Ryle's "category mistake" and why spacetime, to a platonist, is contained in 


This is a very subtle issue. 

"The term "category-mistake" was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his book The 
Concept of Mind (1949)  
to remove what he argued to be a confusion over the nature of mind born from 
Cartesian metaphysics. 
Ryle alleged that it was a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an 
immaterial substance 
because predications of [actual] substance are not meaningful for a collection 
[or fiction] of dispositions and capacities. 

The first example is of a visitor to Oxford. The visitor, upon viewing the 
colleges and library, reportedly inquired 
'but where is the University?' [4] The visitor's mistake is presuming that a 
University is part of the category 
"units of physical infrastructure" or some such thing, rather than the category 
"institutions", say, which are 
far more abstract and complex conglomerations of buildings, people, procedures, 
and so on. "

Ryle, like the eliminative materialists, used this logical error to eliminate 
mind-- simply as being a fiction. 
But to a platonist, his argument can produce a completely different conclusion. 
To a platonist or a solipsist, Mind itself, in which objects exist, is not 
simply a fiction, it is all that there is (the One).
To put it another way, Mind is a necessarily higher order of being in which the 
physical world exists.

Then Mind is not a property of brain, it is a higher order (mental) category in 
which the physical brain exists. 

Brain is in spacetime, which itself is contained in Mind.  
Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] 
See my Leibniz site at 

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