2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>

>  On 11/12/2013 11:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
>
>>  On 11/12/2013 11:15 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
>>
>>>  On 11/12/2013 10:24 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
>>>
>>>>  On 11/12/2013 7:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Nov 11, 2013 at 7:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  Benjamin Button lived his life in reverse.
>>>>>
>>>>> So I'll ask you the same thing I asked Quentin, what's you inference
>>>>> from the fact you, and every body you've ever heard of died before 
>>>>> reaching
>>>>> age 150?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  That observation is not relevant the question at hand.  MWI implies
>>>> subjective immortality, not immortality of others.
>>>>
>>>>  I didn't specify a question.
>>>>
>>>>  And what is this "what's you inference from the fact you, and every
>>> body you've ever heard of died before reaching age 150?" ?
>>>
>>>  Also I don't see the relevance of the fact that we don't have past
>>> eternality for that question ? You don't have to move back to 4 to say we
>>> forget things, from day to day there are a lot of things I forget
>>>
>>>
>>>  Me too, but there are *some things* I remember and even remember
>>> remembering.  My father had Alzheimers and he came to a state where he
>>> didn't remember anything, even minute to minute.  Was he still the same
>>> person?  Didn't seem like it to me.
>>>
>>>
>>>   ... that doesn't mean I'm dead today, or that those event didn't
>>> exists, or that is necessary they did. QI does not state that we should
>>> have an eternal past... only that our 1 POV will never cease (doesn't say
>>> anything about perfect memory recall either).
>>>
>>>
>>>  No, but if we rely on QM to show we have an eternal future, then we
>>> have to say why the time symmetry of QM doesn't imply and eternal past.  Of
>>> course the obvious answer is in the past our physical structure (i.e. brain
>>> etc) didn't exist.  But then that also implies that we won't exist in the
>>> future as our physical structure dissipates.
>>>
>>
>>  Only if MWI is false, QI relies on MWI, with MWI, it is garanteed that
>> some branches will carry a continuum of you from near perfect continuation
>> to no continuation (but these are to be ignore, you're just not where
>> you're not), of course if MWI is false, QI is too.
>>
>>
>>  But when you look at it that way it's not so dependent on QM as on
>> statistical mechanics.  If your 'measure' in the world (and I'm not sure
>> that's a coherent concept) is continually decreasing, as the Born weight of
>> "dead" grows "alive" falls, then the probability you are dead approaches 1.
>>
>
>  But it will never be 1, so the argument follows. As long as there is at
> least one continuation, it is enough, and as MWI garanteed such
> continuation, if MWI is true, QI is too.
>
>
>>  Then it becomes vague what "you" means.
>>
>
>  "You" is your own feeling of being alive.... Only "you" know what "you"
> is.
>
>
>>  Can your next experience be that being a corpse,
>>
>
>  If it's possible to have a 1 POV that feels like 1 POV while being
> alive, why not, I don't know, the only thing QI says, is that "you" will
> feel a next moment.
>
>
>> a rock, a bit of methane gas?  Is there necessarily a Quentin who
>> remembers being Quentin at all?
>>
>
>  There must be one, but there must be a continuum of Quentin in
> between... The only "ignored" ones are the ones who don't remember having
> been Quentin.
>
>
> But that's my point that QI is relying more on statistical mechanics than
> QM.  Essentially you're saying it's *possible* that there will a
> experiences of remembering being Quentin at any given time in the future
>

That's not what I'm saying, MWI garantee that there will always be a
continuation at *each and every* moment, there is always a *next moment*.


> (something that would have been true in a Newtonian world view also)
>

No.


> and since everything possible happens
>

That's not the point, at each "split", there is always a branch containing
a continuation of "you".


>  (another dubious assumption)
>

That's not the assumption, the assumption is MWI, at each "split" there is
a continuum of universe, some containing a continuation of you, some
don't... With QI, you count only the ones containing a continuation of you,
and there is always > 1 at each split if MWI is true.


> you are immortal.  But having a vanishing probability of being alive,
>

This is ASSA, and I find that absurd, there is no absolute probability of
being alive, probability is only meaningful between two moments...


>  seems to me the same as being dead.
>

Being dead is having no next state, as MWI garanteed you'll have (at least
one) next state, you can't be dead.


> Of course you can also argue that it is possible, in some world Quentin is
> alive, full of memories, has a Nobel prize and is married to Gwenth
> Paltrow.  But isn't that, alas, a completely different Quentin.
>

Well it would no be a direct continuation of me now... QI is moment to
moment, MWI also predict (without QI) that such a Quentin exists in another
branch... but that's not the point of QI.

Quentin


>
> Brent
>
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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