# Re: AUDA and pronouns

```Brent: I like to write insted of "we know" - "we THINK we know" and it goes
further: Bruno's "provable' - in many cases - applies evidences (to
'prove') from conventional science (reductionist figments) we still THINK
we know.
I don't think I use the term "T R U E" at all - in my agnosticism.
You had a remark lately to remind me that our 'imperfect' worldview
resulted in many many practical achievements so far. I did not respond the
missing adjective "almost" - meaning the many failures and mishaps such
achievements are involved with. We approach the practical usability.```
```
Another chapter includes math - the *result* of certain HUMAN logic - in
which 17 is defined as a 'prime'. A different logic may devise a different
math with different number-concept in which the equivalent of 17 is NOT a
prime.
I find it a mathematically impressed concept that the 'world' is
describable by numbers (arithmetic series) and not vice versa. Nobody
showed me so far a natural occurrence where arithmetic connotations were
detectable by non-arithmetic trains of thought.

JohnM

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 6:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> On 10/19/2013 3:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 08:17:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 08 Oct 2013, at 11:51, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
>>>  I understand Bp can be read as "I can prove p", and "Bp&p" as
>>>>>> "I know
>>>>>> p". But in the case, the difference between Bp and Bp&p is
>>>>>> entirely in
>>>>>> the verb, the pronoun "I" stays the same, AFAICT.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Correct. Only the perspective change. "Bp" is "Toto proves p", said
>>>>> by Toto.
>>>>> "Bp & p" is "Toto proves p" and p is true, as said by Toto (or not),
>>>>> and the math shows that this behaves like a knowledge opertaor (but
>>>>> not arithmetical predicate).
>>>>>
>>>> It's the same Toto in both cases... What's the point?
>>>>
>>> The difference is crucial. Bp obeys to the logic G, which does not
>>> define a knower as we don't have Bp -> p.
>>> At best, it defines a rational believer, or science. Not knowledge.
>>> But differentiating W from M, is knowledge, even non communicable
>>> knowledge. You can't explain to another, that you are the one in
>>> Washington, as for the other, you are also in Moscow. Knowledge
>>> logic invite us to define the first person by the knower. He is the
>>> only one who can know that his pain is not fake, for example.
>>>
>>>  You've hinted at fixed points being relevant here for the concept of
>> I.
>>
>> So to have an 'I', you need the statement []p->p to be a theorem?
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>>>  and Bp&p as "he knows p", so the person order of
>>>>>> the pronoun is also not relevant.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of
>>>>> the 1-view.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let us define [o]p by Bp & p
>>>>>
>>>>> I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o]([o]p).
>>>>>
>>>>>  ???
>>>>
>>>
>>> B([o]p) is the statement made by the ideal rationalist believer (B)
>>> on a first person point of view ([o]). Here [o]p can be seen as an
>>> abbreviation for Bp & p.
>>>
>> In English, the first statement is that I believe I know something,
>> and the second is that I know I know somthing.
>>
>>
>>> [o]([o]p is the first person statement ([o]) on a first person point
>>> of view ([o]).
>>>
>>>  So, according to you, knowledge is a first person point of view. What
>> I still get stuck on is that we may know many things, but the only
>> things we can know we know are essentially private things things, such
>> as the fact that we are conscious, or what the colour red seems like
>> to us.
>>
>
> Bruno seems to equate "know" with "provable and true".  So we know that 17
> is prime.  In fact we *know* infinitely many theorems that are provable,
> but which no one will ever prove - which seems like a strange meaning of
> "know".
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>> Are these all things you would say satisfy the proposition [o]([o]p)
>>
>>
>>
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