Dear Jason,

  Let's try to be a bit more formal. Interleaving.


On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:32 AM, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com>
> wrote:
>
> Dear Jason,
>
>   I see a flaw in your argument.
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch < <jasonre...@gmail.com>
> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King <<stephe...@provensecure.com>
>> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Jason,
>>
>>   Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-zombies? I
>> have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your
>> reasoning.
>>
>>
>> Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some
>> unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself to
>> be lying, and even though it has all the same informational patterns in
>> it's brain at the time.
>>
>
> What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying?
>
>
> What it always means, to speak an untruth, to deceive.
>

Does my car lie to me when the gas gage points at empty and there is still
gas in the tank? To "deceive" requires intent and thus some implicit notion
of personhood that is unavalable by definition to s p-zombie.



>
> Note all these arguments become stronger if you use "zimboes", which have
> beliefs but are not conscious.
>
> I see no reason why a zombie could not have a belief given that their
> brains contain all necessary information.
>


You are using what is to me strange definition of "belief". In the example
of the lying car gas gauge above, is the direction of the pointer a
"belief" in your thinking?

>
> It cannot lie by definition!
>
>
> What is your definition of lie?
>

The intensional representation of a statement as something that it is not;
misrepresentation. How can a physical system represent itself as
something that it is not? Is an ant that mimics the morphology of a wasp
"lying"?

>
>
> what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model that is pat
> of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have an "I" (model)
> that is making untrue claims.
>
>
> Whether or not it has an I model it is making untrue claims which I
> consider  suffi ent to call lying.
>

Without a self-model that is the referent of "the one who is telling the
lie", I cannot see how an intentional act can obtain. A physical system is
what it is, at least in classical physics... It cannot lie and thus the
notion of a p-zombie is incoherent.



>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball without
>> seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person measurable
>> description of what seeing involves.  The information went into it's brain,
>> spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to catch the ball, was
>> stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the ball his brain recalls
>> the information that it did, again, for some reason it is lying, since
>> zombies cannot see.
>>
>
> What about this, does seeing without seeing make sense logically to you?
>

Not if we parse the meaning of the word "seeing" literally. This is an
interesting topic for me as I still recall the statement in Umberto
Echo's book on Semeotics about how communication is impossible for an
entity that cannot lie. The reasoning is that the act of languaging is to
use representations of objects, which are by definition *not the object
itself", to communicate about objects. When we say, "I see a tree", one is
actually lying for one does not percieve the word "tree", one perceives
what the word "tree" represents and thus is lying in the strict sense of
the definition of a lie: To deceive.

>
>
>
>> Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have
>> their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
>> epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on consciousness
>> and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They have classes on
>> consciousness and mailing list discussions about zombies.  Yet all this, is
>> supposed to be a product of things that never once were conscious!
>>
>> That's why I find them so doubtful.
>>
>
> I would agree that Dennett is a p-zombie... LOL! He is unaware,
> intentionally?, that he is lying.
>
>
> So what causes zombies to write about and discuss consciousness?
>

LOL, it was ironic invective. Have you no sense of humor?



>
> To me this is like descartes in reverse, you are ascribing causes to
> something which is not there. And hence is not physical. It has the same
> problems as epiphenominalism.
>

Numbers "are not there" and yet they have kickability. I think that thou
dost protest too much!



>
> Jason
>
>
>
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch < 
>> <jasonre...@gmail.com><jasonre...@gmail.com>
>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou < 
>>> <stath...@gmail.com><stath...@gmail.com>
>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch < 
>>> <jasonre...@gmail.com><jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
>>>>> Intel
>>>>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
>>>>> that a
>>>>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>>>>> certainly
>>>>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that
>>>>> a
>>>>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
>>>>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Jason
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>>>> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
>>>> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
>>>> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
>>>> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>>>> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>>>> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
>>>> using a computer.
>>>>
>>>
>>> How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that
>>> philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>  The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
>>>> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
>>>> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
>>>> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
>>>> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
>>>> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Kindest Regards,
>>
>> Stephen Paul King
>>
>> Senior Researcher
>>
>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>>
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> --
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> Kindest Regards,
>
> Stephen Paul King
>
> Senior Researcher
>
> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
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-- 

Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher

Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/


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