On 18 Dec 2013, at 01:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/17/2013 4:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 3:55 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
I'll favor it as soon as it provides some surprising but
empirically true predictions - the same standard as for every other
What if in some alternate history Bruno's UDA came before
Everett's, and it provided a possible explanation of the appearance
of random collapse through FPI as seen within an infinite reality?
It would still be an explanation
- not a prediction.
Why? It is hardly harder to make a more testable theory. Physics is
given entirely by precise theories (the quantified _1* mathematics).
It is just my incompetence which slows down the progress, I'm afraid,
together with the lack of interests, nowadays, in the fundamental
questions, or something ...
I predicted in 1991 that such physics (comp + Theaetetus variants)
would be refuted before 2000. It is not yet refuted. It would be
astonishing that the first interview of the machine give the correct
physics. I have always thought that the hypostases are a bit too much
elegant to be entirely correct. Note that I have worked before on a
different and more complex way to implement them (with conditional
logic like Bp / p, or Bp / Dt, etc.) until I realized that it works
(only!) with the simple conjunction (Bp & p) Bp & Dt, etc.
To paraphrase Cantor, I see it, but don't (yet) believe in it. But it
is 100% testable/refutable, and plausibly improvable. But we have to
do the math to see that. Probably for the future generations.
Only one thing is sure: the primary physicalness hypothesis fails in
the comp frame, on the mind-body problem. Comp+theaetetus does not
fail on the mind-body problem, but still fails in providing the
"Hamiltonian". Much works remain to be done. It is the least we can say.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.