On 1 February 2014 06:16, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 30 Jan 2014, at 21:44, LizR wrote: > > On 30 January 2014 22:44, Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Meanwhile - back at the ranch: >> >> Tegmark wants to think of consciousness as - wait for it - a state of >> matter. This is very confusing. He is just making this up as he goes along, >> I'm afraid... >> >> I think to be fair he wants to work out the properties of conscious > matter, e.g. (by assumption) brains, which is in line with the SF idea of > "computronium" (assuming consciousness is in some sense a computation). > > ? > Assuming consciousness is related (and preserved) through computation, > assumes computer, that is Church thesis. > > What is a computronium? >
SF-y stuff that operates as a general purpose computer at or near the Landaur limit. > > I share with Kim that Tegmark is well erring from his previous work, > contradictiing his own previous mathematicalism, and succumbing to the > identity of of what we don't understand (like many use of the quantum in > consciousness). > Ah. Maybe I am being misled by the fact that I rather like Max :) But he allows himself one "mad" paper for every 10 "sane" ones, so maybe he doesn't actually think this is a likely idea, maybe he just had an idea and pursued it to see if it led anywhere. I can sympathise, that is how I produce my cryptic crosswords - they drag me along kicking and screaming until I publish them. Writing can do the same at times, but it's a longer process, more time for reflection... > > It contradicts his own analysis of the brain, as a hot non quantum machine. > Ah. Did he say the brain does quantum stuff (above and beyond the usual) ? OK that is a contradiction. > And its still ignores the comp constraints on the mind-brain identity > thesis. > > There might be interesting insights, but all in all, it looks like a > regression from the comp, or even just his mathematicalist picture. A > priori. > > Hmm. > Which isn't a completely flakey idea, because we already have > "computronium" to some extent. > > We do have universal computer, yes. With Church thesis. > > He's stating that assumption up front, at least in the paper I read > recently, and just seeing what follows. > > (Also, Tegmark's previous definition of consciousness was "what > information feels like when it's being processed" which is in line with > this approach, so he isn't making it up 100%) > > It is the materialist approach. It uses infinities not affordable by a > comp theory. And in that paper, he use quantum information, which is > something else? The term "information" should be banned, as people abuse of > it a lot. I have that feeling sometime. It is a term which equivocates the > 1p and 3p meaning. It looks serious thanks to the Shannon 3p meaning, and > it looks "mental" because of its 1p meaning, which is related to some > understanding. > It creeps in everywhere. Thermodynamics. Black hole information paradox. Yet as Brent says the total amount in the universe never changes. > If he can show how physical supervenience works, he could even be onto > something. > > Surely! But I am not sure he even address the question. The very notion of > "conscious matter" seems to elude the question, it seems to me. > Yes, he is obviously just assuming that it can be sorted out without questioning it. But maybe he contradicts himself. I don't know. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
