On 10/31/2013 10:18 AM, John Clark wrote:
> what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure
of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up
As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought
experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine
who "you" is and easy to determine if predictions about what "you" will see were right
or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a
equal right to the title "you" which means that the predictions about what "you" will
see are useless.
This seems like an inessential detail. Instead of Moscow and Washington, suppose the
teleportation is to Moscow and Anchorhead on Tatooine. There is no third person who will
And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and
neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self.
Bruno is also asking about probability, which from a frequentist viewpoint can be inferred
from the diary entries of the subjects.
> both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.
No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who "you" is, it's the only
fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are
called "you" and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question
asked yesterday "what is the probability "you" will see X?".
The more basic question is whether some kind of duplication is a possible model that can
replace probabilisitic uncertainty in QM with deterministic evolution that still produces
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.