On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> > On 04 Jan 2014, at 16:36, Edgar L. Owen wrote: > > Pierz, > > It may not be "physics" by your definition but both the Present moment and > Consciousness are certainly part of reality, in fact they are basic aspects > of reality. > > Reality subsumes physics, if you want to define physics as just what is > mathematically describable. > > Not all of reality is mathematical, but it is all logical since its > computed. > > Obviously even a silicon software program is a logical structure but not > all of that logic is mathematical operations. > > > Logic is a branch of mathematics. Roughly, any other branch is equivalent > with logic (usually classical, but not always) + the non logical > supplementary axioms. > > For applied mathematics, we usually relate the axiom with facts that we > infer (or believe in for any reason), assuming some reality (to which the > axioms and consequence are supposed to be applied). > > For example, we all have a good intuition of the structure (N, +, *), and > we can axiomatize it by classical logic (= a set of axioms and inference > rules) + the supplementary axioms, in the language of first order logic, > with variables, with equality, union {0, s, +, *}: > > 0 ≠ s(x) > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y > x+0 = x > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > x*0=0 > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > If you accept Church thesis, computability is a purely mathematical > notion. Even an arithmetical notion, which means that you can define it in > that {0, s, +, *} language, and already prove something in that theory. > In fact that theory is "universal" with respect to computability. It is a > full complete programming language. It is not complete with respect to > provability, as no effective theory can be, by Gödel incompleteness. > > Not all reality is mathematical, indeed. This can be proved in the weak > comp theory I work on. The first person notion that we can associate to > machine escapes in some sense the "mathematical". But that escape itself is > mathematical. Mathematics cannot prove the existence of something non > mathematical, but it can prove that comp entails the existence of some > machine's attribute which are non mathematically definable by the machine, > yet "real" from the machine's point of view. > HERE COMP IS AT LEAST CONSISTENT WITH THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE, BOTH WEAK AND STRONG. Opps. Sorry for the caps. But perhaps they were meant to be, one of my superstitions, regarding at least my higher self. > > I propose an argument showing that IF your consciousness is invariant for > a substitution of your "brain" at some description level, (or any finite 3p > description you want) by a digital computer, THEN a weak form of > computationalism is incompatible with a weak form of physicalism. This can > be used to reduce the mind-body problem to a problem of justifying the > beliefs in a physical reality by the average universal number/machine. (I > identify machines with their number indice in some fixed universal > enumeration). > > I am agnostic about the existence of a primitive physical reality, but > "atheist" with respect to this when working in the computationalist theory. > > I have still no idea of what you assume. You seem to assume some physical > or psychological computational space, which makes not sense to any ideally > correct introspecting machines relatively to its most probable universal > implementations and neighbors. The + and * laws above describe already the > unique possible computational space, by the Church-Turing-Post thesis/law. > By its big but subtle redundancies, it defines in arithmetic a "matrix" of > "dreams" (computations seen in the 1p view), and the physical and > psychological realities develop from there, in a relative indexical way. > Computationalism can exploit computer science and mathematical logic to > justify such proposition, even constructively, making the comp theory > falsifiable (up to some technical nuances). > > Many physicists assume (not always consciously) a primitive physical > reality. Do you? It seems you said that you do not, but then how you define > term like moment, time, present moment, etc. And from what? It looks like > you take for granted some hybrid 1p and 3p notions. > You seem also to assume special relativity? What does that mean if you > don't assume some physics? > You talk often about something you call reality. Is not reality exactly > what we are searching and what we should not taken for granted? > > In "science" we start from what we agree on, if only momentarily, and > proceed. If not, there is no genuine attempt to communicate. > I hope you will succeed in clarifying your assumptions. I have still no > idea of your basic ontology. Keep in mind that with Church Thesis, or with > any known formal definitions, computation is a purely arithmetical notion. > You might keep in mind also that the arithmetical reality is vastly greater > than the "computable reality", but both interact/interfere in many relative > ways. > Bruno, If "arithmetic reality" is the 3rd-person static block-universe Platonic being, is then "computable reality" the dynamic first-person comp-matrix of numerous conscious beings and yet the "vastly greater "arithmetic reality"" may do the computations?? . Richard > > Bruno > > > > > > > Edgar > > > > On Saturday, January 4, 2014 4:04:17 AM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: >> >> It's hard to stop arguing with an irrational person, isn't it? I've >> already offered Edgar $100 to tell me any experiment that could be carried >> out to falsify or validate his "theory" (that two separated events occur in >> only one absolute order), but he immediately stopped talking to me. An >> unfalsifiable theory is not a scientific theory. And Edgar even admits his >> idea can't be rendered in mathematics ("like consciousness"). But >> *everything* in physics must be able to be rendered into numbers, or it >> just ain't physics. That's not the same as saying that only the >> quantifiable exists, but it does demarcate a clear boundary between physics >> and metaphysics. >> >> When Galileo showed theologians the mountains on the moon through his >> telescope, which "couldn't exist" according to doctrine at the time, >> because the moon had to be a perfect sphere, they invented ad hoc an >> "invisible substance" that filled all the craters to the exact tops of the >> mountains. Galileo agreed about the invisible substance, but said it was >> piled twice as high on top of the mountains as in the valleys! The >> invention of an ad hoc invisible, unmeasurable, unfalsifiable time >> dimension to rescue the universal present moment from relativity is a >> similarly disgraceful manouevre to that which the cardinals attempted in >> order to rescue their Aristotelian cosmos. >> >> So far the only evidence that Edgar can evince for his theory is that >> it's obvious to him. No maths. No suggested experiments. No means of >> measurement except by some hand-waving reference to the curvature of the >> universe (quote: "anyone know what that equation would be?" Sir, we have no >> idea what you're talking about! It's *your* theory!) No falsification >> possible except by fiat of Edgar Owen. Don't hold your breath. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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