On 29 Oct 2013, at 12:09, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Roger,

Having just learned a thing or two from Bruno,
it strikes me that Leibniz monads are Aristotelian rather than Platonic
just like my string cosmology.
Richard


Exactly. Leibniz, in some text (but not in all) makes a come back to the antic Platonism, but he never get as far as Plotinus. Despite this, Leibniz get close to the discovery of the universal machine and universal language, and the correct metaphysical consequences, but recurrently he get stuck by the spell of some form of Aristotelian metaphysics. He missed the pythagorean neutral monism, but is still very close to it in some texts.

Bruno





On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 6:40 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism

In physics and psychology we have two enigmas if materialism rules,
those of spontaneous mental intentions (so that there is no free will) and also that of spontaneous (probabililistic) events such as we find in statistical mechanics
and quantum mechanics.

But under Leibniz's platonism, these dilemmas vanish.

Reductionism is the view that all mental processes can be reduced or explained by brain mechanisms. But true intentions, where physical actions are initiated by the mind, not the brain, obviously fail this test, so it is a puzzle swept under the rug by the cult of materialism. Free will also then disappears
and creation is enigmatic.

Leibniz's platonism is the inverse view in which all observed or possible brain functions
are controlled by mind, so that reductionism vanishes as a problem and
the will, with possibly some limitations, is free to create. All causes in
Leibniz's world are thoughts.

Similarly, if there is no need





Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough

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