On 18 Oct 2013, at 21:44, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:






Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the
differentiation of the computations supporting us.

Neither can computations feel us.

Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. Only a person can think and live.

Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.

That sounds like a distinction without a difference.

?

To believe that a computation thinks is akin to Searles' error. It is just false. It is a higher level notion which do the thinking, not the computation itself. In some context, it can be enough to say "a machine think", but it is always the (first) person which do the (conscious) thinking.






If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant.

?
If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?




Feelings need computation to persist publicly,

OK. And comp says that it is enough.

If computations are both necessary and sufficient then why is comp not the statement that computations think?

A computation emulates the thinking of some subject, but it is the subject who think, not the computation. computation is not of the right type.







but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.

It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally when a universal machine look inward and outward.

What does "appear" mean?

It means that the existence of those believers, knower, ... is a theorem in arithmetic, concerning self-referential machine/numbers. It appears like the prime numbers appears when you have the + and * laws.



If there are only computations then the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, must be constituted by computations.

Not "constituted". It is more like supervenience. Once you have the right computations (number relations) you have the condition making it possible for some subject (self-referential person) to develop a knower, a believer, etc. But those obeys different logics, and are only supported by the computations. They are higher level features related to the computations, but different from it.

May be I should give more details, but you can read the papers. Universal machines appears also in that same way. The math of them is partially not computable, and that plays some role for the person's logic and behavior. That is why we need some non provable (and non computable) truth and number relations.

Bruno



Brent


There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.


Bruno




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to