On 18 Oct 2013, at 21:44, meekerdb wrote:

## Advertising

On 10/18/2013 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the differentiation of the computations supporting us. Neither can computations feel us.Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. Acomputation cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Thoseare category errors. Only a person can think and live.Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but thatthinking person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.That sounds like a distinction without a difference.

?

`To believe that a computation thinks is akin to Searles' error. It is`

`just false. It is a higher level notion which do the thinking, not the`

`computation itself.`

`In some context, it can be enough to say "a machine think", but it is`

`always the (first) person which do the (conscious) thinking.`

If computations could feel anything, then feelings would beredundant.? If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?Feelings need computation to persist publicly,OK. And comp says that it is enough.If computations are both necessary and sufficient then why is compnot the statement that computations think?

`A computation emulates the thinking of some subject, but it is the`

`subject who think, not the computation. computation is not of the`

`right type.`

but computations, were they able to make sense in and ofthemselves, would have no plausible need for even geometry, muchless flavors or colors.It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it isthe believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, whichappears naturally when a universal machine look inward and outward.What does "appear" mean?

`It means that the existence of those believers, knower, ... is a`

`theorem in arithmetic, concerning self-referential machine/numbers. It`

`appears like the prime numbers appears when you have the + and * laws.`

If there are only computations then the believers, the knowers, thefeeler, the observers, must be constituted by computations.

`Not "constituted". It is more like supervenience. Once you have the`

`right computations (number relations) you have the condition making it`

`possible for some subject (self-referential person) to develop a`

`knower, a believer, etc. But those obeys different logics, and are`

`only supported by the computations. They are higher level features`

`related to the computations, but different from it.`

`May be I should give more details, but you can read the papers.`

`Universal machines appears also in that same way. The math of them is`

`partially not computable, and that plays some role for the person's`

`logic and behavior. That is why we need some non provable (and non`

`computable) truth and number relations.`

Bruno

BrentThere is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behaviorin the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousnesssurf and differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of theinfinite. I mean, by the invariance of consciousness from delays ofcomputations, or length of the computations, we (our souls) are intouch with the infinite; without other magic than arithmetic (whichis no so astonishing, after GĂ¶del we know that the arithmeticalreality escapes all effective theories.Bruno--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.