On 07 Nov 2013, at 20:48, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno, could you kindly tell me how could I find a universal machine? (No joke).
I would LOVE to listen to them.
John M

Right now, you have one in front of you (more exactly: you have one incarnation of it in front of you).

Then you have another one in your skull.

Then all your cells are such universal machines, although they have been forced to specialized.

All human beings are example of universal machine, as humans can easily emulated a universal machine. By listening to me right now, you are listening to such a machine (but logically it makes sense to say that I might be more than that, even assuming comp).

All computers, in the usual mundane sense, are universal machine.

All GSM are universal machines.

The physical universe is also a universal machine. Actually it defines a lot of different universal machines.

Fridges, bridges, houses and clocks are not universal machines, although some sophisticated models of them might be.

All programming language interpreters are also example of universal machines/numbers.

And they all exists in arithmetic together with their executions, (that's a theorem, no need for comp here).

Bruno








On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 6:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 06 Nov 2013, at 21:31, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno wrote No.6:
  You have missed the discovery of the universal machine.
Was it a discovery, or an invention? Is there O N E discovered machine
for studying, or we just imagine how it should behave?

There are many universal machine, or universal number, but they are all equivalent (and maximal) in computability and emulability abilities. They are not equivalent in provability and inductive inference abilities, although the correct one will obeys to very general mathematical laws. In fact they all have the same (rich) theologies, and they are testable as the theology contains the physics.

So it is fun to listen to them, and compare with what we can observe.

Bruno






On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 06 Nov 2013, at 13:48, Roger Clough wrote:

Computers, code and consciousness

Cumputers cannot simulate human activities or experiences
or consciousness because they have to deal in code.

Code is not magic, have no inherent intelligence.
Computers are not magic, they are just machines.

Magic explains even less.
Then, the closure of the computable functions for diagonalization introduces the "magic" of self-reference, in the different points of view.





Computers can only deal in code, which is impersonal and
public. They are noit experiences, but can be descruiptions
of experiences, which is not the same thing.
Unfortunately, experiences are
personal and computers, dealing in code only,
have no access to them.

They have access to their own code, but they are confronted to Truth, also. They have the same difficulty than us to relate truth and code.





Why must I keep explaining this ?

You have missed the discovery of the universal machine. That changes everything. The universal machine have a rich theology.



Computers deal in code.

At some level. Humans too. Cf DNA.

People don't

At some level. Machines too (cf the machine's first person).

If you need to introduce magic, it means you want escape reason, but this can only lead to bad faith, wishful thinking, etc. Computer science shows that there is enough "magic" in reason. No need to introduce it, as this addition might hide the magic which is there. Also, your way of reasoning is invalid? If human can use magic to be conscious, why not machine? You might be underestimating God's power.

Bruno





Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough

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