Every one of the perhaps inifinite copies of you will grow old and die in less than 150 years. There is no quantum immortality

On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 4:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> > >> On 11/12/2013 1:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> >> 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >> >>> On 11/12/2013 1:02 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >>> >>>> On 11/12/2013 12:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2013/11/12 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> >>>> >>>>> On 11/12/2013 12:23 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>> >>>>> This is ASSA, and I find that absurd, there is no absolute probability >>>>> of being alive, probability is only meaningful between two moments... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But there's a probability of being alive at time t in the future, >>>>> >>>> >>>> This is ASSA >>>> >>>> >>>>> and that can become arbitrarily small, and in fact it is arbitrarily >>>>> small >>>>> >>>> >>>> If absolute measure makes sense, then your absolute measure is always >>>> decreasing, still in MWI, as there is always a next moment (which will be >>>> as *real* as the previous one), I don't see how ASSA is relevant for the >>>> question. >>>> >>>> >>>> I guess it depends on how you value future states. If only those you >>>> exist in matter then you can ignore the ASSA. No need for life insurance. >>>> No concern about global warming. >>>> >>> >>> That does not follow... RSSA is moment to moment... If you have a gun >>> in front of you and you shoot in your head and if MWI is true, there will >>> be more branches where you are crippled than where you are perfectly safe >>> (and a hell of a lot more where you're dead, but *we don't count where >>> you're not*). >>> >>> >>> But that's part of what bothers me about this idea. How >>> crippled/brain-damaged can you be and still count as a continuation? Are >>> there degrees of continuation? >>> >> >> As long as you still feel you, that counts. >> >> >>> If so, why can't the degrees asymptote to zero? >>> >>> >> It is, reread my previous message, there is a continuum of such >> continuations. The one that don't count are the one where nothing is left >> from you. I would say also, there is a continuum but by RSSA, nearest >> continuation should have higher probability. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> - so all rational decisions will be based on assuming it becomes >>>>> zero. Right? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see how decisions come into play here, rational decisions >>>> depends on the one taking them... I would rationally choose to minimize arm >>>> for me (so as not to put my life in jeopardy), because if MWI is true *and* >>>> with RSSA, me in front on a shotgun, will likely result me being crippled >>>> while not dead with a hell lot more probability than being perfectly safe >>>> >>>> >>>> But most such events, like being shot with a shotgun, are essentially >>>> classical which implies that your continuations depend on extremely >>>> improbable events >>>> >>> >>> Sure, but the point is *αΊ—here is a continuation*; that's all what is >>> needed for the argument to follow. >>> >>> >>> "There is a continuation" seems to slough over what counts as a >>> continuation and whether we should care about it. >>> >> >> There is a continuum of continuations, the point is there is, so you >> either argue MWI is false, but your argument is pointeless if MWI is true, >> that's the way it is. >> >> >> Well I'm certainly not dogmatically assuming MWI. In fact I'm testing >> whether it leads to absurdities. >> > > Sure, the point is that if MWI is true, the argument follows. > > >> >> >> >> >>> If the only continuations are quite different from what you think of as >>> Quentin Anciaux, do they still count? >>> >> >> The only thing that count is 1st POV... >> >> >> So *you* Quentin Anciaux (incidentally, how do pronounce that?) don't >> necessarily continue. It is just that there is a continuation of 1p POVs. >> So we're down to the question of what constitutes a 1p POV. >> > > I know what is my own, don't know for you, but I assume you do know it for > yourself. > > >> >> >> >> >>> And I don't think you can just rely on the continuity of Hilbert space >>> evolution because the time scale of that evolution can be much faster than >>> the sequences of conscious thought. So as far QM goes you could evolve >>> from Quentin Anciaux to Neo (or to Brent Meeker) in a millisecond. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> - Rumsfeld's unknown unknowns, e.g. you wake up from having dreamed a >>>> whole life which led to you being shot, or you discover you are just >>>> participating in a simulation in which you were shot, or you're not really >>>> Quentin Anciaux, or... Did you read "Divided by Infinity"? >>>> >>>> >>>> .... RSSA is of use, ASSA not much at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> So have you bought an annuity for your retirement? >>>> >>> >>> You confuse things... RSSA is important, and that's why you buy a life >>> insurance. >>> >>> >>> Life insurance I understand, it is for other people that survive you >>> (in almost all worlds). But an annuity is for yourself, so that you don't >>> outlive your savings in your retirement. >>> >> >> So what ? >> >> >> So if you think you will live much longer than the insurance companies >> think you will, you should buy an annuity for your (very) old age. >> > > Maybe we should. > > >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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