. You are the one creating an enemy here. Just from 
>> your prejudice and lack of reflexion on machines.
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> Sometimes an enemy creates themselves.
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> That is weird for an enemy about which you reject the autonomy.
>

I'm speaking figuratively. To be more literal I would say, 'sometimes our 
subconscious intelligence helps us break out of a delusion by projecting 
enemy archetypes on that which reflects our delusion'.


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>> we must use what is our birthright as living beings. We can be 
>> opportunistic, we can cheat, and lie, and unplug machines whenever we want, 
>> because that is what makes us superior to recorded logic. We are alive, so 
>> we get to do whatever we want to that which is not alive.
>>
>>
>> Here you are more than invalid. You are frightening. 
>> We have compared you to racist, and what you say now reminds me of the 
>> strategy used by Nazy to "prove" that the white caucasian were superior. 
>> Lies, lies and lies.
>>
>> We can lie, machines can lie, but I am not sure it is the best science, 
>> or the best politics.
>> With comp, God = Truth, and lies are Devil's play.
>>
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> If there is a chance that a machine will be born that is like me, only 
> billions of times more capable and more racist than I am against all forms 
> of life, wouldn't you say that it would be worth trying to stop at all 
> costs?
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> Should we prevent human birth because it might lead to people like Hitler? 
> You are pushing the precaution principle too far.
>

You don't have any basis to judge the likelihood though. Any random person 
who was given tremendous power could become Hitler.
 

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>> But thanks for warning us about the way you proceed.
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>> This does not help for your case,
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> I am just the beginning. Your sun in law will make me seem like Snoopy.
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> Your negative idea can been used by less scrupulous people I'm afraid.
>

I wouldn't support anti-technology activism, I only say that there is 
almost no chance that the result will be what we currently assume it should 
be.

Craig
 

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> Bruno
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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