On 1/23/2014 1:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/22/2014 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical
ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which
suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true
in ultrafinitism).
Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless.
How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on
finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers?
We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and indeed all known
laws seems to be computable (except the "collapse"). I guess it makes sense in most case.
I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom
system.
Because you reify reality,
LOL! I'm reminded of what Sidney Morgenbesser said to B. F. Skinner, "Let me see if I
understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't athropomorphize people?"
I meant that the meaning of theories is brought by the theories already present in the
brain (generalized or not). If not you reify reality, meaning, and this in a way which,
when assuming comp, looks like magic.
an put the meaning there. But we can't do that when working on the mind-body problem,
so we need a mathematical notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician
sense) plays that role.
That's a point where I disagree with you. We can work on the mind body problem by
creating intelligent machines and when we have created them we will infer that they
have minds just as we infer other people have minds (nobody really believes in
p-zombies) and we will learn to engineer those minds.
We don't believe in human p-zombie. For robots, many would argue that they are zombie,
by construction.
Then, the "constructing AI" and the mind-body problem will be solved by itself, can only
solve the "easy problem", that is not the mind-body problem, which needs to justify the
bodies without assuming them.
Note that there were people who tried an axiomatic approach to defining life - and it
led nowhere, while people working laboratories with x-ray crystallography and
stick-and-ball models discovered the double-helix.
Right. defining "life" does not make sense. Biology is "easy". It is not confronted to
the hard problem, where the 3p complete explanation seems to evacuate the 1p person.
Comp reduces completely this problem by reducing physics to number's
psychology/theology. If not, let us isolate the flaw in the argument.
Theorizing has it's place. Molecular biology was really inspired by a lecture that
Erwin Schroedinger gave (and later expanded into his book, "What is Life") and which
pointed to some of the basic characteristic the chemistry and physics of life must
have. And one its contributions was to emphasize there was no need for magic, no elan
vital. I see computationalism playing a similar role in the study of consciousness.
But just like molecular didn't so much solve the problem of life as dissolve it, I
expect something similar to happen in the study of consciousness.
In the case of consciousness, such dissolution will corresponds to Dennett kind of
explaining the subject away. In biology, we can do everything in the 3p (the 1p plural,
actually, with comp). But for consciousness, the 1p is not reducible. Now, that problem
is solved by ... the oldest solution we have: Theaetetus. The universal and Löbian
machine can refute Socrate's refutation of Theaetetus. All critics of that definition
contains a confusion of two arithmetical hypostases, in the comp frame. We do have made
progresses.
That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question.
It's not an empirical question in Platonia, but in the real world (which I reify :-) )
it is: One raindrop plus one raindrop makes one raindrop. The set of the swim team
with cardinality four plus the set of the basketball team with cardinality twelve is a
set with cardinality 14.
If you believe that 1+1=1, you are in trouble.
That one drop added on one drop give one drop is not a refutation of the arithmetical
statement that 1+1=2. It is a misapplication of a theory in a context which the theory
does not handled.
Exactly my point. And the context where is *does* apply, where it is *not* an empirical
question, is in our language and Platonia.
You can refute the theory of group by showing that (N +) is not a group.
That's bad philosophy, I am afraid, Brent. Come on!
It is a truth, out of space and time, which is true in all models of RA, or PA, or ZF,
etc.
Yes, it's a truth of language;
Not at all. It has nothing to do with language. A computation stops or not in
arithmetic, independently of languages, theories, person and universe.
Only the idealized computations of Turing. Computations in my computer always
stop.
of course you need to agree on the addition table and multiplication table to even just
define what a computation is; but that's all, and any other Turing complete structure
woould do, with the same machines stopping, or not stopping.
Of course, if there is a bigger natural number, none of this make sense. The remedy
seems worst than the disease here.
a rule we made up about the meaning of "successor" and "equal" etc, that is a good
theory of countable things.
And that's all what comp need.
I think it also needs to know what are countable things. When the doctor makes your
prosthetic neuron he needs to know what the connecting neurons are going to count.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
