On 20 Oct 2013, at 21:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, October 20, 2013 1:26:30 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Oct 2013, at 17:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> Not at all. the modal logics are entirely determined by the initial
> axioms.
>
> This is the problem. I do not allow any initial freestanding axioms.

The modal logics are not free, their are derived in arithmetic.

Arithmetic is derived from the possibility of measurement though -


Not at the relevant level.




which supervenes on all sorts of senses of position, duration, recursiveness, sequence, etc. I will always continue to bring this up, but you don't acknowledge it. While it can be argued that a sense primitive is no less miraculous than an arithmetic primitive, the difference is that arithmetic follows easily from sense, but sense does not follow at all from arithmetic,


Derive arithmetic from sense. I ask you this before, but it was not a derivation, in the usual sense when doing science.




unless you smuggle sense into your definition of arithmetic from the start. That would be ok too, but it is not what we see in reality. We do not see experiences appearing out of the interaction of abstract 'rules', and we only see rules as a consequence of pattern recognition applied to experience.

?







The initial sensivity (your term) used here (AUDA) is only your
understanding of the  arithmetical laws of addition and
multiplication, (and of the machines, whose existence and activities
are derived from that.

I don't see that the capacity for sensation has anything at all to do with addition or multiplication.

I assume this. "Not seeing" is not a problem. I don't see it entirely myself. Machines can't see it, nor believe it.

But you keep talking like "seeing that not ...".

"Not seeing" does not imply "seeing that not".




In fact, addition and multiplication are strategies of bypassing sensation. Mathematics is for reductive representation - the collapsing of living experiences into logical facades. This is true in all cases of computation - it is a strategy of exploiting dumber levels of sense for purposes of automation and separation of repetitive tasks from active awareness. I will continue to make this point also, even though you don't acknowledge it.

That math before Gödel and Turing.





You can start from sensitivity, but then you are a poet, not a
scientist.

That's the old definition of a scientist. Relativity, QM, and Godel have changed that forever but few people have recognized it yet. Poetry is the frontier of science, or science is forever stuck being apologetics for engineering.

I can only disagree.

Gödel + comp, might be used to justify poetry done by machine.
But it does not imply substituting science methodology for poetry, is certainly not in the mind of Gödel, or any quantum physicists.





Poetry is important, but it is not science, and it is bas poetry when
it pretend some truth, and denies a respectful attitude toward
possible creatures.

All life depends on disrespecting other creatures, except perhaps photosynthesizing eukaryotes. Beyond that, it is about elevating one's group above the others, and eating them when delicious. We can't eat computers, so unless they are going to serve our interests exclusively, the possibility of their rivalry should be avoided if it was legitimate. I of course have no fear of such a rivalry because I am confident that no machine will ever be a possible creature, any more than a cartoon will possibly be a creature.


> But you are a machine under comp and you CAN believe consistently
> that you are a machine.

This is ambiguous, and when made precise, leads to not so obvious
questions, or simple falsities (I cannot believe consistently that I
am consistent).
Comp is refutable, so more precise questions are open problems.

That sounds like a concession in disguise.

Nope. It is the main result.



What happens when we factor in universal machines who understand how universal machines work? When they can prove to themselves, as you have, that any concept of non-comp is probably ultimately illusion, then that core principle of 1p integration falls apart. Then you have infinite regress of universal mathematician machines who doubt their doubting of doubt. I begin from the other direction. Before we can have doubt, we must have some connection to that which can be doubted - to presence, to sense experience. I think it works better that way from the absolute perspective.

You can do that. It is an emphasizing of the first person discourse.

The problem is when you infer from that discourse that machines are not allowed to do it too.







> Proofs have no existence without a conscious prover. Proof is
> nothing but an expectation of matching one set of experiences to
> another.

We have made progress about things like provability, formal, informal,
and computability. You might study this a little bit.

I think the study of those things is what gets us tangled up in a very narrow aspect of sense.


This shows only how much you have not studied them.



Not that they are bad things to study, but for deep understanding of consciousness, they are a deadly hall of mirrors which reinforce each others assumptions.

Nice rethoric, but I will no more comment rethoric.





> The relation of arithmetic to qualia is completely fabricated and
> has no basis in mathematics as far as I can tell.

You beg the question. Even if the relation between qualia and
arithmetic that I describe as deriving from comp and the classical
theory of knowledge is wrong, you have to show that all possible comp
theories are wrong.

All possible comp theories are wrong because what all computation has in common is the elevation of representation over aesthetic presence.

Why?



To compute is to ignore all qualities except for the single dimension being counted. It is to reduce all being and feeling to insensitive objects of knowing and doing. If I understand that the Moon is made of minerals I do not have to show that all possible green cheese theories are wrong. "Maybe there is a kind of green cheese that does not look very green, and seems like dust and rock..." I don't say that cannot be true, or that people should not check it out, but I don't personally see any reason to doubt the explanation that seems to make much more sense.


That's not an argument.





> I'm not talking about computer science, I'm talking about
> consciousness, metaphysics, and cosmology.


You have to address computer science when saying that computers cannot
emulate consciousness.
But indeed, you seem to just ignore the machines, so you don't gave
them any chance.

