On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Stephen Paul King <
stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:

> Dear Jason,
>
>   Let's try to be a bit more formal. Interleaving.
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Jan 16, 2014, at 9:32 AM, Stephen Paul King <
>> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Jason,
>>
>>   I see a flaw in your argument.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Jason Resch < <jasonre...@gmail.com>
>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King <<stephe...@provensecure.com>
>>> stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Dear Jason,
>>>
>>>   Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p-zombies? I
>>> have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your
>>> reasoning.
>>>
>>>
>>> Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some
>>> unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself to
>>> be lying, and even though it has all the same informational patterns in
>>> it's brain at the time.
>>>
>>
>> What exactly does it mean to say that a zombie is lying?
>>
>>
>> What it always means, to speak an untruth, to deceive.
>>
>
> Does my car lie to me when the gas gage points at empty and there is still
> gas in the tank? To "deceive" requires intent and thus some implicit notion
> of personhood that is unavalable by definition to s p-zombie.
>
>
When a zombie solves a riddle, is it not thinking? When it adds two numbers
together, is it not calculating? I don't see how you can say these words
stop having any meaning to zombies just because you say something about
them (which only they can see) is absent. If you need to twist the meaning
of language to preserve the notion of zombie I think that indicates the
notion of a zombie is not logical or well thought out.


>
>
>>
>> Note all these arguments become stronger if you use "zimboes", which have
>> beliefs but are not conscious.
>>
>> I see no reason why a zombie could not have a belief given that their
>> brains contain all necessary information.
>>
>
>
> You are using what is to me strange definition of "belief". In the example
> of the lying car gas gauge above, is the direction of the pointer a
> "belief" in your thinking?
>
>>
>> It cannot lie by definition!
>>
>>
>> What is your definition of lie?
>>
>
> The intensional representation of a statement as something that it is not;
> misrepresentation. How can a physical system represent itself as something
> that it is not? Is an ant that mimics the morphology of a wasp "lying"?
>

So why can't zombies have intentions? Remember the only thing zombies
supposedly lack is qualia. If a zombie is hungry and goes out to buy a
burger, I would say it had an intention to fill its stomach.


>
>>
>> what makes it a zombie is that, at least, it has no self-model that is
>> pat of its computations. It cannot lie because it does not have an "I"
>> (model) that is making untrue claims.
>>
>>
>> Whether or not it has an I model it is making untrue claims which I
>> consider  suffi ent to call lying.
>>
>
> Without a self-model that is the referent of "the one who is telling the
> lie", I cannot see how an intentional act can obtain. A physical system is
> what it is, at least in classical physics... It cannot lie and thus the
> notion of a p-zombie is incoherent.
>

Right, I agree p-zombies are incoherent and not logically possible.



>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball
>>> without seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person measurable
>>> description of what seeing involves.  The information went into it's brain,
>>> spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to catch the ball, was
>>> stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the ball his brain recalls
>>> the information that it did, again, for some reason it is lying, since
>>> zombies cannot see.
>>>
>>
>> What about this, does seeing without seeing make sense logically to you?
>>
>
> Not if we parse the meaning of the word "seeing" literally.
>

Again we must redefine words in the name of zombies making sense..


> This is an interesting topic for me as I still recall the statement in
> Umberto Echo's book on Semeotics about how communication is impossible for
> an entity that cannot lie. The reasoning is that the act of languaging is
> to use representations of objects, which are by definition *not the object
> itself", to communicate about objects. When we say, "I see a tree", one is
> actually lying for one does not percieve the word "tree",
>

Then there is no third person way of ever knowing if someone is
communicating with you or not, since there is no third person way to know
if anyone is a zombie or not. For all you know, you have been a zombie all
your life until right now, and all your previous e-mails contain zero
information content.


> one perceives what the word "tree" represents and thus is lying in the
> strict sense of the definition of a lie: To deceive.
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have
>>> their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism,
>>> epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on consciousness
>>> and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They have classes on
>>> consciousness and mailing list discussions about zombies.  Yet all this, is
>>> supposed to be a product of things that never once were conscious!
>>>
>>> That's why I find them so doubtful.
>>>
>>
>> I would agree that Dennett is a p-zombie... LOL! He is unaware,
>> intentionally?, that he is lying.
>>
>>
>> So what causes zombies to write about and discuss consciousness?
>>
>
> LOL, it was ironic invective. Have you no sense of humor?
>
>
I am not replying to your comment on Dennett, but was looking for a
response to the idea of a planet full of zombies and what causes them to
write books about consciousness?


>
>
>>
>> To me this is like descartes in reverse, you are ascribing causes to
>> something which is not there. And hence is not physical. It has the same
>> problems as epiphenominalism.
>>
>
> Numbers "are not there" and yet they have kickability. I think that thou
> dost protest too much!
>

Give me a compelling answer to why zombies write books about consciousness
and I will have to concede that zombies may be possible.

Jason


>
>
>
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch < 
>>> <jasonre...@gmail.com><jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou < 
>>>> <stath...@gmail.com><stath...@gmail.com>
>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch < 
>>>> <jasonre...@gmail.com><jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>>>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
>>>>>> Intel
>>>>>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
>>>>>> that a
>>>>>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
>>>>>> that a
>>>>>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
>>>>>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jason
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>>>>> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
>>>>> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
>>>>> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
>>>>> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>>>>> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>>>>> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
>>>>> using a computer.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How does this follow? Personally I don't find the notion that
>>>> philosophical zombies make logical sense at all.
>>>>
>>>> Jason
>>>>
>>>>  The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
>>>>> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
>>>>> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
>>>>> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
>>>>> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
>>>>> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> Kindest Regards,
>>>
>>> Stephen Paul King
>>>
>>> Senior Researcher
>>>
>>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
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>> Kindest Regards,
>>
>> Stephen Paul King
>>
>> Senior Researcher
>>
>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>>
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>
>
>
> --
>
> Kindest Regards,
>
> Stephen Paul King
>
> Senior Researcher
>
> Mobile: (864) 567-3099
>
> stephe...@provensecure.com
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>  http://www.provensecure.us/
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