On Friday, October 18, 2013 5:02:26 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>
> Bruno: "what" is a person? (according to the US Supreme Court lately:
> a Corporation, but I don't buy that) 
> How can a Turing Machine EMULATE something different from it?
> (I know very little about the T.M.: is it infinite?)  
> You wrote: ...*"we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite..."*
> Is a person different from 'it's' SOUL? How can WE (and who is that?)  be 
> in touch with the infinite? Are "WE" infinite? is our "SOUL" finite? 
>

I think that the problem with soul is the same problem that aether, or 
prana, qi have. They attempt to give public form to that which is 
inherently trans-formative. It is easy to see why we are compelled to do 
this - to make awareness and experience into an 'it' which can be defined 
within form-function descriptions, and it does make it more convenient to 
talk about it that way, but ultimately, it sends us off in the wrong 
direction. The solution, I think, is easier than it seems: Let experience 
be exactly what it seems like it is. Awareness is the general sense of 
everything in which it is possible to participate, and the particular sense 
of each aesthetic condition which is experienced. It's not a gas or a 
fluid, not a formula or machine...all of those things are themes within 
sense. Sense itself is the absolute possibility of any kind of sanity, be 
it human, biological, chemical, physical, or abstract. All of it has to 
make sense or none of it can.

Craig

 

> I never met Mr Soul so far. IMO Descartes invented it for his duality to 
> escape from the threat of the inquisition. (Spinoza was luckier: he did not 
> have to go that far, he was only 'shunned' by his Jewish brethren.)
>
> Is it wrong to try to KNOW (understand maybe) what we are talking about?
>
> John Mikes
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, October 18, 2013 10:34:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Oct 2013, at 15:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>>>
>>> > On 18 October 2013 12:24, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>   
>>> > wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> >>> The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain 
>>> >>> processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B,   
>>> >>> is 
>>> >>> associated with different brain processes. The brain processes 
>>> >>> associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B.   
>>> >>> That 
>>> >>> is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the 
>>> >>> physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the 
>>> >>> former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about 
>>> >>> the supervenient consciousness. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Ok, I can work with this. First let me say that, given your   
>>> >> assumptions, 
>>> >> your reasoning is absolutely correct. The assumptions themselves,   
>>> >> although I 
>>> >> don't think they are even conscious, are also completely   
>>> >> reasonable. That is 
>>> >> a perfectly reasonable expectation about nature, and it is one that   
>>> >> I myself 
>>> >> shared until fairly recently. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Starting with the first assumption: >"The decision to go to the   
>>> >> store, A, is 
>>> >> associated with certain brain processes" 
>>> >> 
>>> >> To that I say, lets slow down a moment. What do we know about about   
>>> >> the 
>>> >> association? As far as I know, what we know is that 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 1) measurable changes in brain activity occur in synchronization to 
>>> >> self-reported or experimentally inferred changes in subjective   
>>> >> states. 
>>> >> 2) the regions of the brain affected have been mapped with a high   
>>> >> degree of 
>>> >> consistency and specificity (although the anomalies, such as with   
>>> >> people who 
>>> >> live seemingly normal lives with large parts of their brain   
>>> >> 'missing' makes 
>>> >> that kind of morphological approach potentially naive) 
>>> >> 3) that externally induced brain changes will induce changes in   
>>> >> subjective 
>>> >> experience (so that brain changes cannot be epiphenomenal). 
>>> >> 
>>> >> What we do not know is that 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 4) the entirety of our experiences are literally contained within the 
>>> >> tissues of the brain, or its activities. 
>>> >> 5) that the brain activity which we can observe with our contemporary 
>>> >> instruments is the only causal agent of subjective experience. 
>>> > 
>>> > OK up to here. 
>>> > 
>>> >> 6) that subjective experiences cannot cause observable brain   
>>> >> changes (to the 
>>> >> contrary, we count on subjects being able to voluntarily and   
>>> >> spontaneously 
>>> >> change their own brain activity). 
>>> > 
>>> > We don't know this for sure, but it goes against every scientific 
>>> > observation. If a subjective experience is supervenient on the 
>>> > underlying physical process then the observable brain changes can all 
>>> > be attributed to this underlying physical process. 
>>>
>>> The subjective experience cannot be supervenient on the underlying   
>>> physical process *only*. It can only be supervenient with some   
>>> abstract type that the underlying physical process can incarnate   
>>> locally. This made eventually the "underlying process" itself   
>>> supervenient on infinities of computations (or perhaps more general   
>>> abstract processes in case comp is false). 
>>>
>>
>> If comp is false, then it might not be general abstract processes, but 
>> the opposite: proprietary diffractions of a single concrete "pre-longing" 
>> (sense, experience). A pro-cess is a going forward, or discarding of the 
>> past, but what I suggests prefigures spacetime entirely. There is no 
>> underlying process, there is a fundamental eternal now/here from which all 
>> 'theres' and 'thens' appear in contradistinction. Like a subroutine or a 
>> circuit, it is the fundamental pull to return to the higher level which 
>> allows coherence to the function. Functions which do not return data to the 
>> originating inquiry, or representations which fail to ground themselves in 
>> aesthetic presentations, are, like a computer with no i/o ports, completely 
>> useless.
>>
>>
>> Interpreting your term very favorably, the ideally correct machine might 
>> relate.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the   
>>> differentiation of the computations supporting us.
>>
>>
>> Neither can computations feel us.
>>
>>
>> Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation 
>> cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. 
>> Only a person can think and live. 
>>
>> Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking 
>> person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.
>>
>>
>> If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant. 
>>
>>
>> ?
>> If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Feelings need computation to persist publicly, 
>>
>>
>> OK. And comp says that it is enough.
>>
>>
>>
>> but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, 
>> would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.
>>
>>
>> It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the 
>> believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally 
>> when a universal machine look inward and outward.
>>
>> There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in 
>> the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and 
>> differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by 
>> the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of 
>> the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without 
>> other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we 
>> know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
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