I don't ignore the machines, they ignore me. Hey computer! I'm talking to you now! Yoohoo, ghosts of the future internet traveling backward through simulated time...I'm right here, talking a whole mess o insulting stuff about your family! Come and get me! Come on and emulate a consciousness to trick me into buying some expensive cookware.




>> I am specifically challenging the assumption that computation or
>> arithmetic is elementary,
>
>
> It is not.
>
> Then what are you saying is elementary?

0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.

I meant that computation are not elementary, or assumed. It is defined
from 0, s(0), ... and the laws of + and *.

I think that 0, s(s(0)), and the laws of + and * should not be assumed to be irreducible.

They can be reduce to combinators.
But combinators are not taught in schools.




What is "+"? It is feeling of augmentation, of more of (x). This is derived from experience, since a lot of experience has themes of augmentation. That doesn't mean that + is literally real. It only means that under conditions where augmentation can be measured precisely, we can expect certain sensible relationships to be revealed. Its all rooted in a capacity to make sense in this very literal, didactic way where all is exposed and no poetry is allowed.

I don't mind what '+' is, if you agree that, for all numbers x and y we have

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

Then we reason only from such axioms.





> Then you have to provide just one counter-example.
>
> I am the counter-example. Color is the counter example. Flavor,
> sound, feeling, etc.


You beg the question. Comp already explain why the 1p says so, but
that is an (machine's) opinion/feeling.
You are not a counter-example to comp. On the contrary you illustrate
very well the comp prediction that comp is hard to believe by machines
introspecting themselves a little bit.

Then you illustrate the failure of that same comp prediction since you do not find it hard to believe comp.

I find extremely hard to believe in comp.
Without the QM confirmation on its most startling consequences (we have infinities of bodies), I might just disbelieve in it.



The thermometer that is always wrong but says 'the appearance that this thermometer is wrong is an illusion' is not the secret of consciousness, it is the imposter - the ontological Mad Hatter conjuring white rabbits. The step to take from there is not within intelligence, it is within wisdom, intuition, courage, and faith (if you must). Doubt fails when you can no longer trust your ability to doubt that which tells you that you cannot be trusted. The fact is, we have never seen a concrete experience which follows only from a disembodied rule or law. We have never seen a machine that can care or not care about its own experience.

You don't know that. We don't find any evidence of that when we look at animals and humans. The empirical evidence are that nature exploits computable phenomena.





Comp, like the Gödelian sentences, says something like "you can't
believe in me". That is why it asks for an act of faith.

No, I think that's why it returns faith to you. The act of faith is in realizing that mathematical forms, even though they have the appearance of profound objective truth, are actually empty addresses that define the edges of experience. Gödel is not about having faith in the omniscience of numbers, it is about faith in the limitations of formal descriptions of all kinds to ever tap into the primordial source. They can only reflect, in their incompleteness, the absolute completeness of the pansensitive capacity to pretend.

But machines understand this.





> Not true. There are no elementary axioms. Axioms are rules.

Logicians distinguish axioms (which are formula, or sentences), and
rules, which are operations on formulas leading to other formula. It
is as different as a number, like 0, and an operation like s (s(x) = x
+ 1).

Ok, good to know. Still, formula or sentences can be casually understood as 'rules', or 'logical conditions', or 'codified expectations'...whatever we want to label them, they are disembodied analytical figures, not presences.

Sure. That is what the Bp & p versus Bp will explains.





I have to go, but I have read the other comment, and either you are
not providing any reason to believe that comp is false or inconsistent.

As far as I can see, all of our disagreement stems from our opposite stances on whether comp must be given the benefit of the doubt. The reason why my hypothesis denies the comp hypothesis is because 1) there is undoubtedly sensory experience.

I agree.



and 2) sensory experience is not necessary for interpretation of quantitative data.

I disagree. Sensory experience can be unavoidable semantical fixed point for some computable self-transformation. Assuming comp, many fixed points will behave like if the machine is not a zombie, and the machine has already the mean to refute attempt to be treated as a particular zombie, or even body, or any third person things.




Everything that I have seen from comp is retrospective views of qualia, where comp just digs a hole and puts a carpet over it and sum-body stands next to it and says 'you can't prove that there's no qualia in there'.


Well, you are the one saying the big thing: "I have a proof, or I know, that there is no qualia there".



Everything from blindsight, to synesthesia, to puppetry and cartoons and actors points to a fundamental discontinuity between presentation and representation.


Bp & p is not representable. But comp makes it still present.



There is no reason to naively swallow the assumption that something which reminds us of ourselves - which we have designed to remind us of the way that we think, cannot in fact be as dumb as a doorknob.

Hmm... The UM has been discovered, and the interview today has been a sequence of surprising results in mathematical logic. Nothing was programmed there by us. Nobody but machines proposed G and even G* (in some sense).

Bruno



We have seen over and over how easy it is to project superstition onto inanimate objects, and I have no problem with using such things as oracles to tap into our super-personal intuitions (as long as we don't take them for absolute truth), but that is not the same thing as concluding that the magic 8-ball itself must literally be alive just because it never says anything when we ask certain questions. There are other, more nuanced explanations, and I think that I have begun to understand some of them.






Craig



Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to