On Friday, October 18, 2013 7:06:35 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 18 Oct 2013, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Friday, October 18, 2013 3:22:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Friday, October 18, 2013 10:34:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Oct 2013, at 15:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>>>
>>> > On 18 October 2013 12:24, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>   
>>> > wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> >>> The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain 
>>> >>> processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B,   
>>> >>> is 
>>> >>> associated with different brain processes. The brain processes 
>>> >>> associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B.   
>>> >>> That 
>>> >>> is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the 
>>> >>> physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the 
>>> >>> former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about 
>>> >>> the supervenient consciousness. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Ok, I can work with this. First let me say that, given your   
>>> >> assumptions, 
>>> >> your reasoning is absolutely correct. The assumptions themselves,   
>>> >> although I 
>>> >> don't think they are even conscious, are also completely   
>>> >> reasonable. That is 
>>> >> a perfectly reasonable expectation about nature, and it is one that   
>>> >> I myself 
>>> >> shared until fairly recently. 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Starting with the first assumption: >"The decision to go to the   
>>> >> store, A, is 
>>> >> associated with certain brain processes" 
>>> >> 
>>> >> To that I say, lets slow down a moment. What do we know about about   
>>> >> the 
>>> >> association? As far as I know, what we know is that 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 1) measurable changes in brain activity occur in synchronization to 
>>> >> self-reported or experimentally inferred changes in subjective   
>>> >> states. 
>>> >> 2) the regions of the brain affected have been mapped with a high   
>>> >> degree of 
>>> >> consistency and specificity (although the anomalies, such as with   
>>> >> people who 
>>> >> live seemingly normal lives with large parts of their brain   
>>> >> 'missing' makes 
>>> >> that kind of morphological approach potentially naive) 
>>> >> 3) that externally induced brain changes will induce changes in   
>>> >> subjective 
>>> >> experience (so that brain changes cannot be epiphenomenal). 
>>> >> 
>>> >> What we do not know is that 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 4) the entirety of our experiences are literally contained within the 
>>> >> tissues of the brain, or its activities. 
>>> >> 5) that the brain activity which we can observe with our contemporary 
>>> >> instruments is the only causal agent of subjective experience. 
>>> > 
>>> > OK up to here. 
>>> > 
>>> >> 6) that subjective experiences cannot cause observable brain   
>>> >> changes (to the 
>>> >> contrary, we count on subjects being able to voluntarily and   
>>> >> spontaneously 
>>> >> change their own brain activity). 
>>> > 
>>> > We don't know this for sure, but it goes against every scientific 
>>> > observation. If a subjective experience is supervenient on the 
>>> > underlying physical process then the observable brain changes can all 
>>> > be attributed to this underlying physical process. 
>>>
>>> The subjective experience cannot be supervenient on the underlying   
>>> physical process *only*. It can only be supervenient with some   
>>> abstract type that the underlying physical process can incarnate   
>>> locally. This made eventually the "underlying process" itself   
>>> supervenient on infinities of computations (or perhaps more general   
>>> abstract processes in case comp is false). 
>>>
>>
>> If comp is false, then it might not be general abstract processes, but 
>> the opposite: proprietary diffractions of a single concrete "pre-longing" 
>> (sense, experience). A pro-cess is a going forward, or discarding of the 
>> past, but what I suggests prefigures spacetime entirely. There is no 
>> underlying process, there is a fundamental eternal now/here from which all 
>> 'theres' and 'thens' appear in contradistinction. Like a subroutine or a 
>> circuit, it is the fundamental pull to return to the higher level which 
>> allows coherence to the function. Functions which do not return data to the 
>> originating inquiry, or representations which fail to ground themselves in 
>> aesthetic presentations, are, like a computer with no i/o ports, completely 
>> useless.
>>
>>
>> Interpreting your term very favorably, the ideally correct machine might 
>> relate.
>>
>
> It seems to me that not needing aesthetic presentations or i/o is one of 
> the defining features of a machine. We can see it: a computer works just as 
> well whether it is connected to a screen or not.
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>
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> Try using your computer without a screen.
> Humans can also survive when dissociated from i/o.
>

Without i/o, what difference would survival make? How could you tell the 
difference?
 

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>>> Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the   
>>> differentiation of the computations supporting us.
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>> Neither can computations feel us.
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>>
>> Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation 
>> cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. 
>> Only a person can think and live. 
>>
>> Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking 
>> person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.
>>
>
> What are the universal machines doing to emulate a thinking person other 
> than compute?
>
>
> They have true, or false arithmetical relation with infinities of 
> "environment". They have consistent extensions, etc. 
>

What's an environment? Sounds like you are smuggling in non-comp 
'extensions' to prop up comp.
 

