On Sunday, January 12, 2014 10:43:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jan 2014, at 14:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, January 12, 2014 5:41:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jan 2014, at 05:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > > RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014 > Consciousness as a State of Matter > Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014 > > Hi Folk, > Grrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr! > I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings > with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so > pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long > way from physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we > can see it for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk) see that the > so-called “science of consciousness” is > · the “the science of the scientific observer” > > > That's observation theory, not consciousness theories. > > > Observation is part of consciousness. Without consciousness there is no > observation. > > > It depends on what you mean by observation. For many purposes, observation > can be only an interaction. >
Nothing can "interact" without consciousness either. > that is enough to explain the wave collapse appearance from the SWE. > Now, observation can also be defined in a stringer sense involving > consciousness, I can agree. Yet, this does not permit a direct > identification of consciousness theory with observation theory. > It does if we question what observation really is other than consciousness. > > > > > > > > > · trying to explain observing with observations > > > Of course you need logic, ans some assumption on the mind (like > computationalism assume mind to be invariant for Turing simulation). > > > Since observation is part of consciousness, > > > OK, for some sense of observation. But there are many use of "observation" > which do not require consciousness. > Those uses are metaphorical. There can be no literal observation, detection, signaling, i/o etc of any kind without a sensory-motive capacity. The only legitimate confusion in my mind is that it is not necessarily intuitive to realize that low level types of sensation do not necessarily scale up to higher levels - it is higher levels which can be masked and throttled to appear low. > > > > he is pointing out that trying to explain consciousness without > recognizing that all evidence of it comes from consciousness is circular > reasoning. > > > But nobody tries to negate that! Obviously consciousness requires > consciousness to be part of the evidence. > Not if you invent types of unconscious "observation". > The same occurs for matter. But from this you cannot conclude that > consciousness or matter have to be primitively assumed in the theory. That > would be circular. > I don't see anything circular about assuming that awareness is primitive. > > > > Whether or not we need assumptions for our theories is not relevant to the > ontology of consciousness. > > > ? > Reality doesn't have to be convenient for our theoretical expectations. > > > > > > > > > · trying to explain experience with experiences > > > Well, at some level, we can't avoid that, but the experience are extended > into testable theories. > > > Tests and theories are experiences. > > > > You confuse a theory, with the experience of a theory. > You confuse a theory with the non-experience of a theory. > > > > > > > > > > · trying to explain how scientists do science. > > > In some theoretical frame. yes, "meta-science" can be handled > scientifically (= modestly). > > > > But consciousness ≠ modesty or science. > > > Sure. Nobody said that. A theory of consciousness does not need to be > conscious. > A theory of consciousness needs to reflect the actual nature of consciousness, not the nature of theory. > > > > > > > > > · a science of scientific behaviour. > · Descriptive and never explanatory. > > > You overgeneralize. That is the case of physics, but not of > meta-mathematics in the comp frame. I recall to you that computationalism > is incompatible with physicalism. > > > Why is meta-mathematics in comp more explanatory? > > > > Meta-mathematics explains how machine can be aware (in some variate > senses) of their own limitations, in both the ability to justify some > guess, and to express some lived experience. > But that doesn't explain experience, only that given experience and beliefs, mathematics can model the dynamics of trivial self reference. > > > > > > > > > · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of > nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality... > > > That's partly wrong, partly correct. > > > That's partly information about an opinion, mostly cryptic. > > > It was correct, because consciousness does not tell anything per se about > the reality, except for itself. > Reality is an expectation within consciousness. There can be contact with any reality other than what consciousness presents directly or indirectly. It was not correct, because a *theory* of consciousness can have verifiable > aspects, and so, if they are refuted we *might* learn something about > reality, in some local revisable way. > Verifiable to consciousness only though. This is what the whole post is about - denying the role of consciousness in science, in 'verification' and 'observation'. Logic cannot look at all of consciousness because logic is part of consciousness. > > > > > > > > > · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever > ever questioning that. > > > ? > That's fuzz > > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.