On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, October 18, 2013 10:34:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 15:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On 18 October 2013 12:24, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>> The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain
>>> processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B,
>>> is
>>> associated with different brain processes. The brain processes
>>> associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B.
>>> That
>>> is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the
>>> physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the
>>> former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about
>>> the supervenient consciousness.
>>
>>
>> Ok, I can work with this. First let me say that, given your
>> assumptions,
>> your reasoning is absolutely correct. The assumptions themselves,
>> although I
>> don't think they are even conscious, are also completely
>> reasonable. That is
>> a perfectly reasonable expectation about nature, and it is one that
>> I myself
>> shared until fairly recently.
>>
>> Starting with the first assumption: >"The decision to go to the
>> store, A, is
>> associated with certain brain processes"
>>
>> To that I say, lets slow down a moment. What do we know about about
>> the
>> association? As far as I know, what we know is that
>>
>> 1) measurable changes in brain activity occur in synchronization to
>> self-reported or experimentally inferred changes in subjective
>> states.
>> 2) the regions of the brain affected have been mapped with a high
>> degree of
>> consistency and specificity (although the anomalies, such as with
>> people who
>> live seemingly normal lives with large parts of their brain
>> 'missing' makes
>> that kind of morphological approach potentially naive)
>> 3) that externally induced brain changes will induce changes in
>> subjective
>> experience (so that brain changes cannot be epiphenomenal).
>>
>> What we do not know is that
>>
>> 4) the entirety of our experiences are literally contained within the
>> tissues of the brain, or its activities.
>> 5) that the brain activity which we can observe with our contemporary
>> instruments is the only causal agent of subjective experience.
>
> OK up to here.
>
>> 6) that subjective experiences cannot cause observable brain
>> changes (to the
>> contrary, we count on subjects being able to voluntarily and
>> spontaneously
>> change their own brain activity).
>
> We don't know this for sure, but it goes against every scientific
> observation. If a subjective experience is supervenient on the
> underlying physical process then the observable brain changes can all
> be attributed to this underlying physical process.

The subjective experience cannot be supervenient on the underlying
physical process *only*. It can only be supervenient with some
abstract type that the underlying physical process can incarnate
locally. This made eventually the "underlying process" itself
supervenient on infinities of computations (or perhaps more general
abstract processes in case comp is false).

If comp is false, then it might not be general abstract processes, but the opposite: proprietary diffractions of a single concrete "pre- longing" (sense, experience). A pro-cess is a going forward, or discarding of the past, but what I suggests prefigures spacetime entirely. There is no underlying process, there is a fundamental eternal now/here from which all 'theres' and 'thens' appear in contradistinction. Like a subroutine or a circuit, it is the fundamental pull to return to the higher level which allows coherence to the function. Functions which do not return data to the originating inquiry, or representations which fail to ground themselves in aesthetic presentations, are, like a computer with no i/o ports, completely useless.

Interpreting your term very favorably, the ideally correct machine might relate.







Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the
differentiation of the computations supporting us.

Neither can computations feel us.

Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. Only a person can think and live.

Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.


If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant.

?
If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?




Feelings need computation to persist publicly,

OK. And comp says that it is enough.



but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.

It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally when a universal machine look inward and outward.

There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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