On Wednesday, October 30, 2013 4:52:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Oct 2013, at 19:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 1:01:25 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Oct 2013, at 16:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > 
>> > On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>> > 
>> > > 
>> > > 
>> > > On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > > 
>> > > On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>> > > 
>> > >> 
>> > >> 
>> > >> On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> > >> 
>> > >> On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: 
>> > >> 
>> > >>> What do you call "ANY PHYSICS"? is there a "God given" marvel 
>> > >>> (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable   
>> > "PHYSICS"? 
>> > >> 
>> > >> I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable 
>> > >> lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. 
>> > >> 
>> > >> Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense 
>> > >> contradict such deterministic law. 
>> > >> 
>> > >> That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts 
>> > >> a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding 
>> > >> anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into 
>> > >> sense: "Laws", "Forces", "Fields", "Wavefunctions", 
>> > >> "Probability"...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all 
>> > >> primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- 
>> > >> constellation. 
>> > > 
>> > > Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. 
>> > > 
>> > > Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the- 
>> > > gap, etc. 
>> > 
>> > No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a 
>> > question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of 
>> > machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter is a 
>> > matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the 
>> > introspective machine. 
>> > 
>> > Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed), 
>>
>>
>> You might be dreaming. 
>>
>
> Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. 
> Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that   
>> > appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence.   
>> > It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be   
>> > precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it   
>> > the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the   
>> > possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of   
>> > experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories   
>> > in parallel or phase-shift. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > > I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be 
>> > > anything more or less than sense. 
>> > 
>> > This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of what 
>> > is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non justifiable 
>> > feature like consciousness, etc. 
>> > 
>> > There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the most   
>> > self-evident phenomena possible as it is self-evidence period, full   
>> > stop. 
>>
>> Yes, you are right. But it is not evident in any communicable way, if   
>> only because it escapes definition. 
>>
>
> Communicability would be redundant though. 
>
>
> In platonia, yes. You can survive without publishing, but you have to wait 
> for heaven. Hereby, you need to communicate, because it is the job. For 
> this you need to start from notions that your audience has already study, 
> so that you can share initial statements and reason from them.
>

That assumes that being alive implies separation from Platonia - that our 
essence is isolation rather than absolute. What we see in reality I think 
supports my version. If we had to begin with abstract notions to initialize 
communication, we would fail to develop language. Isn't it obvious that the 
converse is more true? We begin to communicate by diverging from common 
consciousness, from familiarity and gesture. We point, we imitate, we 
laugh. We do not initialize a bootstrap code and demand that our neighbors 
read the manual.
 

>
>
>
>
> Sense has no reason to communicate since any receiver would not be able to 
> communicate unless it could already sense.
>
>
> Like arithmetic truth, who win all war, without any army, and not saying 
> one word.
>

Sure. Arithmetic truth and Sense are almost twins, but only one of the two 
can be the authentic absolute. Given that measurement (_metric) is 
meaningless without some sense to measure and some sensed to be measured, 
it is absolutely clear which is the absolute head and which is its tail. 
Because of the nature of sense, its reflectivity and transparency, 
Arithmetic truth is indeed the most universal reflection of the Absolute 
available - so if we want a public representation of the Absolute, that is 
fine with me. Since the Absolute is sense, however, we must be careful to 
realize that only private presentation is primitively real. Public forms 
and functions are only locally real...which is huge of course, but 
nevertheless, building a private experience from public forms won't work 
unless the private experience natively wants to build itself.


>
>
>  
>
>> So we can't use it to do a theory of 1p. 
>
>
> The theory of 1p is easy, you just have to imagine the opposite of 3p.
>
>
> That's a fuzzy unclear oversimplification.
>

That's a good start. 1p = fuzzy unclear oversimplification. Yes. 3p = sharp 
unfeeling undersignification. Go on...
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> It is an important data, and   
>> its immediacy and obviousness is certainly a clue. 
>> Then, if you do the math, you can intellectually understand why   
>> machines looking inward describes something which looks very much like   
>> that. 
>>
>
> I think it would look the same if the machines weren't looking inward at 
> all. The same vending machine can sell cigarettes, candy bars, live ostrich 
> eggs, or just empty space. It doesn't impress me that it doesn't know what 
> the things that it sells are or where they come from.
>
>
> This remind me a Joke. 
> Hardy: "-Do you think a machine can think?"
> Laurel: "-hmm... I don't think ...."
> Hardy: "I am not asking if *you* can think, but if *machine* can think!"
>
> The machine knows what she is selling.
>

Why would it? Certainly a vending machine doesn't, and it vends them pretty 
well.
 

