On 10 Dec 2013, at 13:38, Richard Ruquist wrote:

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Bruno: All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense ofa logical categorical definition. Why we understand them is amystery, but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable.We don't need an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axiomsof the TOE is RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms).But with comp at the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at theepistemological level---or at least the creature generated by RA dothat, and we interview them to retrieve the physical laws.Richard: Could explain why the physical laws are not ontological.?

`The laws of physics should emerge from the FPI on all sigma_1 truth.`

`The intuitive certainty (Bp & Dt (& p)) gives indeed a quantization on`

`the (true) sigma_1 sentences.`

`We get three arithmetical quantizations(*), so strictly speaking we`

`get three type of physical reality.`

`The physical laws are not ontological because the theory assumes *any*`

`universal system, and I use numbers, because people know them (but the`

`proof of universality is not that simple).`

`This leads to the first person measure problem, and its solution`

`should be the physical laws (by UDA). And the propositional physics`

`found there is up to now not refuted by the facts. Too bad, we don't`

`refute comp!`

Bruno

`(*), on p sigma_1, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & p & Dt). In those case we get`

`p -> BDp, and can test a comparison with quantum logic(s).`

On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 09 Dec 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:On 12/9/2013 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 09 Dec 2013, at 01:33, LizR wrote:On 9 December 2013 05:52, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 4:38 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > Could you name a materialistic theory that explains consciousnessConsciousness is the feeling information has when it is beingprocessed; if conscious is fundamental, that is to say it comesat the end of a long line of "what is that?" questions, thenafter saying that there is just nothing more that can be saidabout it. And hey, it's just as good as a billion otherconsciousness theories.Ah yes, Max Tegmark's "theory".These aren't theories, is theproblem. One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousnessis, to start with, and then a theory that explains all itsobserved features, and makes testable predictions. Otherwise allone has is a jumble of words.To be precise, we don't need a definition of what consciousnessis. WE need only to agree on some assertion on consciousness. Itis the same with line and points. The same with natural numbers.We don't need to define them (in fact we can't). We need only toagree on axioms about them, and methods or rules of logicalinference/deduction.And we learn what are natural numbers in the same way, ostensivelyby one's mother holding up fingers and saying "one", "two",... Andso we generalize and make a theory about fingers and othercountable things. And we know that in all cases we run into we canadd one more and so we casually assume an axiom of infinity becauseit is convenient and seems to cause no problems. But if it leadsto paradoxes and absurdities...All this does not define the natural numbers in the sense of alogical categorical definition. Why we understand them is a mystery,but we can meta-explained why that mystery is unsolvable. We don'tneed an infinity axiom in the ontology (indeed the axioms of the TOEis RA: no infinity axioms, not even induction axioms). But with compat the meta-level, we do use infinity axioms at the epistemologicallevel---or at least the creature generated by RA do that, and weinterview them to retrieve the physical laws.This is a point where I might be quick sometimes/UDA start from comp, and at step 8, we should understand that theTOE is RA (or equivalent), and comp is replaced by the restrictionto the sigma_1 sentences for the epistemology.So going from UDA to AUDA, comp passes from the base level to themetalevel. In AUDA we assume RA, and interview richer believer (likePA) as generated by RA (or equivalently the universal dovetailer).After UDA, we know that we dont need and cannot need anything morethan0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) -> x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+xThe comp philosophy is then translated entirely in term ofdefinitions, and theorems in that theory.BrunoBrent --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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