On 19 Oct 2013, at 03:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, October 18, 2013 7:06:35 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, October 18, 2013 3:22:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, October 18, 2013 10:34:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 15:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On 18 October 2013 12:24, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>> The decision to go to the store, A, is associated with certain brain >>> processes, and the getting in the car and driving to the store, B,
>>> is
>>> associated with different brain processes. The brain processes
>>> associated with A *cause* the brain processes associated with B.
>>> That
>>> is to say, a scientist anywhere in the universe could observe the >>> physical processes A and the physical processes B and see how the >>> former lead to the latter without necessarily having any idea about
>>> the supervenient consciousness.
>>
>>
>> Ok, I can work with this. First let me say that, given your
>> assumptions,
>> your reasoning is absolutely correct. The assumptions themselves,
>> although I
>> don't think they are even conscious, are also completely
>> reasonable. That is
>> a perfectly reasonable expectation about nature, and it is one that
>> I myself
>> shared until fairly recently.
>>
>> Starting with the first assumption: >"The decision to go to the
>> store, A, is
>> associated with certain brain processes"
>>
>> To that I say, lets slow down a moment. What do we know about about
>> the
>> association? As far as I know, what we know is that
>>
>> 1) measurable changes in brain activity occur in synchronization to
>> self-reported or experimentally inferred changes in subjective
>> states.
>> 2) the regions of the brain affected have been mapped with a high
>> degree of
>> consistency and specificity (although the anomalies, such as with
>> people who
>> live seemingly normal lives with large parts of their brain
>> 'missing' makes
>> that kind of morphological approach potentially naive)
>> 3) that externally induced brain changes will induce changes in
>> subjective
>> experience (so that brain changes cannot be epiphenomenal).
>>
>> What we do not know is that
>>
>> 4) the entirety of our experiences are literally contained within the
>> tissues of the brain, or its activities.
>> 5) that the brain activity which we can observe with our contemporary
>> instruments is the only causal agent of subjective experience.
>
> OK up to here.
>
>> 6) that subjective experiences cannot cause observable brain
>> changes (to the
>> contrary, we count on subjects being able to voluntarily and
>> spontaneously
>> change their own brain activity).
>
> We don't know this for sure, but it goes against every scientific
> observation. If a subjective experience is supervenient on the
> underlying physical process then the observable brain changes can all
> be attributed to this underlying physical process.

The subjective experience cannot be supervenient on the underlying
physical process *only*. It can only be supervenient with some
abstract type that the underlying physical process can incarnate
locally. This made eventually the "underlying process" itself
supervenient on infinities of computations (or perhaps more general
abstract processes in case comp is false).

If comp is false, then it might not be general abstract processes, but the opposite: proprietary diffractions of a single concrete "pre-longing" (sense, experience). A pro-cess is a going forward, or discarding of the past, but what I suggests prefigures spacetime entirely. There is no underlying process, there is a fundamental eternal now/here from which all 'theres' and 'thens' appear in contradistinction. Like a subroutine or a circuit, it is the fundamental pull to return to the higher level which allows coherence to the function. Functions which do not return data to the originating inquiry, or representations which fail to ground themselves in aesthetic presentations, are, like a computer with no i/o ports, completely useless.

Interpreting your term very favorably, the ideally correct machine might relate.

It seems to me that not needing aesthetic presentations or i/o is one of the defining features of a machine. We can see it: a computer works just as well whether it is connected to a screen or not.


Try using your computer without a screen.
Humans can also survive when dissociated from i/o.

Without i/o, what difference would survival make? How could you tell the difference?

Evolution needed cooperation/competition between many machines. isolated machines have no chance. A human in an isolation box get very peculiar experience too. I don't see anything distinguishing humans from machine here.















Of course we can see only one process, as we cannot feel the
differentiation of the computations supporting us.

Neither can computations feel us.

Sure. Computations are not of the same type as person. A computation cannot no more think than a brain or a neuron. Those are category errors. Only a person can think and live.

Comp is not the statement than computation can think, but that thinking person can be emulated by (Turing) universal machines.

What are the universal machines doing to emulate a thinking person other than compute?

They have true, or false arithmetical relation with infinities of "environment". They have consistent extensions, etc.

What's an environment? Sounds like you are smuggling in non-comp 'extensions' to prop up comp.

All what I say is that machines are not confronted only with computable properties, but also with many truth which are not computable.











If computations could feel anything, then feelings would be redundant.

?
If neurons could think then brain would be redundant ?

The brain is just a different name for a collective of neurons. I agree, if they could think in the same way that we do, then our thoughts would be redundant.





Feelings need computation to persist publicly,

OK. And comp says that it is enough.

It's enough to explain computation in terms of feelings, but not to explain feelings.

Sorry, but I find simpler to explain feelings from computation, a well defined notion (accepting Church's thesis), than "feelings" which is a much more complex notion.

I don't find either of those reasons to be scientific. Being a well defined notion is nothing more than convention and convenience. Feelings are not more complex than computation - a baby knows fear, disappointment, anger, joy, etc before they can ever conceive of an abstraction like 1+1.

What is that for an argument?
The baby has inherited a billions neuronal extremely sophisticated machinery which ease that type of things. Computation is an elementary arithmetical notion on which everybody agree, since Church and Turing. A feeling, like a fear, is an evolved construct, needing brain and a long evolutionary history.



Certainly feelings are problematic to measure and define, but that is entirely consistent with my expectation that local definitions are diffracted from the masking of the absolute rather than assembled from isolated parts in a void. Feelings, being closer to the boundaryless Absolute, are not going to fit into the rigid containment of logic or numbers, which are a posteriori reflections and representations of feelings.