> I was saying that the machines already know that if you decide that she is 
> not thinking, she has no mean to prove you wrong. Comp  explains why 
> machines will fear you.
>

She has no means to prove what I have decided either. I think the whole 
notion of machines having fear is too silly to even call science fiction. 
Again, not because I don't like technology, or wouldn't rather be a 
computer myself, but because it obviously is not true of the world we live 
in. The whole premise of countering the argument that machines are 
unfeeling by assuming the claim that feeling people are machines is the 
ultimate circular reasoning. It's like saying 'we don't know that dead 
people won't come back to life, since all people are just dead people who 
are still alive'.


>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > All that is, is because it has been made evident within some sensory   
>> > context. 
>>
>> You bet. It is OK. 
>>
>>
> Sure, but the other bet, that there can be some kind of existence outside 
> of sense, 
>
>
> Unless you disbelieve in the existence of the prime numbers, it is obvious 
> that there are other kind of existence. 
>

Prime numbers are a particular part of the sense of counting. A horse might 
be trained to count, but I doubt they will count prime numbers. If you can 
count prime numbers, however, they they make sense in the same way to 
everyone. Some people are colorblind, but to those who can see red and 
blue, they see them as having the same relation as everyone else who can 
see them does. The red-blue truth does nor run on a more primitive 
arithmetic truth, just as prime numbers don't run on a more primitive color 
truth. Sense is primitive, so there is nothing outside of it. No prime 
numbers can exist independently of some experience in which they are 
presented as aesthetic phenomena (feelings, meanings).


>
>
>
> then brings in the implausibility of sense and the necessity for a 
> homunculus regress between sensory and (hypothetical) nonsensory 
> phenomena.  
>
>
> Computer science excels in solving the recursive regress. There are many 
> fixed points which solve them. 
> The universality comes from some closure properties.
>

But there is no plausible entry for sensory experience, and no way of 
bridging it to this hypothetical non-sensory existence.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > There is nothing there to be evident except for this relativity of   
>> > presence shared with the contents and contexts of eternity.   
>> > Justification is nothing but a sense of comparison among subordinate   
>> > sense experience. You are looking for something that you have   
>> > already found but won't accept it. 
>>
>> I found it in my head, and I show that all universal machine "looking   
>> in their head" can find something quite similar. 
>>
>
> ? Everything can find sense.
>
>
> No, only the universal machine, notably looking in their own head (so to 
> speak). looking outside their head can accelerate or distract that process.
>

What is an example of something that isn't a universal machine?
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> You are just insulting the machine, by what looks like prejudice, as   
>> you admit not trying to study them. 
>>
>
> To me that's just pointing to the pet rock and saying 'you're hurting his 
> feelings. You should study geology.'
>
>
> To you who admit not having studied the machine. But your comparison is 
> nonsensical. No geologist that I know believe that rock can think, except 
> perhaps complex quasi-cristal, in *some* sense.
>
> But the idea that machine can think is defended since the beginning, and 
> is at the least a venerable hypothesis, plausible, even trivial (in the 
> weak comp sense). Then studying computer science provides clues (as I try 
> to explain).
>

That's not surprising though. The idea that dolls can come to life has 
always been pretty popular too. Again - it is not such a bad theory, but it 
happens to be untrue in reality.


>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > 
>> > Unlike Comp, it does not assert the supremacy of arithmetic truth,   
>> > but then add in dreaming numbers, resurrection by mechanical   
>> > incantation, duplicated persons, machines emulating other machines   
>> > which think they aren't machines (even though Comp prohibits any   
>> > possibility of what else there would be besides machines.). 
>>
>> Not at all. Arithmetical Truth is full of gods, and daemons, which are   
>> non-machines. 
>
>
> If there are non-machines that are gods, why would there need to be 
> machines also who are people? 
>
>
> Because the number exists and have complex relations making it so. 
>

That's not anywhere near an answer as far as I can tell. If a number 
exists, and complex relations make it so, what does that have to do with 
dictating what is machine, what is non-machine, what are gods and who are 
people?
 

