On 27 Oct 2013, at 13:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, October 27, 2013 4:27:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Oct 2013, at 02:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Saturday, October 26, 2013 7:06:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Oct 2013, at 14:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Saturday, October 26, 2013 6:01:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Oct 2013, at 11:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What mathematical categories could correspond to a sound?

In the 3p, length waves + special information handling machine.
In the 1p, the non communicable/provable/rationally-believable part of some self-referential intensional logics.

What makes non communicable/provable/rationally-believable part of some self-referential intensional logics correspond to sensation or sound sensation in particular?

They are good candidate. You can imagine that when the machine will refer to those, she might feel you treat her as a zombie, if in fine, you deny them to her. Keep in mind that the logic here implies that the machine got a direct link to some statement which she believes in, and which are true (even if only God can know that. My trick is to limit myself to correct machine. It is a non constructive notion. Nobody can distinguish a (sufficiently complex) correct machine from one that is not.

I have no problem with there being slippery, undetectable appearances in math (they would appear that way because sense is amputated), but I don't see why sense would or could arise from arithmetic when it could just be the nature of arithmetic to function as it does without sense, as far as Comp can propose.

It is very simple: I assume that. It is my working hypothesis. If we get a contradiction from that, then we have refuted comp. Then AUDA provides some information. But you need to study a bit of computer science.

Again, I am NOT defending comp. But you are pretending comp is false, and I just intervene to explain your refutation of comp beg the question.

The only issue that I have about comp though is that assumption. Instead, I intentionally make the assumption that thought and computation are both a particular kind of qualia and a special case, first-branch of qualia which plays the role of public facing integration across felt histories. I think that besides the assumption that panqualia follows computation, your view makes another assumption that is unintentional, which is that thought/ computation is primitively unlike sensation or perception. I see only that they are a different specie of experience.

As all experience is a kind of pretending,

First person experience is when we cease pretending, or even fail to communicate or pretend. When you experience a joy or a pain, you don't need to pretend anything to feel it personally. That does not prevent the others to interfere with it of course.


there is great value in a way to access experience which pretends that it is not pretending. This is quanta and arithmetic truth.

I would say that is different. It is just simple sharable belief, like x + 0 = x, etc. We just put some principles on the table so that we can use it without "philosophy" to proceed. Of course the intuition we have that x + 0 = x (for all number x) is related to our sense and qualia, but that does not make them depending on qualia, we don't have to rely on qualia and complex psychology to proceed from x + 0 = x. Be careful, as arithmetic truth is far (an euphemism) bigger that the computable, and if comp is true, it manages the quanta and the qualia (admitting some standard definition in philosophy/theology).



It has a job to do, so that the rest of the concrete universe of experience can continue dreaming in peace. In a sense, that makes is 'conscious' as far as being the voice of vigilance and the motor of realism. It is locally closer to "God" as far as allowing us access to control over our bodies and the outside world (except where that control conflicts with the deeper streams of large dreams with a lot of momentum, aka destiny, luck).

I put the scare quotes around 'conscious' though, because the character of that consciousness would be so perpendicular to experience that any person or animal would have that it is closer to anti-consciousness than something we would recognize. It would be like taking our experience of 'today' and our experience of 'forever' and switching them, so that we would come to the world of experienced moments from the loong way around.

This *looks* like a description of the salvia experience, but term like "anti-consciousness" is a bit pejorative for that, although it has anti-life aspect, pointing on the fact that theology is not much "pro-life". Once you have the cognitive ability to imagine you might be a machine, you have the cognitive abilities to understand that somehow, you don't really need the machine. Comp makes transhumanism possible, but i the deep, it suggests it might also be vain, like just prolonging the Samsara, and procrastinating the Nirvana.



It is the Mona Lisa from behind the paint, bleeding through in reverse from within the spectacularly-invisible depths of the canvas and frame. I might be able to work with that more if I had help on learning the math. I still do not think that the view from inside the canvas will ever experience the Mona Lisa, but who knows, maybe she tastes better on the inside than she looks on the outside?

:)

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to