On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 11:15 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 11/12/2013 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Both with Comp and with Everett-QM we have lost that unique theoretical
> evidence, because our best current explanation (comp, or QM) makes that
> mind-brain identity non sensical.
> I don't see anything about QM that makes "mind is what a brain does"
> non-sensical. Quantum immortality relies on it: QM implies material
> objects exist as states in Hilbert space which evolve unitarily. If mind
> and brain are not one-to-one, then your duplication thought experiments
> don't work as arguments.
I think Bruno may be criticizing the mind-brain identity (a.k.a
type-physicalism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_physicalism ) which
holds there is a one-to-one mapping, where the more modern theories of mind
(functionalism, computationalism, etc.) subscribe to multiple
realizeability, which implies it is not a one-to-one identity, but rather a
a many-to-one (many_physical_states-to-one_mind_state) theory (
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