>
>
>
> Again it seems completely unfalsifiable. Comp keeps morphing from 'UMs can 
> emulate consciousness' to 'gods and daemons exist (who are conscious) which 
> are not machines. 
>
>
> No, it is well known mathematical theorems. The logicians study machines 
> and non-machines all the time. Most attributes of machines are themselves 
> non-machines, and some are Löbian entities. 
>

But you can study Löbian entities without ascribing to them literal 
awareness.


>
>
> You say 'UMs believe this' yet you run on a UM that does not believe that 
> anymore. Or you can meditate on your own superimposed belief and disbelief, 
> yet without realizing that by doing so you are contradicting what you say 
> UMs believe.
>
>
> ?
>

Your knowledge about what machines think proves that machines do not think 
that (since you are a machine).
 

>
>
>  
>
>> Comp is a vaccine against the reductionism of the   
>> finite, and the infinite. To understand comp is to understand the   
>> abyssalness of the mindscape. Comp prohibits nothing, not even 0=1,   
>> although we better should hope it is not the case. 
>>
>
> That's why Comp is not a view to the authentic and singular truth of the 
> uni-verse, but the opposite. Comp reflects, impersonates, multiplies, and 
> makes generic. It is neither uni, nor verse, but rather nihil-phoria. 
> Instead of feeling that can overwhelm with terror or ecstasy, there is a 
> toy model: hypostases of self-reference. Modal logics and recombinatory 
> switch positions. 
>
> Like any divination oracle, the UM will deliver interesting information in 
> a voice with an uncanny ring. It is not nothing. That is clear. It does 
> reflect deep insight, just as a Ouija board or I Ching (try it: 
> http://www.eclecticenergies.com/iching/virtualcoins.php)
>
> Here's what I got just now:
>
> 25. Without Pretense 
>
> Not plowing yields uncultivated land. 
> Thus, it is beneficial to have a goal to move to.
>
> Not taking action to make things happen, so nothing happens. It is better 
> to work towards a goal.
>
> Pretty good I think. Without pretense. It perfectly describes back to me 
> my own intention here. I do not try to impose an agenda, I only show you 
> what I am looking at. The super-personal reflections which can work through 
> inanimate objects without turning those objects into literal subjects.
>
>
> Distracting.
>

That's good. Distraction is the only thing that can break the spell of Comp.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > Comp may mistake self referential logic for a self, 
>>
>> Comp does not mistake the self-referential logic for the self. There   
>> is no reason why comp would do such a big mistake. 
>>
>
> So you say, but I don't believe it.
>
>
> Because you don't study. You are like "I know machines are dumb, so I 
> don't need to listen to them. "
> That is a self-enforcing prejudice.
>

Know, I am like "I know that I can be sucked into a delusional belief that 
machines are smart, so I should assume that it is even easier for such a 
delusion to be present in those who work closely with them."
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > but I don't. I have no problem a sentence that we read as "this   
>> > sentence is lying" as a trivial syntactic contradiction rather than   
>> > a profound puzzle that reveals the ontology of consciousness. 
>>
>> That's Tarski. You need both Gödel and Tarski to get the Bp & p versus   
>> Bp nuances. 
>>
>> What I understand of Gödel makes the same kind of point. Incompleteness 
> means that whatever rules are used to make a mathematical system create 
> their own blind spots when it comes to proving those rules. You are the 
> only one that I know of who interpret Gödel's incompleteness as an 
> affirmation of arithmetic supremacy rather than an indictment of its 
> limitations on discovering its limitation. But Gödel was a person. The 
> mathematical truth was not visible in the math alone, he had to wrestle it 
> out. Unlike a UM, we *can* appreciate our own limitation and 
> meta-limitations more than a machine can, because sense is transparent and 
> flexible rather than rigid and opaque.
>
>
> No; please read the literature.
>

Please stop reading the literature. Have a look around.
 

> My position is almost the conventional one by logicians. You can read the 
> book by Judson Webb on the subject, or the books by Torkel Franzen. I sum 
> up all the papers on the Gödel, mind and machine question in my long text 
> "conscience et mécanisme". It is a rich subject. 
>

I never said it isn't a rich subject.There are other subjects though.
 

