On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 7:20 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 11/12/2013 5:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 5:57 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On 13 November 2013 11:12, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Every one of the perhaps inifinite copies of you will grow old and die >>> in less than 150 years. >>> There is no quantum immortality >>> >> >> A pretty bold statement. I don't see that the laws of physics require >> this - there must be a small chance of living to be 200, e.g. if a load of >> cosmic rays miss your DNA by some miracle? Or something similar. Of course >> you end up rather frail in 99.999999999999% of the branches, so QTI seems >> to suggest an eternity of being not quite dead. Not a great prospect... >> > > > Eventually the probability of the simulation hypothesis ( > http://www.simulation-argument.com/faq.html ) takes over. The simulation > hypothesis (that you exist in a simulation) essentially is already 100% if > you believe in MWI. The question is what proportion of your explanations > are simulations. Say it is 1%. Then when the probability of your organic > survival drops ever lower in the many worlds, then your survival through > the simulation hypothesis becomes increasingly likely. > > > ?? What's the difference between the simulation and 'another world' (or > this world for that matter)? > The difference is the world that is simulating ours has access to information about ours, and we/our memories may continue there (in that other universe). Therefore, we can survive even the heat death of this universe. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.