The problem with modernity is precisely the confusion and madness (and I
may say lack of intellectual strenght)  of this fluidity, ever depending on
audiences and personal interest that makes today amoebas to have rights ...
and tomorrow morning we can massacrate people because at last, they are
like amoebas.


2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>

> On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > I know a single concept of people....
> >
> > I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I
> manage
> > (either philosophical or not)
> >
> > Have they rights?
>
> This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate
> how the concept of "people" is difficult and fluid.
>
> Past issues:
> - Are other races people, do they have right? Depressingly, until the
> middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human
> beings are people with equal rights.
>
> Current issues:
> - Are animals people to some degree? Do they have rights? Many modern
> societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a
> crime;
> - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have
> rights like free speech;
>
> Future issues:
> - Are aliens people? Should they have equal rights? Does that depend
> on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw
> the line?
> - Are robots people?
> - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people?
>
> Crazy issues:
> - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes.
>
> Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say:
> "Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss...
> What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can
> be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under..."
>
> So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear
> cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has
> a meaning closer to "person" then "man". So I actually made a mistake,
> Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they
> wouldn't disagree to much on this.
>
> Also wikipedia, for what it's worth:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person
>
> Telmo.
>
> >
> > 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com
> >
> >> wrote:
> >> > Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack
> self-referential
> >> > means, like quarks.
> >> >
> >> > Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi
> >> > fridge's
> >> > food.
> >>
> >> You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to
> >> share the same string of characters and call it an argument.
> >>
> >> >
> >> > 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the
> >> >>> molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my
> >> >>> opinion
> >> >>> (from diverse reading) handle to information.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be
> >> >>> seen
> >> >>> as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a
> >> >>> liver
> >> >>> cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are
> any
> >> >>> each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism
> >> >>> have
> >> >>> lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is
> >> >>> ourself.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level
> is
> >> >>> lower than some thought.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's
> >> >>> still
> >> >>> too much an aristotelian way to express the "identity" thesis.
> >> >>> Consciousness
> >> >>> is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to
> >> >>> machines,
> >> >>> when those person develop *some* true belief.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers?
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack
> >> >> self-referential
> >> >> means, like quarks.
> >> >> relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not
> >> >> people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive
> abilities.
> >> >>
> >> >> Bruno
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Bruno
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>
> >> >> --
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> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
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-- 
Alberto.

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