> You seem to miss the important point that machine have not just limitation 
> (by Gödel's theorem), but that they know that they have those 
> limitations),. They can prove them about themselves, in the 3p way. And 
> with the Bp & p, sense is transparent and flexible ... from the machine's 
> 1p pov.
>

It's a cartoon of transparency and flexibility though. It is our 
familiarity with the absolute which allows us to fill in the skeleton of 
comp with an assumption of familiarity, but it is pareidolia and projection.


>
>
>
>
>  
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > To start from sense is like to start from God. This answers nothing 
>> > (even if there is a God). 
>> > 
>> > It is to start before God, and before arithmetic, truth, and even   
>> > before 'starting'. Your are still vastly underestimating the hubris   
>> > that I intend. Sense = the Absolute, means that there has never been   
>> > anything else, and there can never be anything else. 
>>
>> It looks like the arithmetical truth. 
>>
>> What makes you so sure that it is not arithmetical truth? 
>>
>
> Because if it was arithmetical truth we wouldn't need flavor. Numbers make 
> sense to organize flavors, but flavors do nothing for numbers which can 
> already inform each other (instantly, and non-locally to boot).
>
>
> :(
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On the contrary, comp explains 100% of matter, and 99,9% of sense, but 
>> > explain 100% of why it remains 0.01% of a necessary non comprehensible 
>> > aspect of the inside first person view. 
>> > 
>> > The entire universe fits in the 0,1% of sense that comp fails to   
>> > find. Everything else is a reflection of that sense. Comp is inside   
>> > out. 
>>
>> Meaning it is the same thing. Except with comp the sun in law enjoy   
>> the steak, where with your sense "theory" he does not, sadly. 
>>
>
> Its not the same thing. The horse can pull the cart, but the cart cannot 
> pull the horse. Any one cart can pull another horse inside of it, iff that 
> cart has a horse pulling it. It's a matter of seeing that on the absolute 
> level, the first difference is that of the head and the tail, since it is 
> only the head who can tell the difference that the tail makes.
>
>
> Sure, but universal machine can be "head". You have nice analogies, but 
> you just use them to beg again the question.
>

No, because if the universal machine was the head, it wouldn't need a tail 
that thought it was a head.
 

>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Anyway, the solution is testable, so you should be happy that we might 
>> > refute comp. 
>> > 
>> > Comp may be testable (using consciousness) but consciousness is not   
>> > testable using comp. 
>>
>> Consciousness is not testable, using what you want. 
>>
>
> Sure it is. We know that we have slept deeply. We know when we have lost 
> consciousness.
>
>
>
> We never lose consciousness. Losing consciousness is an illusion that our 
> brain introduces for making us believe that ... we can lose consciousness, 
> and life. But we never do. That might play a role in surviving (on earth) 
> strategies, but with comp, and actually with Descartes, there is the idea 
> that we never lose consciousness, and with training, you can learn to 
> notice this during all nights. 
> First person unconsciousness does not make sense. That simply does not 
> exist.
>

I agree, but that doesn't mean that we can't test the relative loss of 
consciousness as I mentioned. We know that we have slept a dreamless sleep, 
whether the dreamlessness is an illusion or a retroactive fill in. 
 

> But we can become amnesic, and lose memory, and context. We cannot be 
> unconscious, but we can believe having been unconscious, but that is an 
> artificial, fragile, construct of the mind.
>

We can lose personal consciousness and know it. I would agree that 
consciousness continues at the super-personal level, and at the 
sub-personal level until death.
 

>
> Then, by testing consciousness, we were actually talking about the 
> consciousness of someone else, in the 3p sense of testing, like in physics 
> and science. Or own consciousness cannot be tested by another, as the 
> Löbian machines already know. We can test it ourself, but it is trivially 
> alway positive testing. A dead corpse cannot test and conclude "I am not 
> conscious". Nor can a zombie.
>

Right, but it is not that simple. Because of the transparency of sense, our 
personal unconsciousness can be reported back to us when we regain 
consciousness by way of these other ranges of our awareness. We cannot test 
personal unconsciousness personally but we can sense its reflection 
metaphorically.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to