Atoms are simpler than molecules, but you need a huge number of molecules to get a system capable of discovering and understanding what is an atom.










but computations, were they able to make sense in and of themselves, would have no plausible need for even geometry, much less flavors or colors.

It is not the computations which makes sense of themselves, it is the believers, the knowers, the feeler, the observers, which appears naturally when a universal machine look inward and outward.

This 'appearing naturally part' is the problem. Why would they, and how could they?

AUDA provides, at the least, an example. I can't explain without doing the math.

It doesn't seem plausible.

But it is true. It belongs to math. machines access much more truth than what they can prove, all the time. That makes them confused on those matter. A priori, the AUDA hypostases are in conflict, as we can intuitively already understand with the simple 1p/3p difference in the thought experiment.


I think that nothing appears in math without the mathematician's imagination and intuition.

This contradicts your preview assessment that "1+1=2" does not depends on us.



I don't think that computation knows how to compute.

Computations know nothing.
But the person emulated by some computation can know many things (although only God can decide if it is knowledge or wrong belief).



It's a patternless void upon which we project a universal shadow of the absolute through the template of our own collective history.





It seems more likely that what appears naturally is the computations - as habits which mark the seams and joints across the many believers, feelers, knowers, etc.. I would not even count on them being feelers so much as feelings - experiences which are only in some cases condensed into experiencers.


There is a large variety of nameable and also non nameable behavior in the spectrum of the universal machines, and her consciousness surf and differentiate on the arithmetical neighborhood of the infinite. I mean, by the invariance of consciousness from delays of computations, or length of the computations, we (our souls) are in touch with the infinite; without other magic than arithmetic (which is no so astonishing, after Gödel we know that the arithmetical reality escapes all effective theories.

I think that flavors and colors are well beyond the infinite, and beyond arithmetic.

I think you are right, but arithmetic seen from inside go well beyond arithmetic. That appears already in number theory (which is pure 3p). That's why number theorists use analytical tools all the times. But things get worse with self-reference and their intensional nuances.

How do you know that arithmetic has an inside, or that there is anything to see it?

Machines knows that because they cannot not distinguish justification and proof. Arithmetic emulates ZF. Arithmetic knows nothing compared to ZF, but arithmetic still emulates it. Like I can emulate einstein brain, without understanding what Einstein is telling me in that emulation.



If I put out a net in the ocean, there is a computation which will dictate what will be more likely to be caught in the net and what will pass through. I don't think that there is any interiority to that computation - it isn't a presence in the universe, it is only an analysis of the relation between measurements of net and fish in our consideration of it. I don't see how any form of computation does not boil down to large sets of such comparisons. It's a mirror. The more complex and beautiful ideas we put into computation, the more our own sensitivity is reflected back at us, but its just a reflektor...a Magic 8 ball in the dark.

What can I say? It is your feeling, but that is not an argument. The math explains well why complex machine can discover all its own intensional probability nuances. You might just study computer science to be familiar with the fact that universal machines can do more than just computations, and to *be* much more than that.







Arithmetic is the what you get when you put a lot of different experiences in a pot, boil it, strain it, boil it again, freeze dry it, and chop it up into powder. It's an amazing powder, but even though it is a common ingredient of so many experiences, by itself, I see nothing that persuades me that it is enough to create even a single experience.

The discovery of the universal machines makes such statement doubtful. You have to develop some familiarity with them to appreciate, probably.

I don't see that universal machines change anything fundamental. I think that what UMs do is point to a sense which is common to measurements related to both form and function (without providing any access to either form or function).

Functions can be conceived extensionally (set of i/o couples) and intensionally (a hell of a difference, taking into account how things are computed, and not just the i/o behavior).



Because of that commonality, it is possible to impersonate any measurable 3p condition, given that the measurement capacity of the interpreter does not exceed that of the presentation technology. Impersonation, or emulation, however, has limits, which I would say become increasingly relevant the closer it gets to 1p.

Sure. the 1p of the machine has not even a name or description for the machine. It will seems obvious that she is her body. What you describe is exactly what comp predict the 1-machine will feel.

Before it can ever get to 1p,

The 1-p is there. machines will live it a long time before she get the definitions and axioms. Humans have to wait for the Indians and Greeks to get it. And well, we are still at the beginning.



emulation failure increases exponentially, such that all emulations of 1p fail absolutely...by definition,

The 1-p is not Turing emulable, not even descriptible. The machine's too will get the metaphysical vertigo when meditating on the "Who am I" koan. That's what the logics of self-reference shows us.




due to the ontology of 1p and its connection to authenticity, simplicity, uniqueness, and spontaneity.

It is not that much spontaneous. You need a very long story with competing universal entities.

if that was simple and spontaneous, why would we ever need a complex brain?







Instead, I see lots of hints that such an appearance of thingness from the conceptual theoryness of arithmetic is obviously impossible.

The math shows indeed that the first person (Bp & p) cannot believe she is also a third person entity (Bp). There is something which has the appearance of an impossibility. at some point. Necessarily.

How do you know that the math is not just reflecting it's own separation from authenticity in the only way that a mirror which is made of inauthenticity can?

If the math can "reflect it's own separation from authenticity", how do you know that is not enough to get genuine person, given that the math shows that it correspond to behavior and discourse similar to our own behavior and discourse? If there is no genuine consciousness there, we get philosophical zombies in arithmetic.

Bruno



Craig


Bruno




Craig



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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