On 11/12/2013 4:13 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 November 2013 11:22, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
On 11/12/2013 1:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
So *you* Quentin Anciaux (incidentally, how do pronounce that?) don't
necessarily continue. It is just that there is a continuation of 1p
we're down to the question of what constitutes a 1p POV.
I know what is my own, don't know for you, but I assume you do know it for
Yes, but how do I "know" it? Is it a matter of perceiving temporal overlap
thoughts - no, because then I woudn't be the same person after anesthesia.
Is it a
matter of memories - that seems plausible; although I don't seem to need
memories or access them often to be "me". Is it a matter, as comp
realizing the "Brent" input-output function in the brain?
You don't know if your memories are accurate or that you are the same person as you were
a second before, or anything else to do with the /contents/ of your consciousness. What
you do know is that you're having your present experiences and thinking your present
But I think that fuzzes up the idea of "continuation". If consciousness is a set of
disconnected "observer moments" then "continuation" can only refer to some inherent
similarities that suffices to order these moments. I don't think conscious thoughts,
which last maybe 100msec, have sufficient content to do this. On the other hand, because
of their duration, I think they overlap preceding and succeeding thoughts. The brain, as a
neural net, can have thoughts in various stages of becoming conscious or producing
actions. But that model implies that the continuity is due to physical processes which are
not conscious (or in Bruno's model they are at the much lower level). But that implies
not all brain processes entail some consciousness. MWI implies continuity at the physics
level, but not at the consciousness level.
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