On 11 Jan 2014, at 00:24, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 10:57, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor computing "the state of the universe". In fact there is no such universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the substitution level, on all computations going through our current state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although this is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type of reality. Everett confirms that such a computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the comp theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by numbers leading to a unique computable reality.

Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore out?

As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete output of the UD. In effect the UD must "finish" in order to have computed the world, which of course is an uncomputable output.

Eek! Of coruse it must, to have an infinity of computations...! Still, I suppose the UD has always finished, within Platonia.

The complete infinite execution is in "platonia", but it is infinite, and there is no output. It is finished in perhaps some metaphorical way, but that is misleading. The UD has no input, and no output, like a "universe".



But a computer, running for a large amount of time, running the UD, might still generate some experiences --- eventually --- surely?

I don't think it is wise to say that the UD generates experiences. It relativizes the consciousness in particular histories. By the 1p delay invariance we are infinitely distributed in the UD*, and that might play a role in consciousness, which, by being pure 1p, is associated to both the state and the infinitely many extensions in the UD.

Bruno






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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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