On 10/18/2013 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the
    differentiation of the computations supporting us.

Neither can computations feel us.

Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. Only a person can think and live.

Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.

That sounds like a distinction without a difference.

If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant.

If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?

Feelings need computation to persist publicly,

OK. And comp says that it is enough.

If computations are both necessary and sufficient then why is comp not the statement that computations think?

but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.

It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally when a universal machine look inward and outward.

What does "appear" mean? If there are only computations then the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, must be constituted by computations.


There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.


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