On 18 Oct 2013, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, October 18, 2013 3:22:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Friday, October 18, 2013 10:34:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 15:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 18 October 2013 12:24, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> > wrote: >>>> The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain >>> processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B,>>> is >>> associated with different brain processes. The brain processes >>> associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B. >>> That >>> is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the >>> physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the>>> former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about>>> the supervenient consciousness. >> >> >> Ok, I can work with this. First let me say that, given your >> assumptions, >> your reasoning is absolutely correct. The assumptions themselves, >> although I >> don't think they are even conscious, are also completely >> reasonable. That is>> a perfectly reasonable expectation about nature, and it is one that>> I myself >> shared until fairly recently. >> >> Starting with the first assumption: >"The decision to go to the >> store, A, is >> associated with certain brain processes" >>>> To that I say, lets slow down a moment. What do we know about about>> the >> association? As far as I know, what we know is that >>>> 1) measurable changes in brain activity occur in synchronization to>> self-reported or experimentally inferred changes in subjective >> states. >> 2) the regions of the brain affected have been mapped with a high >> degree of >> consistency and specificity (although the anomalies, such as with >> people who >> live seemingly normal lives with large parts of their brain >> 'missing' makes >> that kind of morphological approach potentially naive) >> 3) that externally induced brain changes will induce changes in >> subjective >> experience (so that brain changes cannot be epiphenomenal). >> >> What we do not know is that >>>> 4) the entirety of our experiences are literally contained within the>> tissues of the brain, or its activities.>> 5) that the brain activity which we can observe with our contemporary>> instruments is the only causal agent of subjective experience. > > OK up to here. > >> 6) that subjective experiences cannot cause observable brain >> changes (to the >> contrary, we count on subjects being able to voluntarily and >> spontaneously >> change their own brain activity). > > We don't know this for sure, but it goes against every scientific > observation. If a subjective experience is supervenient on the> underlying physical process then the observable brain changes can all> be attributed to this underlying physical process. The subjective experience cannot be supervenient on the underlying physical process *only*. It can only be supervenient with some abstract type that the underlying physical process can incarnate locally. This made eventually the "underlying process" itself supervenient on infinities of computations (or perhaps more general abstract processes in case comp is false).If comp is false, then it might not be general abstract processes, but the opposite: proprietary diffractions of a single concrete "pre-longing" (sense, experience). A pro-cess is a going forward, or discarding of the past, but what I suggests prefigures spacetime entirely. There is no underlying process, there is a fundamental eternal now/here from which all 'theres' and 'thens' appear in contradistinction. Like a subroutine or a circuit, it is the fundamental pull to return to the higher level which allows coherence to the function. Functions which do not return data to the originating inquiry, or representations which fail to ground themselves in aesthetic presentations, are, like a computer with no i/o ports, completely useless.Interpreting your term very favorably, the ideally correct machine might relate.It seems to me that not needing aesthetic presentations or i/o is one of the defining features of a machine. We can see it: a computer works just as well whether it is connected to a screen or not.
Try using your computer without a screen. Humans can also survive when dissociated from i/o.
Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the differentiation of the computations supporting us. Neither can computations feel us.Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. Only a person can think and live.Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.What are the universal machines doing to emulate a thinking person other than compute?
They have true, or false arithmetical relation with infinities of "environment". They have consistent extensions, etc.
If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant.? If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?The brain is just a different name for a collective of neurons. I agree, if they could think in the same way that we do, then our thoughts would be redundant.Feelings need computation to persist publicly,OK. And comp says that it is enough.It's enough to explain computation in terms of feelings, but not to explain feelings.
Sorry, but I find simpler to explain feelings from computation, a well defined notion (accepting Church's thesis), than "feelings" which is a much more complex notion.
but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally when a universal machine look inward and outward.This 'appearing naturally part' is the problem. Why would they, and how could they?
AUDA provides, at the least, an example. I can't explain without doing the math.
It seems more likely that what appears naturally is the computations - as habits which mark the seams and joints across the many believers, feelers, knowers, etc.. I would not even count on them being feelers so much as feelings - experiences which are only in some cases condensed into experiencers.There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.I think that flavors and colors are well beyond the infinite, and beyond arithmetic.
I think you are right, but arithmetic seen from inside go well beyond arithmetic. That appears already in number theory (which is pure 3p). That's why number theorists use analytical tools all the times. But things get worse with self-reference and their intensional nuances.
Arithmetic is the what you get when you put a lot of different experiences in a pot, boil it, strain it, boil it again, freeze dry it, and chop it up into powder. It's an amazing powder, but even though it is a common ingredient of so many experiences, by itself, I see nothing that persuades me that it is enough to create even a single experience.
The discovery of the universal machines makes such statement doubtful. You have to develop some familiarity with them to appreciate, probably.
Instead, I see lots of hints that such an appearance of thingness from the conceptual theoryness of arithmetic is obviously impossible.
The math shows indeed that the first person (Bp & p) cannot believe she is also a third person entity (Bp). There is something which has the appearance of an impossibility. at some point. Necessarily.
Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
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