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>> If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant. 
>>
>>
>> ?
>> If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?
>>
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> The brain is just a different name for a collective of neurons. I agree, 
> if they could think in the same way that we do, then our thoughts would be 
> redundant.
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>> Feelings need computation to persist publicly, 
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>> OK. And comp says that it is enough.
>>
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> It's enough to explain computation in terms of feelings, but not to 
> explain feelings. 
>
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> Sorry, but I find simpler to explain feelings from computation, a well 
> defined notion (accepting Church's thesis), than "feelings" which is a much 
> more complex notion.
>

I don't find either of those reasons to be scientific. Being a well defined 
notion is nothing more than convention and convenience. Feelings are not 
more complex than computation - a baby knows fear, disappointment, anger, 
joy, etc before they can ever conceive of an abstraction like 1+1. 
Certainly feelings are problematic to measure and define, but that is 
entirely consistent with my expectation that local definitions are 
diffracted from the masking of the absolute rather than assembled from 
isolated parts in a void. Feelings, being closer to the boundaryless 
Absolute, are not going to fit into the rigid containment of logic or 
numbers, which are a posteriori reflections and representations of feelings.


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>> but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, 
>> would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.
>>
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>> It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the 
>> believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally 
>> when a universal machine look inward and outward.
>>
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> This 'appearing naturally part' is the problem. Why would they, and how 
> could they? 
>
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> AUDA provides, at the least, an example. I can't explain without doing the 
> math.
>

It doesn't seem plausible. I think that nothing appears in math without the 
mathematician's imagination and intuition. I don't think that computation 
knows how to compute. It's a patternless void upon which we project a 
universal shadow of the absolute through the template of our own collective 
history.

 

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> It seems more likely that what appears naturally is the computations - as 
> habits which mark the seams and joints across the many believers, feelers, 
> knowers, etc.. I would not even count on them being feelers so much as 
> feelings - experiences which are only in some cases condensed into 
> experiencers.
>  
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>>
>> There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in 
>> the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and 
>> differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by 
>> the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of 
>> the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without 
>> other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we 
>> know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.
>>
>
> I think that flavors and colors are well beyond the infinite, and beyond 
> arithmetic. 
>
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> I think you are right, but arithmetic seen from inside go well beyond 
> arithmetic.
> That appears already in number theory (which is pure 3p). That's why 
> number theorists use analytical tools all the times. But things get worse 
> with self-reference and their intensional nuances.
>

How do you know that arithmetic has an inside, or that there is anything to 
see it? If I put out a net in the ocean, there is a computation which will 
dictate what will be more likely to be caught in the net and what will pass 
through. I don't think that there is any interiority to that computation - 
it isn't a presence in the universe, it is only an analysis of the relation 
between measurements of net and fish in our consideration of it. I don't 
see how any form of computation does not boil down to large sets of such 
comparisons. It's a mirror. The more complex and beautiful ideas we put 
into computation, the more our own sensitivity is reflected back at us, but 
its just a reflektor...a Magic 8 ball in the dark.
 

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> Arithmetic is the what you get when you put a lot of different experiences 
> in a pot, boil it, strain it, boil it again, freeze dry it, and chop it up 
> into powder. It's an amazing powder, but even though it is a common 
> ingredient of so many experiences, by itself, I see nothing that persuades 
> me that it is enough to create even a single experience. 
>
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> The discovery of the universal machines makes such statement doubtful. You 
> have to develop some familiarity with them to appreciate, probably.
>

I don't see that universal machines change anything fundamental. I think 
that what UMs do is point to a sense which is common to measurements 
related to both form and function (without providing any access to either 
form or function). Because of that commonality, it is possible to 
impersonate any measurable 3p condition, given that the measurement 
capacity of the interpreter does not exceed that of the presentation 
technology. Impersonation, or emulation, however, has limits, which I would 
say become increasingly relevant the closer it gets to 1p. Before it can 
ever get to 1p, emulation failure increases exponentially, such that all 
emulations of 1p fail absolutely...by definition, due to the ontology of 1p 
and its connection to authenticity, simplicity, uniqueness, and spontaneity.


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> Instead, I see lots of hints that such an appearance of thingness from the 
> conceptual theoryness of arithmetic is obviously impossible.
>
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> The math shows indeed that the first person (Bp & p) cannot believe she is 
> also a third person entity (Bp). 
> There is something which has the appearance of an impossibility. at some 
> point. Necessarily.
>

How do you know that the math is not just reflecting it's own separation 
from authenticity in the only way that a mirror which is made of 
inauthenticity can?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
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> Craig
>  
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>> Bruno
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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