On 16 Jan 2014, at 16:11, Jason Resch wrote:

On Jan 16, 2014, at 8:41 AM, Stephen Paul King <stephe...@provensecure.com > wrote:

Dear Jason,

Could you be more specific about why you are skeptical of p- zombies? I have my reasons to disbelieve in them, but I am curious as to your reasoning.

Ask a zombie if it is conscious, and it will say yes. For some unexplianed reason it is lying, even though it does not believe itself to be lying, and even though it has all the same informational patterns in it's brain at the time.

Throw a ball to a zombie and have it catch it. It caught the ball without seeing it, even though it saw it by every third person measurable description of what seeing involves. The information went into it's brain, spread to other parts of it's brain, was used to catch the ball, was stored, and when you ask the zombie if he saw the ball his brain recalls the information that it did, again, for some reason it is lying, since zombies cannot see.

Finally consider a world where everyone is a zombie. They still have their Descartes and dennett, their mystics, theories of dualism, epiphrnominalism, functionalism and so on. They have books on consciousness and thought experiments like inverted qualia. They have classes on consciousness and mailing list discussions about zombies. Yet all this, is supposed to be a product of things that never once were conscious!

That's why I find them so doubtful.

I agree that zombies do not make a lot of sense ... assuming comp. But if we forget all assumptions, the concept of zombie makes logical sense. It is someone behaving like you and me, but which happens to lack consciousness. I think your argument is build on the comp intuition pump. You find the notion of zombie doubtful, because you find non-comp doubtful, OK?



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